Iran-Iraq War Timeline

[Note: This chronology is intended to provide a detailed, though by no means comprehensive,
road map to events relating to the Iran-Iraq war. The entries derive primarily from U.S. media
accounts as well as from declassified documents.]

6 March 1975- The Algiers Accords is signed. Saddam Hussein gives partial control of
the Shatt al-Arab waterway to a militarily superior Iran. In return, the Shah promises to
respect Iraq’s security and stop Iranian aid to Iraqi-based Kurdish rebels.

16 January 1979- The Shah and his family are forced into exile.

1 February 1979- Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran following 14 years of exile in Iraq
and France.

August 1979- Iraqi authorities invite Mehdi Bazargan, the first Prime Minister of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, to visit Baghdad. This meeting is intended to improve bilateral
. relations between the two countries.

4 November 1979- The U.S. embassy in Tehran is overrun and 66 Americans are taken
hostage. The crisis lasts until January 20, 1981, when Iran releases the remaining 52
Americans. Among other outcomes, the event leads to the resignation of Prime Minister
Mehdi Bazargan and his government. Bazargan is later accused of plotting the overthrow
of the Islamic Republic—with the help of the Iraqi regime.

8 February 1980- Saddam Hussein proposes a pan-Arab charter calling for a
“nonaligned” Arab world and opposing the presence of either superpower in the region.
Aside from being an attempt to place Iraq at the center of a new Arab coalition, the move
is seen as part of Hussein’s determination to resist Soviet expansionism after the invasion
of Afghanistan.

April 1980- The Iranian-backed militia group Al-Dawa attempts to assassinate Iraqi
Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. Shortly after this failed assassination attempt, the group
tries to kill Latif Nusseif al-Jasim, the Iraq Minister of Culture and Information. Iraq
responds by immediately rounding up members and supporters of Al-Dawa in Iraq, and
deporting thousands of Iraqi Shiites to Iran.

7 April 1980- Iran puts its armed forces on “full alert,” declaring this is in response to
repeated Iraqi attacks on oil and other facilities near the border between the two
countries.

8 April 1980— Khomeini broadcasts a speech in which he calls on the Iraqi people to
“wake up and topple this corrupt regime in your Islamic country before it is too late.” An

* This chronology was prepared by Devin Kennington, Joyce Battle and Malcolm Byme. Kari Mirkin and
Magdalena Klotzbach provided copy-editing assistance.

article in The Washington Post observes that relations appear to be moving “closer to ©
open warfare.” The Post article cites intelligence estimates pointing out that Iran’s armed

forces are in a vulnerable position, and quotes an unnamed U.S. military analyst as

saying, “I’d put my bet on the Iraqis now. Iran is totally shattered.”

17 April 1980- In the last of a series of steps designed to block most transactions with
Iran since the U.S. embassy seizure in November 1979, President Carter prohibits all
financial transactions, imports from and travel to and from Iran. He also impounds all
military materiel previously under order from Tehran.

25 April 1980- A covert U.S. attempt to rescue hostages in Tehran ends in flames in
Tabas, Iran. Some Iranians fear the real purpose of the operation was to overthrow the
Islamic regime. Carter Administration officials immediately begin planning a second
rescue operation but never carry it out. .

Summer 1980- Saddam Hussein orders the execution of Al-Dawa leader Ayatollah
Sayyid Muhammad Bagir al-Sadr.

4 September 1980- Using long-range artillery fire Iran begins shelling Iraqi border
towns. Iraq considers this the beginning of the war.

17 September 1980- Iraq abrogates the 1975 Algiers Accord signed with Iran.

22 September 1980- The Iraqi military launches a two-pronged attack against Iran. A
10,000-man force from Basra invades southern Iran with the goal of laying siege to the
Iranian air base at Dezful. Iraq also sends formations of MiG-23s and MiG-21s to attack
other Iranian air bases with the goal of preventing an Iranian counter-attack. These
attacks largely fail, however, and within hours Iranian F-4 Phantom jets take off from the
same bases and proceed to bomb strategic targets within Iraq.

Farther north, a second front is launched from Baghdad straight into the central
provinces of Iran by an Iraqi mechanized mountain infantry division. This movement is
designed to put immediate pressure on Tehran. Iraq’s initial attack succeeds in capturing
several hundred square kilometers of Iranian territory, destroying the oil refinery at
Abadan, and laying siege to the Iranian city of Mehran.

22 September 1980- The Overseas and Defense Committee of the British cabinet
discusses how to enter “Iraq’s lucrative arms market.”

23 September 1980- Iran responds to the Iraqi invasion by bombing military and
economic targets in Iraq.

30 September 1980- Iranian F-4 Phantom jets reportedly bomb the Osirak (Tammuz)
nuclear reactor while on a raid targeting a conventional electric power plant near
Baghdad. The attack causes minimal damage to the reactor dome, which is still under
construction at this time. Iran denies bombing the site.

30 September 1980- During discussions with Italy's foreign minister, Secretary of State
Edmund Muskie remarks that the best channel for communications to Iraq, aside from
Muslim countries, could be Italy. He indicates that, although the U.S. can re ach Iraq, it
has to be careful because of the hostages and "Iran's accusation that we favor Iraq."

30 September 1980- During discussions with Italy's foreign minister, Secretary of State
Muskie reports that the Soviets turned down an Iraqi request for additional military
supplies: "no air or sea response to Iraq's needs has yet been forthcoming."

Late-September 1980- Iranian armed forces begin shelling the Kurdish stronghold of
Mahabad killing an estimated 325 Kurdish civilians.

Mid-October 1980- Some Iraqi troops advance towards the strategic oil fields of Abadan
while others move towards Ahvaz, the provincial capital and site of a crucial Iranian air
base. Backed by long-range artillery fire the Iraqis advance almost eighty kilometers
during the first few days of the attack. In the battle for Dezful, an Iranian general
requests air support leading President Bani Sadr to release many Iranian pilots still loyal
to the Shah from jail. They come to the aid of Iranian ground forces largely curtailing
any further Iraqi advances into Iranian territory.

3 November 1980- Iraqi forces finally reach the city of Abadan but once there are beaten
back by a smal] Pasdaran unit. Iraqi troops then surround the city on three sides but are
still unable to overcome local resistance.

7 November 1980- Iranian commando units attack Iraqi oil export terminals at Mina al-
Bakr and al-Faw.

10 November 1980- Irag captures Khorramshahr but loses over 6,000 troops while
Iranian casualties are even higher. Soon after their costly victory, Iraqi troops begin to
dig in and slow their advance into Iranian territory.

2 December 1980- Saddam Hussein accuses the U.S. of supporting “Iran’s ‘aggression’
against Iraq.”

26 December 1980- Saddam Hussein says that the Iraqi front-line will be the new
military border between the two countries until the war is over. Hussein also rules out a
withdrawal until Iran accepts full Iraqi control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway as well as
self-rule by the ethnic Arab population in Southwestern Iran.

1981

3 January 1981- Members of the Iranian Majlis accuse President Bani Sadr of
inefficiently directing the Iranian war effort and allowing Iran’s main oil centers to be
crushed by Iraqi forces. Parliament members claim that between 20-30 Iranians are being
killed each day in the southern province of Khuzestan by Iraq’s around-the-clock shelling
of the region.

4 January 1981- Iran alleges that it has destroyed 500 Iraqi oil centers, military bases,
airports and other strategic targets since the war began. The country also claims to have
“ruined Iraq’s oil industry.”

5 January 1981- Iranian President Bani Sadr announces that he has ordered his country
to begin a counter offensive against Iraq using both Basji volunteers (The People’s
Army) and regular armed forces.

6 January 1981- The war intensifies with Iran claiming they have killed around 550
Iraqis and captured another 1,700 in two battles. Iraq, however, charges that Iranians are
retreating, leaving behind 381 dead Iranian solders, “a large number of weapons,
equipment and tanks, destroyed and in good condition, as well as prisoners.”

10 January 1981- Tehran accuses Iraq of using napalm and chemical bombs against the
city of Ahyaz in Southern Iran.

10 January 1981- Iraq declares they have crushed a major Iranian offensive in five days
of fighting along the southern front, killing 450 Iranians, shooting down three Iranian ~
fighter-bombers, and capturing over 50 of Iran’s U.S.-made M-60 Tanks. This was
claimed to have been the largest tank battle in the Middle East since the 1973 War.

16 January 1981- United Nations Special Envoy Olof Palme, a former Swedish prime
minister, visits both Tehran and Baghdad in an attempt to bring the conflict to a peaceful
conclusion.

18 January 1981- Saddam Hussein alleges that Iran has been getting American arms and
spare parts from private markets despite the U.S. embargo. Meanwhile, U.N. Special
Envoy Olof Palme warns of potential superpower involvement in what has been, up until
this point, a strictly regional conflict.

20 January 1981- After 444 days, the last 52 American hostages depart Iran, on the same
day that Ronald Reagan becomes the 40™ U.S. president.

26 January 1981- The Kurdish guerilla group Pesh Merga, based in Northwest Iran,
reportedly begins attacks on Iranian forces using Soviet-made Kalashnikovs and U.S.
designed M16 rifles. Iraq claims they have no role in coordinating the Iranian-based
Kurdish resistance.

1 February 1981- A Lebanese newspaper reports that Iraq has received 60 Mirage F1
fighter jets from France despite France’s professed neutrality in the Iran-Iraq conflict.
This is to be the first of four French shipments of the jet to Iraqi forces.

3 February 1981- A senior member of Iraq’s Revolutionary Command Council claims
the Soviet Union has ceased weapon deliveries to Iraq.

The National Security Archive

The George Washmugton Urtiversity

Dear Conference Participants,

We are pleased to present to you this document reader, intended to facilitate the
discussions at the upcoming conference “The Origins, Conduct, and Impact of the
Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988,” to be held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars in Washington, DC, 19-20 July 2004. The volume consists of declassified US
government documents which, we hope, will provide context, shed new light, and
stimulate discussion on important issues.

This collection, the product of extensive research by staff at the National Security
Archive and the Cold War International History Project, does not attempt to be
comprehensive and, in many ways, merely touches the surface. In selecting the
documents, the editors have made every effort to include the most significant records that
have so far been declassified. Many other crucial documents remain classified.

We would like to thank all those who helped us during the research and editing process
by contributing time, effort, and expertise. At the National Security Archive, special
acknowledgement goes to Joyce Battle, editor of the Archive’s Iraqgate microfiche
collection (Chadwyck-Healey, 1995), and author of many of the Freedom of Information
Act requests that produced a number of the documents here. Svetlana Savranskaya
provided expertise in Soviet policy and extensive contacts in Moscow. Magdalena
Klotzbach carried out a variety of research and editing tasks, including exploring the
Polish archives in Warsaw. At the Woodrow Wilson Center, deputy director Michael
Van Dusen, Division of International Studies director Robert Litwak, Middle East
Program director Haleh Esfandiari, Senior Policy Scholar Ambassador William Miller,
Jillian Frumkin, and the CWIHP team—NMircea Munteanu, Martha “Dee” Beutel, and
CWIHP research assistant Kari Mirkin—played important roles in securing the necessary
funding, organizing the conference, and researching and compiling this reader. CWIHP
research assistant Devin Kennington was instrumental in compiling the timeline included
at the beginning of the reader.

This reader and the conference would not have been possible without the generous
support of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the Open Society
Institute, and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

Malcolm Byrne
Christian F. Ostermann

3 February 1981- Iran reports that it has killed over 200 Kurdish insurgents at a battle
near the city of Mahabad. Meanwhile, Iran’s Chief of Staff, Valiollah Fallahi, says that
the Iranian counter offensive against Iraq forces initiated in early January 1981 has so far
pushed the Iraqi forces back 20 miles.

4 February 1981- Citing unnamed London-based diplomatic sources, The New York
Times reports that around 100 Soviet-made T-54 and T-55 tanks shipped from Eastern
Europe have been unloaded at Saudi ports with the intention of being shipped to Iraq.
This comes amid complaints by Iran that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the
UAE are financing the Iraqi war effort.

5 February 1981- Britain rejects requests from both Iraq and Iran for British military
equipment.

9 February 1981- Both Iran and Iraq agree to a visit by Islamic leaders looking to forge
an Islamic peace initiative to end the Iran-Iraq war.

11 February 1981- The Iranian delegation walks out of the conference of the non-
aligned movement as Iraqi Foreign Minister Saadoun Hammadi offers Iran a cease-fire
saying that Iraq is ready to end the 5-month-old conflict. Iran had previously been asking
the non-aligned movement to call for the expulsion of Iraq.

17 February 1981- Olof Palme sets out on his third trip to Iran and Iraq carrying specific
proposals for a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement of the war.

22 February 1981- Palme leaves Iran after his attempts at providing a peaceful
settlement to the conflict fail. Iranian leaders insist that there will be no cease-fire while
Iraqi troops are on Iranian soil.

26 February 1981- Iraq resumes pumping oil through its 550-mile pipeline that runs
from Kirkuk, through Syria, to the Mediterranean. Iraqi oil has been cut off twice since
the war began in September 1980.

28 February 1981- A high-level Islamic peace mission arrives in Tehran in an attempt to
end the conflict. Iran, however, will not negotiate an end to the war until Iraqi troops
withdraw from Iranian territory.

4 March 1981- The Islamic peace mission presents a detailed proposal for a cease-fire
calling for the disengagement of the opposing troops, the deployment of a joint Islamic
military force, and, finally, negotiations. However, the plan is immediately rejected in
both Baghdad and Tehran.

4 March 1981- The Italian government authorizes the export to Iraq of 11 naval vessels
and a floating dock worth more than $1.8 billion.

7 March 1981- Iran’s Supreme Defense Council officially rejects the proposals for a
cease-fire and negotiated settlement with Iraq. Baghdad responds by immediately
stepping up military action against Iran. Iraqi planes begin bombing the town of Ilam
killing four people and wounding 70. There are also reports that the Soviet made Frog-7
surface-to-surface missile hit an oil refinery in the province of Khuzestan.

12 March 1981- Representatives of the Islamic mission that had tried to bring an end to
the conflict say that it has failed.

14 March 1981-Cuba’s foreign minister, Isidoro Malmierca Peoli, arrives in Beirut
leading an attempt by the non-aligned bloc to bring an end to the Iran-Iraq war.

16 March 1981- The Wall Street Journal reports that Iraq is threatening to exploit
political rifts within Iran between the country’s fundamentalist clergy and moderate
President Bani Sadr in an attempt to “dismember” the Iranian government. In a speech
given the previous night, Saddam Hussein warned that unless Iran agrees to a cease-fire,
Iraq will provide assistance to dissident Iranians.

18 March 1981- Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA) tells The Christian Science Monitor that
Iraq “is making an all out effort to acquire the ability to make nuclear weapons.”

19 March 1981- A massive artillery battle breaks out close to Qasr-I-Shirin, northwest of
Gilan in Iran. Iranian forces claim they have recaptured the highest points from the
enemy, while Iraq alleges that 124 Iranians and 17 Iraqis were killed in the last 24 hours
of fighting.

23 March 1981- The speaker of Iran’s parliament, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, says
that his country will not accept a cease-fire until the government of Saddam Hussein is
overthrown. ;

26 March 1981- The Iranian military claims that it has taken an observation post at
Koukalan two and a half miles inside Iraqi territory. The New York Times also reports
that there are signs that ethnic minorities inside Iran are close to an open rebellion.

27 March 1981- The Islamic peace movement begins its second attempt to negotiate a
peaceful resolution to the Iran-Iraq conflict.

31 March 1981- A State Department cable reports that President Anwar Sadat confirms
that Egypt has supplied military equipment to Iraq, after being asked to do so by a "third

party.”

4-5 April 1981- Iran’s dominant Islamic Republican Party says that it can only hold talks
with an Iraqi government “based on the will of the Iraqi people, ‘not the present
treacherous rulers of Baghdad.”” Iranian jet fighters also bombed four air bases deep
inside Iraqi territory destroying a number of Tupolev bombers.

4 April 1981- In preparation for Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Morris Draper's visit
to Baghdad the following week, William Eagleton (head of the U.S. Interests Section in
Iraq) states that "we now have a greater convergence of interests with Iraq than at any
time since the revolution of 1958 .. . on Iran our views largely converge." In public
comments, Draper says that he sees no likelihood the two countries will reestablish
relations in the near future.

8 April 1981- In a message to Iraqi Foreign Minister Saadoun Hammadi, delivered by
Morris Draper in Baghdad, Secretary of State Alexander Haig declares that the U.S.
considers Iraq an important country with influence in the region, and indicates that he
hopes to meet with Hammadi personally soon. On April 12, Draper meets with senior
Iraqi Foreign Ministry officials, and then with Hammadi in Baghdad.

19 April 1981- Tariq Aziz, a leading member of Iraq’s Revolutionary Command
Council, says in a U.S. newspaper report that his government favors high-level contacts
between the United States and Iraq though he is “not very optimistic” that the Reagan
administration will carry out the necessary changes in its Middle East policy to make this
possible. Aziz also’says that there would have been a major crisis in Soviet-Iraqi
relations had Iraq not been able to locate from other countries the arms and spare parts
denied to them by the Soviet Union.

19 April 1981- Iranian government officials reportedly acknowledge that $56 million
sent recently to France to buy arms has been stolen by Iranian representatives in Paris.

21 April 1981- Kuwait grants an interest-free loan of $2 billion to Baghdad to help
reconstruct areas destroyed in the war with Iran. Some estimates claim that Iraq has
received between $6 billion and $7 billion in loans from Arab countries since the war
began last September.

27 April 1981- French nuclear physicists and technicians arrive in Iraq to work ona
nuclear reactor near Baghdad. They had been driven from the country after an Iranian
air-attack on the reactor on 30 September the previous year.

May 1981- Iraq reportedly purchases 100 tons of yellow cake from Niger.

4 May 1981- Libya reportedly begins shipping military supplies to Iran, and also offers
to train Iranian tank crews.

4 May 1981- Iran says that Iraqi shelling of the oil refinery at Abadan in southwestern
Iran has resulted in the death of 22 Iranian citizens. Iraq claims this shelling was in
response to Iranian shelling of the oil terminal at Faw on the Iraqi side of the Shatt al-
Arab waterway.

5 May 1981- The Washington Post reports that the Soviet Union is indirectly supplying
arms to Iraq through its allies in Eastern Europe. The Soviets have also helped to repair a
Soviet-built Iraqi power plant recently damaged by Iranian warplanes.

29 May 1981- Iraq reports capturing the town of Dehloran in southwest Iran, killing 96
Iranian soldiers. Iran promptly denies the report.

7 June 1981- The Iraqi military amasses 60,000 troops and 1,000 tanks on the outskirts
of the oil-rich Iranian city of Abadan, a city that both Iran and Iraq regard as the key to
control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway.. An Iraqi offensive is expected to come within
days.

7 June 1981- Israeli fighter pilots bomb and destroy the French-built Osirak nuclear
facility 12 miles southeast of Baghdad. Iraq says its nuclear technology has not been
seriously damaged and vows to continue building its nuclear arsenal. Though the Soviets
charge the United States as an accomplice in the act, the U.S. administration immediately
moves to suspend the sale of fighter-bombers to Israel.

10 June 1981- The Wall Street Journal reports that at least half a dozen large American
firms have either resumed exports to Iran or are considering doing so despite the U.S.
embargoes in place since spring 1980.

11 June 1981- Iranian President Bani Sadr is dismissed as chief of Iranian armed forces.
Later in the month he flees the country for France.

16 June 1981- Seventeen wounded Iraqis held by Tehran are exchanged for twenty-five
Iranian prisoners of war in Iraq under Red Cross supervision at the airport in Larnaca,
Cyprus. This is the first prisoner-of-war exchange since the conflict broke out nine
months ago.

17 June 1981- Libyan leader Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi announces that he will soon visit
both Tehran and Baghdad in an attempt to bring an end to conflict. Until this point, Libya
has been supporting Iran in the war against Iraq.

21 June 1981- Olof Palme embarks on his fourth trip to Tehran in order to convince the
Iranian government to come to the negotiating table with Iraq. After visiting the
leadership in Tehran, Palme will fly to Iraq to begin negotiations with President Hussein.

24 June 1981- Britain signs a trade-pact with Baghdad in the hope of bringing business
between the two countries to more than $2 billion annually.

July 1981- Iran rejects an Iraqi call for cease-fire during the holy month of Ramadan.
2 July 1981- A bomb attack in Tehran kills 72 members of Iran’s parliament. Supreme
leader Ayatollah Khomeini describes the attack as “an American movement against

Islam.” U.S. officials deny any involvement with the blast.

9 July 1981- A Kuwaiti delegation visits Moscow to look at Soviet military equipment.
Kuwait backs Iraq in the conflict.

16 July 1981- Saudi Arabia offers to finance the reconstruction of the French-built Iraqi
nuclear reactor destroyed by Israeli armed forces in the 7 June attacks.

6 August 1981- A delegation including members from Cuba, India, Zambia and the
Palestine Liberation Organization arrive today in Tehran seeking to bring an end to the
nearly year-long conflict with Iraq.

21 August 1981- Deposed Iranian President Bani Sadr announces that, during his term as
President of the Islamic Republic, Israel sold his country spare U.S.-made military parts
including 250 tires for American made F4 Phantom jets. The transactions occurred while
Iran was holding a number of U.S. citizens hostage. Israel immediately denies Bani
Sadr’s claim.

26 August 1981- A total of 85 prisoners of war are exchanged between Iran and Iraq at
the airport in Larnaca, Cyprus. This is the second prisoner exchange of the war.

3 September 1981- Iraq reports that its troops in Iran have driven back an Iranian
offensive killing more than 5,000 Iranians in just three days of battle.

15 September -5 October 1981- During this period, the Reagan administration considers
having the CIA undertake an arms trade with Iraq. The United States would offer 24
175-mm guns to Baghdad in return for a Soviet T-72 tank. A congressional investigation
later reports that the idea is dropped in January 1982. (In September 1988, Saddam
Hussein says that Iraq refused to provide the tank because of its commitment to the
Soviet Union.)

27 September 1981- Iran claims that its forces have driven the Iraqi military from the
oil-rich city of Abadan, killing over 600 and capturing 1,500 Iraqi troops.

1 October 1981- Kuwait accuses Iran of carrying out three air attacks on Kuwaiti oil
instillations. Iran denies the charge.

2 October 1981- Iranian fighter planes bomb four Iraqi hydroelectric power stations in
response to Iraqi air and ground attacks on “civilian” targets near Abadan.

16 October 1981- The New York Times reports that the Iranian government has executed
over 1,800 Iranians since June. This brings the total to 3,350 killed since the Shah was
deposed in January 1979.

9 November 1981- Jordan’s King Hussein says that Iraq helped his country pay for a
$200 million surface-to-air missile system bought from the Soviet Union.

10 November 1981-Iran rejects an Iraqi call for a cease-fire during the holy month of
Moharram. The Speaker of Iran’s Parliament, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, says that
the Iraqi plea is a sign of the weakness of Iraq’s military.

29 November 1981- The Iranian military launches an attack on Iraqi forces in Khuzestan. ©
Iran claims to have captured 1,300 Iraqi troops and killed 1,000 while regaining control
of the border region. Iraq concedes that its troops have lost some positions.

10 December 1981- The Lebanese press reports that the Soviet Union has resumed
delivery of heavy arms to Iraq including the transfer of tanks and MIG-25 warplanes.
The Soviet Union had discontinued military support to Iraq after the war broke out in
September 1980.

12 December 1981- The Reagan Administration rejects an Iranian request to buy spare
parts for its fleet of F-14 fighter planes.

15 December 1981- Saddam Hussein says that his country is ready to end the war with
Iran if Tehran agrees to recognize Iraq’s borders. Iran rejects Hussein’s plea.

21 December 1981- Kuwait and the U.A.E. agree to loan Iraq another $2 billion to aid in
the war against Iran. This brings the total of loans extended to Baghdad by the Gulf
Emirates to $16 billion.

29 December 1981- Syria decides to initiate talks with Tehran in an attempt to end the
Iran-Iraq war and instead focus Muslim energies on the struggle against Israel.

1982

6 January 1982- Iraqi Kurds join with dissident Ba’ athists, breakaway Iraqi military
leaders, and Iraqi Shiites, in an attempt to overthrow the Iraqi leadership. The coalition is
supported financially by Iran and Syria.

16 January 1982- The Washington Post reports that the Iranian military is turning the
tide of the war and winning the battle against Iraq.

22 January 1982- Italian government officials agree to an Iranian plan to swap Italian
technology for Iranian oil.

26 January 1982- Both Iran and Iraq agree to reciprocal visits by families of military
prisoners seized by both sides.

29 January 1982- Jordan’s King Hussein announces that he will send a contingent of
Jordanian troops to Iraq to help in the war against Iran. It is reported that thousands of
young Jordanians are eager to volunteer.

6 February 1982- U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger sets off on a tour of
three Arab countries in which he will discuss the possibility of U.S. aid to help the six
nations in the Gulf Cooperation Council build an arms industry. Weinberger will also &

10

discuss sending American F-14s and U.S.-made anti-aircraft weapons to Jordan though
he denies Jordanian requests for the U.S. to outwardly back Iraq in the war with Iran.

24 February 1982- The Wall Street Journal reports that “trade between the Soviets and
the Iranians is growing,” and that the Soviets have dramatically increased their presence
in Iran. The New York Times confirms the report writing that Soviet-Iranian relations are
‘Friendly’ and ‘Profitable.’”

27 February 1982- The U.S. State Department removes Iraq from the list of countries
that sponsor terrorism.

March 1982- The State and Commerce Departments remove Iraq from the U.S.
government's list of countries supporting international terrorism, without consulting
Congress. Subsequently, Commerce is authorized to disallow exports to Iraq for only two
reasons: risk of diversion to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, or the People's Republic
of China; or risk of use for nuclear weapons development.

1 March 1982- Olof Palme says that he has failed for a fifth time to convince Iran and
Iraq to call a cease-fire to their now 17-month war.

5 March 1982- It is reported in The Wall Street Journal that Iraq has recently expressed
interest in buying a range of military hardware from the U.S. and Britain. The U.S.
Administration reportedly rejects Iraq’s requests.

8 March 1982- The New York Times reports that Iran is receiving military equipment
from Israel, North Korea, Syria, Libya, the Soviet Union, and several countries in
Western Europe. $100 to $200 million in arms, spare parts and ammunition have
reportedly been shipped to Tehran since the war with Iraq began.

16 March 1982- Taha Yassin Ramadan, first deputy prime minister and member of
Iraq’s Revolutionary Command Council, says that Iraq is prepared to withdraw from
Iranian territory and is ready to accept a cease-fire agreement with Iran.

19 March 1982- President Saddam Hussein sends a special envoy to the nine-member
Islamic mediation mission with written proposals for cease-fire and Iraqi withdrawal
from Iranian territory.

’ 19 March 1982- Though France had agreed to help rebuild the Iraqi nuclear reactor
destroyed by Israeli warplanes in June 1981, French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson
begins to ask the Iraqi leadership to include other nations in the Iraqi nuclear project.

23 March 1982- Iran claims that its military has broken through Iraqi lines and taken

back a huge area of territory from Iraqi occupation. Though Iraq acknowledges the battle,
they claim that Iraqi forces have been successful in repelling the attack.

11

24 March 1982- Iranian forces launch a massive attack against Iraqi held territory led by &
an Iranian armored division just transferred in from the Eastern front on the border with

Pakistan. Iran claims to have taken 2,000 Iraqi prisoners-of-war and killed or wounded

10,000 members of the Iraqi armed forces.

25 March 1982- The Iraqi leadership asks the U.S. administration to block the transfer of
U.S.-made weapons from Israel to Iran. A State Department spokesman says that
although some U.S. weapons may be getting through from Israel to Iran, these weapons
would not be subject to U.S. export controls.

26 March 1982- Iraq claims that it has killed over 4,000 Iranians in a new Iraqi offensive
in southwestern Iran while an Iranian spokesperson says that Iran has re-captured
territory in the same region.

28 March 1982- Iranian armed forces claim that they have killed 8,000 Iraqis, wounded
12,000, and taken more than 14,000 prisoners in the last eight days of combat.

29 March 1982- Saddam Hussein proposes an Iraqi troop withdrawal to pre-war borders.
Iranian leaders respond by saying that they will only consider negotiations with Iraq once
the government of Saddam Hussein is overthrown.

30 March 1982- Saddam Hussein confirms that his country’s forces have been forced to
retreat from previously held territory in Southern Iran.

1 April 1982- Saudi Arabian Interior Minister Prince Nayef announces that Iran’s
ultimate goal is to control the Arab countries of the region by using Shi-ite minorities as
“revolutionary spearheads.” The oil-rich Arab countries worry that the recent success in
the Iranian offensive will soon threaten their ability to maintain hold of their respective
countries.

2 April 1982- According to press report, the deputy commander of Iran’s armed forces
says that the “end of the war with Iraq is very near,” unless Iraq brings in outside help to
support its army.

12 April 1982- Saddam Hussein announces that he is ready to withdraw troops from Iran
provided there will be guarantees that this move will end the war and that Iran will
respect Baghdad’s border claims.

13 April 1982- The Washington Post reports that Iran, convinced of ultimate victory in
the Iran-Iraq war, has begun seeking to expand its influence with the West and pro-
western countries of the Middle East. Over the previous winter, [ran dispatched more
than 25 missions to Western Europe and has also recently moved to improve ties with
Pakistan and Turkey.

12

14 April 1982- The Reagan administration permits Iraq to purchase six to twelve U.S.-
made L100 transport planes. Iraq states that these planes will only be used for civilian
transport rather than military purposes.

26 April 1982- The U.S. purchases $53.1 million worth of crude oil from Iran in the first
American purchase of Iranian oil since the country took American diplomats hostage in
November 1979.

30 April 1982- Iran launches a new offensive against Iraq aimed at finally driving the
Iraqis out of Iranian territory.

5 May 1982- Iranian helicopters raid an Iraqi town for the first time in the war.
8 May 1982- Iran announces that its offensive has reached the pre-war Iraqi border.

10-24 May 1982- Iranian forces advance to the port city of Khorramshahr held by Iraq.
Iraq then attempts to attack the Iranian forces near the city but the Iraqi military is forced
to retreat. Finally, on 24 May, Iran reports that it has captured the oil-rich city of
Khorramshahr.

May 24, 1982- Israeli media report that the U.S. is encouraging Egypt to supply Soviet
arms to Iraq and that American weapons are being supplied to Egypt for shipment to Iraq,
with the goal of establishing a pro-U.S. Arab front comprising Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
Jordan, and Iraq. Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir are reported to have decided to
launch an "all-out diplomatic campaign against the delivery of American weapons to
Jordan and Iraq."

25 May 1982- Officials in the Reagan administration announce that Iran’s defeat of Iraq
would create a potentially dangerous situation for Western interests.

28 May 1982- Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon announces that the United States
was aware of his country’s sale of American-made weapons to Iran. U.S. officials deny
Sharon’s claim.

June 1982- President Reagan reportedly issues a National Security Decision Directive
(NSDD) on Iraq. According to a court affidavit by former NSC staff member Howard
Teicher, “Reagan decided that the United States would do whatever was necessary and
legal to prevent Iraq from losing the war with Iran.” Teicher also claims that “CIA
director [William] Casey personally spearheaded the effort to ensure that Iraq had
sufficient military weapons, ammunition and vehicles, to avoid losing the Iran/Iraq war.”
Teicher also asserts that, beginning this month, Casey and Deputy Director Robert Gates
“approved of, and assisted in the sale of non-U:S. origin military weapons, ammunition
and vehicles to Iraq.” ,

June 1982- The Soviet Union resumes arms shipments to Iraq, which had been
suspended since the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war.

13

4 June 1982- Tariq Aziz arrives in Moscow seeking Soviet political and military ©
assistance but Soviet officials refuse to meet with him.

10 June 1982- Iraq’s Revolutionary Command Council issues a statement announcing
that the country is prepared to accept an unconditional cease-fire and withdraw its troops
from Iranian territory. Iran rejects the proposal because Saddam Hussein did not sign his
name to the declaration.

22 June 1982- Saddam Hussein announces an Iraqi troop withdrawal to be completed in
ten days. Iranian Supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini says that the war with Iraq will not
end even if Iraq withdraws its troops. The commander-in-chief of the Iranian army, Col.
Sayed Shirazi, says that Iran will continue its war with Iraq until Saddam Hussein is
overthrown.

28 June 1982- Saddam Hussein dismisses all the members of Iraq’s Revolutionary
Command Council just one day before that country is scheduled to withdraw all troops
from Iranian territory.

29 June 1982- Iraq reports that all of its troops have left Iranian territory.

July 1982- Iraq uses tear gas and skin irritants against Iranian forces "quite effectively,"
according to a State Department report.

14 July 1982- Iranian armed forces announce that they have opened a new offensive
against Iraqi territory and expect Iraqi Shi-ites to take up arms for Iran. They are initially
reported to have moved ten miles into Iraq in the first day of combat.

31 July 1982- Iraq claims that its military has finally “crushed” the Iranian drive that
began earlier in the month.

20 September 1982- The U.S. Interests Section in Baghdad informs the Commerce
Department that Iraq's Agricultural Aviation Department is interested in purchasing 12
crop spraying aircraft, including helicopters and fixed-wing planes, and will want to buy
more later.

22 September 1982- On the second anniversary of the war, an Iraqi MIG-25 jet tries to
bomb the Iranian capital of Tehran.

2 October 1982- Iranian armed forces attack Iraqi units inside Iraq and claim to have re-
captured 90 square kilometers of territory including the strategic heights overlooking the
highway into Baghdad. Iraq, however, claims that it has beaten back the Iranian
offensive.

3 October 1982- Sudan announces that it will send troops to help Iraq in the war with
Tran.

14

4 October 1982- U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko meet in New York to discuss, among other things, the Iran-Iraq war.
Both diplomats agree that the conflict should be concluded as soon as possible.

27 October 1982- Iran announces elections will be held in December to choose a
successor to leader Ayatollah Khomeini, 83, who is said to be in poor health.

2 November 1982- Iranian armed forces launch an offensive against Iraq’s strategic oil
port of Basra. Iran’s president, Ali Khamenei, says the Iranian military will proceed
towards Baghdad.

16 November 1982- Saddam Hussein charges that the United States and the Soviet
Union have done nothing to help end the conflict.

20 November 1982- Tariq Aziz claims that the United States is allowing American-
made weapons to be funneled to Iran. He also says that Soviet-made weapons are being
given to Iran through Syria and Libya.

10 December 1982- Iran elects an 83-member committee to choose Ayatollah
Khomeini’s successor after his death.

15 December 1982- Hughes Helicopter Inc., a Los Angeles based company, agrees to
sell 60 new commercial helicopters to Iraq for $25 million. Iraq promises the helicopters
will be used for civilian purposes only.

19 December 1982- U.S. officials discover that Iran has been trading oil for weapons
with North Korea. Reportedly, North Korea has supplied Iran with 40% of the
approximately $2 million worth of weapons used in the war with Iraq.

31 December 1982- The Senate drops an effort to amend legislation to prohibit all
exports of helicopters to Iran and Iraq, and instead asks the State Department to tell Iraq
that the U.S. does not want recently purchased Hughes helicopters to be used for military

purposes.
1983

7 January 1983- The CIA's assistant general counsel concludes that there are no legal
prohibitions against the CIA's provision of arms to Iran, although there is a policy to
prevent violation of U.S. neutrality in regard to the Iran-Iraq war.

13 January 1983- According to a report, Western diplomats have discovered that China
has been supplying Chinese-made weapons to Iraq in return for Iraqi oil. Chinese
officials have also been allowing North Korean planes carrying weapons to Iran to stop
and refuel in China. Some western officials allege that Chinese planes have been
carrying North Korean weapons to Tehran independently. China has also signed a Sino-

15

Iranian trade pact with Iran allowing $300 million in increased trade between the two
countries. Many believe that this package includes Chinese military supplies and civilian
equipment that can be converted into military equipment.

8 February 1983- Iran launches an invasion of southeast Iraq in what many analysts call
the largest offensive since the war broke out in September 1980.

9 February 1983- Volkswagen Brazil signs a contract with Iraq promising to supply to
Baghdad 50,000 automobiles and spare parts in a deal worth $300 million.

14 February 1983- George Shultz meets with Saadoun Hammadi, who asks the U.S. to
limit Iran's arms supplies and to expand the U.S.-Iraqi trade relationship by means
including "encouraging financing from official and private sources." In describing the
meeting, the State Department denies that U.S. policy toward the Iran-Iraq war has
changed. Regarding U.S. agricultural credit guarantees for Iraq, State declares that "we
attach no political significance to the promotion of U.S. agricultural exports to Iraq."

3 March 1983- Iraq claims that its Navy has destroyed a number of Iranian oil rigs and
five ships in the Persian Gulf.

5 March 1983- Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko meets with delegates from both
Iran and Iraq in a Soviet attempt to mediate the conflict.

14 March 1983- George Shultz is advised to instruct William Eagleton in Baghdad to
meet with Iraqi officials to discuss options for U.S. financial programs for Iraq. Assistant
Secretary of State Richard McCormack reports that Eximbank discourages inquiries from
U.S. exporters about Iraq because of Iraq's payment problems. He indicates that the
prohibition of Eximbank financing for any government harboring terrorists could affect
funding decisions, but there are no Foreign Assistance Act statutes specifically barring a
CCC program for Iraq. McCormack notes that "the Iraqis probably discount disclaimers
that the USG [U.S. government] cannot swing loans for Iraq through friends in the
private sector" and suggests that the USG "could offer to arrange consultations between
Iraqi government financial officials and U.S. government and private international
financial experts."

22, March 1983- A Soviet-built Iraqi military helicopter crashes in the Dolomite
Mountains of Italy after being covertly flown to that country for installation of advanced
electronic equipment. The aircraft was expected to be flown back to Iraq after its time in
Italy to be used in the war with Iran.

4 April 1983- Iraq offers to observe a one-day limited cease-fire with Iran in order to
clean up a 7,500 square mile oil spill. Iran rejects the offer.

12 April 1983- Iraq in a public statement warns of "new weapons ... [to] be used for the

first time in war ... not used in previous attacks because of humanitarian and ethical
. Teasons ... that will destroy any moving creature."

16

14 April 1983- Iraq claims that it has repelled the recent Iranian offensive killing 9,800
Iranian soldiers and giving up no territory.

17 April 1983- Saddam Hussein invites Ayatollah Khomeini to Baghdad for an Islamic
conference already underway on the Iran-Iraq war.

2 May 1983- Iran and Iraq exchange a total of 55 prisoners-of-war in Ankara, Turkey.
13 May 1983- Tariq Aziz visits Paris to ask France to trade arms for oil.

July-August 1983- Iraq reportedly uses lethal chemical agents against Iranian forces, and
subsequently against Kurdish insurgents.

6 July 1983- After Tariq Aziz's July 5 return from Cairo, the State Department reports
that Iraq apparently agreed to upgrade its relations with Egypt but not to restore full
diplomatic relations, noting that "Baghdad must insure that it has access to a continuing
supply of Egyptian munitions at a time when its financial resources are severely limited."

27 June 1983- France finally agrees to lend Iraq five of its Super Etendard fighter-
bombers capable of firing Exocet missiles. Iraq plans on using the planes to pox oil
facilities inside Iranian territory.

20 July 1983- Tariq Aziz says that large quantities of American-made weaponry are
pouring into Iran through “neutral countries.”

23 July 1983- Iran launches a new drive against Iraqi forces in the mountains of
northeastern Iraq.

27 July 1983- Eight men are arrested in New Jersey in connection with a scheme to sell
$2 billion worth of sophisticated weaponry to Iran including attack helicopters, rocket-
propelled grenade launchers, tanks and rifles.

5 September 1983- The United Nations tells Iran to conform to international conventions
and stop recruiting child soldiers for the war with Iraq.

7 September 1983- Iraqi Foreign Ministry official Ismat Kittani meets with Under
Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger in the first of a series of “candid and
welcome contacts” between the U.S. and Iraq. During the meeting, Kittani asks the
United States to help end the conflict by exerting more pressure on the government of
Ayatollah Khomeini.

20 September 1983- Ayatollah Khomeini threatens to cut off oil supplies to the West by
closing the Persian Gulf if Western countries step up military aid to Iraq. He also vows
to restrict shipping in the Gulf if Arab states in the region continue to allow their ports to
be used by ships delivering weapons to Iraq.

17

October 1983- A U.S. National Security Council (NSC) study reportedly concludes that
an Iraqi defeat in the Iran-Iraq war would harm U.S. interests, and indicates that Iraq's
primary needs are for economic assistance and improved morale for its officers. In
response to the study, the Reagan administration encourages Persian Gulf states to
maintain or Increase their financial support for Iraq, and Increases its efforts to stop third-
country arms shipments to Iran.

1 October 1983- Under heavy international pressure, France reportedly has decided to
delay its shipment of five Super Etendard Jets to Iraq. But one month later, Iraq confirms
it has taken delivery of the aircraft.

7 October 1983- In response to his request, Lawrence Eagleburger is provided an
analysis of the implications of a shift from neutrality toward the Iran-Iraq war to a policy
of supporting Iraq. The analysis indicates that "the Iranian strategy of bringing about the
Iraqi regime's political collapse through military attrition coupled with financial
strangulation seems to be slowly having an effect." It reports obstacles to providing
additional financial assistance to Iraq, assesses possible diplomatic and military measures
that might be adopted, and notes that a policy of strict neutrality has already been
modified, in favor of Iraq, adding "we assume that other actions not discussed here, such
as providing tactical intelligence, would continue as necessary."

8 October 1983- France begins delivery of five jets to Iraq. Iraq says the jets will be put
into immediate use.

25 October 1983- Iran says that Iraqi troops have destroyed the Iraqi city of Penjwin in
the Kurdish mountain region of northern Iraq in an attempt to “begin a new propaganda
campaign against the Islamic republic” by blaming the destruction of the city on Iranian
forces.

31 October 1983- The U.N. Security Council calls on both Iran and Iraq to immediately
end all hostilities in the Persian Gulf region. Iraq accepts the Security Council mandate
while Iran immediately rejects it.

1 November 1983- Jonathan Howe of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs reports that
the State Department has additional information confirming Iraqi chemical weapons use,
and indicates that "we also know that Iraq has acquired a CW [chemical weapons]
production capability, primarily from Western firms, including possibly a U.S. foreign
subsidiary." The issue of Iraq's use of chemical weapons will be added to the agenda for
an upcoming NSC meeting, for which the State Department has prepared a discussion
paper outlining "a number of measures we might take to assist" that country.

23 November 1983- Iraq bombs and sinks a Greek cargo ship off the Iranian port of
Bushehr.

18

12 December 1983- Members of al-Dawa bomb several sites in Kuwait, including the
U.S. and French embassies. Iraq retaliates against Iran for the suspected Iranian hand in
the attacks by launching surface-to-surface missiles into six Iranian cities, killing 24 and
wounding 283. Iran denies involvement in the bombings.

14 December 1983- A background cable prepared by William Eagleton for Donald
Rumsfeld's visit to Iraq indicates that "the USG ... would regard any major reversal of
Iraq's fortunes as a strategic defeat for the West." The cable also indicates that a lifting of
testrictions on military items sent from third parties to Iraq could be discussed by
Rumsfeld and Iraqi representatives. Another background paper prepared for Rumsfeld’s
visit to the Middle East asks, “How can we begin to restore a productive relationship with
Iran while at the same time ensuring that the Iraq/Iran war neither spreads nor produces a
clear winner.or loser?”

19-20 December 1983- Donald Rumsfeld arrives in Baghdad to meet with Saddam
Hussein and Tariq Aziz. Rumsfeld immediately informs the Iraqi leaders that the U.S. is
prepared to resume official diplomatic relations with Iraq. In his 90-minute long meeting
with Hussein, Rumsfeld discusses preventing “Iranian and Syrian expansion.” He also
assures the Iraqi leader that the U.S is trying to limit third-party weapons shipments to
Iran, and that the U.S. is looking into alternative routes for the export of Iraqi oil.
According to a State Department cable, Saddam tells Rumsfeld that “Iraq is an
independent and non-aligned country and that it was incorrect and unbalanced to have
relations with the Soviet Union and not with the U.S.” He also notes that he is pleased to
open full relations with the U.S.

23 December 1983- Jordan agrees to give Iraq a $125 million credit in order to reaffirm
Jordanian support for the Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein.

1984

1 January 1984- An article in The Washington Post reports that the U.S. has informed its
Persian Gulf allies that an Iraqi loss to Iran in the Iran-Iraq War would be “contrary to
U.S. interests”, and has vowed to prevent U.S. weapons and spare parts from reaching
Iran.

7 January 1984- Iran claims that it has killed 230 Kurdish rebels and captured 30
villages in a week-long offensive on the Iran-Iraq border.

10 January 1984- A source reports that Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council has

‘ approved a project to construct an oil pipeline for Iraq terminating at the port of Aqaba in
Jordan, promoted by Donald Rumsfeld during his meetings with Iraqi leaders in
December.

20 January 1984- Secretary of State Shultz declares Iran a sponsor of international
terrorism. According to the Tower Commission report, "Thereafter, the United States

19

actively pressured its allies not to ship arms to Iran, both because of its sponsorship of
international terrorism and its continuation of the war with Iraq."

30 January 1984- The State Department reviews export policy for Iran and Iraq. It says
that "we have discouraged some, but not all, exports of non-licensable militarily useful
equipment such as certain light helicopters and airplanes ... the aircraft export approvals
constitute precedent for ceasing to discourage any non-controlled exports to Iraq,
including those with military implications."

February 1984- George Shultz approves the export to Iraq of 2,000 heavy trucks valued
at $224 million. The State Department indicates that the sale will serve U.S. interests
while maintaining "a fig leaf of neutrality.""On March 2, when a minority staffer from the
House Foreign Affairs Committee asks whether the trucks are to be used for military
purposes, an official indicates that "I told her we presumed that this was Iraq's intention,
and had not asked."

12 February 1984- Iraq launches surface-to-surface missiles and air strikes against
Iranian civilians in the city of Dezful near the Iran-Iraq border, killing 5 and wounding
over 100. Iraq claims this is in response to earlier Iranian strikes against a number of Iraqi
population centers. Iran responds to the Iraqi attacks by shelling at least three Iraqi cities.
This marks the first time in the conflict that both sides are intentionally striking at civilian
targets.

15 February 1984- According to court papers, Egypt's Ministry of Defense and IFAT
Corp., Lid. of Zug, Switzerland, sign a contract for a joint project by Egypt, Iraq, and
Argentina to develop the Condor 2/Badr 2000 missile. Consen S.A.M., based in Monaco,
begins recruiting engineers from European companies for the project.

16 February 1984- Iranian forces launch a major offensive drive against Iraqi border
fortifications bombing three Iraqi towns and shelling others along the border. Iraq claims
it has lost 17 while Iran insists that this drive has resulted in well over 1,200 Iraqi
casualties.

18 February 1984- Iran agrees to a United Nations plea for a group to inspect civilian
areas of the Persian Gulf damaged by the war but the country said that it would not
participate in U.N. sponsored negotiations. Nonetheless, both sides in the conflict agree
to end attacks on civilians.

21 February 1984- An Iraqi military spokesman says that Iraq could use chemical
weapons in the next Iranian offensive. He is quoted as saying that “the invaders should
know that for every harmful insect there is an insecticide capable of annihilating it
whatever their number and Iraq possesses this annihilation insecticide."

23 February 1984- British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher announces that her country
may soon send warships to the Persian Gulf to help protect tankers carrying oil to the

20

United States and Britain. Meanwhile, President Reagan says that “there’s no way we
could allow” Iran to close the Persian Gulf to U.S. shipping.

23 February 1984- While Iraq reports that its military has crushed a recent Iranian
offensive, Iran claims that its forces have moved through the Tigris-Euphrates valley.
Both sides, however, agree that a total of 7,300 soldiers from both sides have been killed
in recent fighting.

27 February 1984- Iraqi warplanes bomb a major Iranian oil terminal at Kharg Island
vowing to continue attacks on Iranian oil until Iran agrees to end the war. A spokesman
for the Iranian armed forces denies that Iraq has bombed the terminal alleging that the
Iraqi claims are “lies” aimed at boosting Iraqi troop moral.

1 March 1984- Tehran Radio announces that United States military presence in the
Persian Gulf is “an act of aggression and blackmail!” and that the five-mile safety zone
the U.S. has declared around four of its ships in the Gulf is a violation of international
law and constitutes support for Iraq in the war.

1 March 1984- France agrees to lend Baghdad $500 million claiming that the loan will
be used to help Iraq pay French civilian contractors working in that country.

4 March 1984- The New York Times quotes General Fakhri, a senior Iraqi military
official, as saying that his country reserves the right to use chemical weapons against Iran
because “we will use all possible means to protect our country.” Iran has previously
charged that Iraq has used nitrogen mustard gas against Iranian troops though Iraq has
denied those claims.

5 March 1984- U.S. officials publicly condemn Iraq for using chemical weapons.

8 March 1984- The United Nations decides to send a mission to Baghdad to investigate
claims that Iraq has used chemical weapons.

11 March 1984- A State Department Cable, citing an article in The Observer, says that
“the Iraqis now have as many as three ‘poison gas’ plants,” and it adds that "Iraq is now in
a position to use chemical weapons to devastating effect if extreme action against Iran is
required. It has already shown that it does not lack the will to do so."

13 March 1984- The U.N. team sent to investigate Iraqi use of chemical weapons arrives
in Baghdad today amid new accusations by Iran that Iraq is using mustard gas against
Iranian troops on Majnun Island north of the Iraqi city of Basra.

17 March 1984- A Belgian laboratory finds two types of chemical agents in samples
taken from Iranian patients wounded in the war with Iraq—mustard gas and “yellow
rain” mycotoxins. The Soviet Union has recently been accused of using “yellow rain” in
Afghanistan, Laos, and Cambodia.

21

22 March 1984- The Soviet Union agrees to finance and build a nuclear power plant in
Iraq in what is believed to be the first Soviet nuclear reactor sold to the Third World. The
plant is to replace the French-built nuclear facility destroyed by Israeli warplanes on 9
June 1981.

26 March 1984- U.S. Special Envoy Donald Rumsfeld stops in Baghdad on a week-long
tour of the Middle East to meet with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. This is the
second meeting between the two high-ranking officials. According to Howard Teicher, a
former NSC staffer present at the meeting, Rumsfeld presents to Aziz an Israeli offer of
assistance to Iraq. Israel at this time, according to Teicher, had perceived Iran to be more
dangerous to its existence that Iraq because of Iran’s growing influence in Lebanon. At a
meeting in Jerusalem earlier in the year, Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir had
asked Rumsfeld to present Israel’s offer of assistance to Iraq. Aziz, however, “refused to
even accept the Israeli’s letter to Hussein offering assistance because, Aziz told us, he
would be executed on the spot by Hussein if he did so.” In addition to the Israeli letter,
Rumsfeld also intends to repair U.S. relations with Iraq because, according to a State
Department cable, “bilateral relations were sharply set back by our March 5
condemnation of Iraq for CW use, despite our repeated warnings that this issue would
emerge sooner or later.” Finally, Rumsfeld discusses with Aziz the Reagan
administration’s hope that it can obtain Export-Import Bank credits for Iraq and the
Ababa pipeline.

28 March 1984- U.S. Federal Agents seize a shipment of more than $7 million worth of
replacement parts for M-60 Tanks being sold by E&F Marketing Inc. of Plymouth, MN
to Tehran.

29 March 1984- U.S. Intelligence officials discover that Iraq has been buying lab
equipment to produce chemical weapons from a West German company. However, West
German officials in Bonn claim that they believe that the laboratory parts sent to Iraq are
not being used to make chemical weapons, though they admit it is possible. Intelligence
also indicates that Iraq has five sites—each heavily fortified, and reportedly six stories
below ground level-- dedicated to the production of chemical weapons.

30 March 1984- A Greek cargo ship traversing the Persian Gulf is hit by an Iraqi missile.
Many in the U.S. believe that Iraq has begun bombing oil tankers in the Gulf in order to
draw the superpowers into the conflict. In other developments, the U.S. bans the export of
five chemicals to Jraq—potassium fluoride, dimethyl-methylphosphionate,
methylphosphonyl, diflouride, phosphorous oxychloride and thioglycol.

5 April 1984- President Reagan signs NSDD 139, "Measures to Improve U.S. Posture
and Readiness to Respond to Developments in the Iran-Iraq War." It states that "measures
must be taken now to improve our immediate ability to deter an expansion of the conflict
in the Persian Gulf and, if necessary, defend U.S. interests." Its provisions include
instructions to the secretary of state to "prepare a plan of action designed to avert an Iraqi
collapse."

22

6 April 1984- Zhe Guardian reports that some British firms have recently sold Iraq some
ingredients to make mustard gas, as well as the nerve agent Sarin. The British firms were
reportedly under the impression that these chemicals would be used for the manufacture
of agricultural pesticides.

17 April 1984- Vice President George Bush presents the Reagan administration’s
proposal to ban chemical weapons worldwide to a U.N. Conference on Disarmament.
The Soviets immediately reject the plan.

3 May 1984- Former President Richard Nixon writes to Romanian President Nicolae
Ceausescu to express pleasure that Romania's Ministry of Light Industries is working
with former Nixon administration officials John Mitchell and John V. Brennan on a
project to produce military uniforms for Iraq.

9 May 1984- A State Department memorandum indicates that a policy review favors
export of some dual-use items to Iraqi nuclear entities, and that end-use assurances
should not be pursued, since "the Iraqi Government is not disposed to give meaningful
assurances."

14 May 1984- A Kuwaiti oil tanker carrying over 80,000 tons of crude oil to Britain is
attacked traversing the Persian Gulf by two Iranian jets. This attack inaugurates a new
stage in the war which will become known as “The Tanker War” characterized by attacks
on Persian Gulf shipping by both Iran and Iraq.

16 May 1984- The United States offers to provide Arab countries on the Gulf with air
cover to guard oil tankers leaving gulf ports. No Arab country immediately takes up the
U.S. offer though Iranian planes reportedly hit a Saudi tanker- the fifth in three weeks.

20 May 1984- A ship registered in Panama becomes the first commercial carrier sunk in
the Persian Gulf after an Iraqi air attack.

21 May 1984- Officials from the State Department blame Iran for the continuation of the
war.

23 May 1984- Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam and Foreign Minister
Farouk Charaa are dispatched to Tehran in an attempt to mediate the conflict. Iranian and
Iraqi attacks on commercial oi! tankers in the Persian Gulf continue with eight ships
destroyed off the Iranian port of Kharg Island.

29 May 1984- Four hundred American-made Stinger anti-aircraft missiles are exported to
Saudi Arabia to help the Gulf state defend itself against Iranian air attacks. Iran responds
by promising to “resist and fight” any form of U.S. military intervention in the Persian
Gulf. In other developments, the U.S. will back a U.N. sponsored resolution condemning
Iran for its attacks on Gulf shipping. The resolution does not censure Iraq which has
been carrying out similar attacks.

23

5 June 1984- U.S. Navy warships begin escorting oil tankers through the Persian Gulf.
This threatens to raise U.S. involvement in the war because any attack on a tanker &
escorted by a U.S. warship will provoke U.S. retaliation.

6 June 1984- Saudi Arabia shoots down two Iranian fighter jets over the Persian Gulf
using American-made Stinger missiles.

5-7 June 1984- An Iranian delegation led by Sayyid Mohammad Sadr visits Moscow to
meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. The trip is intended to improve
relations between the two countries and avert American intervention in the Persian Gulf.

7 June 1984- Iraq reportedly receives two new types of Soviet air-to-surface missiles
from Moscow designed to be fired from Iraq’s Tu-16 and Tu-22 bombers. Iraq says these
missiles will be used to hit the Iranian oil export terminal at Kharg Island.

15 June 1984- United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar brokers an
agreement between Iran and Iraq in which both sides agree to halt attacks on civilian
targets.

27 June 1984- The Reagan administration agrees to send $75 million worth of air-
defense equipment to Kuwait even though the Gulf emirate says it is also going to the
Soviets for aid.

9 July 1984- Kuwait signs a $327 million arms deal with the Soviet Union.

August 1984- According to Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward in a December 15,
1986, article, “the CIA stepped up the initiative with Iraq by establishing a direct, top-
secret Washington-Baghdad link to provide the Iraqis with better and timelier satellite
information. One source with firsthand knowledge said the Iraqis receive the information
from satellite photos ‘several hours’ after a bombing raid in order to assess damage and
plan the next attack. This source said the intelligence information is "vital" to Iraq's .
conduct of the war.”

6 August 1984- Mohsen Rafiq Dust, the Iranian Minister for Revolutionary Guards,
vows that Iran will no longer attack oil carrying tankers in the Persian Gulf. The
announcement comes after an escalation in the tanker war that saw ships from Greece,
Switzerland, Japan, Britain and others downed by both Iranian and Iraqi air-assault.

8 August 1984- Citing unnamed government officials, The Washington Post reports that
over the past year the Commerce Department has consented to the sale of over $27
million worth of U.S.-made equipment to Iran. While this equipment is described by the
US. officials as “non-military” in purpose, the Post reports that it can easily be converted
to military use.

24

8 August 1984- Amid allegations that West German laboratory equipment has been used
by Iraq to manufacture chemical and biological weapons, Bonn agrees to restrict the sale
of chemical manufacturing equipment to Baghdad.

19 August 1984- Britain agrees to send to the Iranian Navy two 2,500-ton unarmed ships
described by the British as “hospital ships designed for disaster relief.” The British
government announces that they have received assurances by Tehran that these ships will
not be used in the war against Iraq. In other developments, France agrees to a new oil
deal with Baghdad totaling a reported 40,000 barrels a day from Iraq to France. Paris has
also agreed to refinance $1.4 billion worth of Iraqi debts.

28 August 1984- A Senate Foreign Relations Committee report says that the military
balance in the Iran-Iraq war is now “tilting towards Iraq.” It also says that “several key
Iranian leaders appear to be reaching the conclusion that the costs of continuing military
efforts are becoming too great.” The report attributes Iraqi success to the fact that both
the United States and Soviet Union have “tilted” towards Baghdad.

10 September 1984- A group of self-described Iranian monarchists hijack an Iranian
airliner and are given asylum in Baghdad after they release the 188 hostages aboard the
plane, most of whom are Iranian citizens. The Iraq government says the former hostages,
as well as the hostage takers, are free to stay in Iraq or return to Iran.

22 September 1984-The war enters its fifth year with an Iraqi air attack on an Iranian
petro-chemical plant located at the head of the Persian Gulf.

27 September 1984- Shintaro Abe, the Japanese foreign minister, presents a cease-fire
proposal to U.N. General Assembly designed to bring an end to the Iran-Iraq war.
Japanese civilians are currently working to build a petrochemical plant in southern Iran.

8 October 1984- Iraq breaks a three-week cease-fire in the “Tanker War ” with an attack
on a ship departing from Iran’s Kharg Island killing six including two British officers.

10 October 1984- Tariq Aziz complains to a major U.S. newspaper that “almost all
Western European countries are skirting U.S. efforts to dry up (military) supplies” sent to
the government of Iran. Aziz says that the supply of Western arms is prolonging his
country’s war with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

12 October 1984- In an interview with an Arabic-language newspaper published in Paris,
Saddam Hussein says he is ready to reestablish diplomatic relations with the United
States.

18 October 1984- The Iraqi government begins negotiations with the Reagan
administration to buy 45 helicopters from the United States. These helicopters are
intended to be used for civilian purposes only, though U.S. officials note that they could
be transformed for military use.

25

-19 October 1984- Iranian armed forces mount a massive attack against Iraq in the
mountains northeast of Baghdad in what has become the first major ground campaign of
the war in over eight months. Tehran radio soon reports that Iran has retaken 20 square
miles of land from Iraq in what it describes as a “spectacular victory.” .

24 October 1984-The United States Information Service reopens its office in the Iraqi
capital of Baghdad. The office has been closed since 1958. Many see this as a prelude to
a restoration of relations between Washington and Baghdad.

26 October 1984- Tariq Aziz tells George Shultz that Iraq is now ready to resume full
diplomatic relations with the United States after a 17-year hiatus.

October-November- CIA Director William Casey meets with senior Iraqi officials twice
in Fall 1984, once in October and again in November, according to Washington Post
reporter Bob Woodward. The purpose is “to make sure the new channel was functioning
and to encourage more attacks on Iranian installations,” sources told Woodward.

3 November 1984- An American government official speaking on the condition of
anonymity tells The Washington Post that Iraq has amassed “significant stocks” of
chemical weapons for possible use against Iran.

26 November 1984- The United States and Iraq re-establish full diplomatic relations.
Earlier in the day, President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz met at the White House
with Tariq Aziz. Despite the renewal of diplomatic relations between the two countries,
the U.S. maintains its official stance of “neutrality” in the Iran-Iraq war.

1985

1985- Italy sells "conversion kits to Iraq for Hughes helicopters that Iraq had purchased
from the U.S. with assurance of nonmilitary use," according to a 1992 U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) report.

28 January 1985- An Iraqi military spokesman in Baghdad announces that Iraq has
launched a major offensive against Iran on the southern front. Iran, however, claims that
this drive has been crushed while Baghdad asserts that Iraqi troops have seized several
key Iranian positions in less than two hours of fighting.

20-21 February 1985- U.S. and Soviet officials meet in Vienna to discuss a way to settle
the Iran-Iraq war. President Reagan, however, downplays the talks suggesting that “We
simply felt it was time to exchange views with one another” stressing that the discussions
in Vienna do not signal a new U.S. willingness to cooperate with the Soviets in
negotiating a peace settlement. “We don’t favor that,” says Reagan, “we don’t believe
there should be that many hands in the pot.”

7 March 1985- Both Iran and Iraq abrogate the June 1984 treaty that banned military
attacks on civilians, according to reports. Iran complains that Iraqi shelling of the

26

Southwestern Iranian region of Khorramshahr has killed at least 14 and wounded 123
civilians, while Iraq reports that Iranian artillery fire on the Iraqi city of Basra has killed
an unspecified number of Iraqi non-combatants. This initiates an escalation of attacks on
civilians by both sides.

11 March 1985- Tehran radio reports that the Iranian air force has struck the Iraqi capital
of Baghdad as well as ten other Iraqi cities while Iraq claims that it has attacked seven
Iranian cities including Isfahan, Iran’s second largest city. Iran says that the Iraqi attacks
have resulted in over 100 Iranian deaths.

17 March 1985- Iranian and Iraqi forces battle each other for control of a strategic road
in southern Iraq. The New York Times describes this battle as “the fiercest fighting of the
war.” - :

18 March 1985- A military communiqué from Baghdad claims that the Iraqi air force has
bombed Tehran, “scoring crushing hits. e

21 March 1985- A State Department spokesman announces that the U.S. administration
believes Iraq has defeated Iran. Edward Djerejian says that “while there is still the
possibility of further action which could change the situation, it appears that the Iraqis
have blunted, and to a large extent, rolled back the latest Iranian offensive.” He also
stresses that “we do not provide arms to either side.” Appealing to Iran to accept a
negotiated settlement, another administration official, who did not wish to be identified,
said that “we have to keep trying and hoping that the sheer number of Iranians killed on
the battlefield will persuade Khomeini to try another tack.”

25 March 1985- U.S. Intelligence agents discover that Iraq has again used toxic chemical
weapons to repel the latest Iranian offensive on the southern front. In light of the recent
allegations, Secretary of State George Shultz meets unannounced with Iraqi foreign
minister Tariq Aziz. When asked if Shultz had confronted him with allegations of
chemical weapons use, Aziz responded, “I don’t recall.” Nonetheless, it is widely
believed by the American press that Iraq did indeed use chemical in the most recent
battle.

26 March 1985- In an editorial purportedly written by a top Iraqi government official,
Iraq threatens to spread the war to “every corner of Iran” unless Iranian officials agree to
a comprehensive peace settlement. The editorial, published in Baghdad’s Al-Jumhuriya
newspaper, also notes that Iraq’s only alternative to total peace is “an overall destructive
war.”

31 March 1985- U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar begins a ten-day tour of
the Persian Gulf. While Iraq has formally invited the Secretary General to Baghdad, Iran
has still not indicated that it is prepared to discuss “full-scale cessation of hostilities”—
necessary condition if the Secretary General is to visit Tehran.

27

1 April 1985- The U.N. Secretary General cancels his trip to both Baghdad and Tehran
citing Iranian hesitancy to discuss a peaceful and complete resolution to the conflict.

5 April 1985- Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Kazempour Ardebili leads a
delegation to Moscow to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. The
official Iranian press agency reported that the Iranian delegation “set forth (to the
Soviets) the known stand of the Iranian Government on the terms of ending the war”—
complete Iraqi surrender. Gromyko told the delegation that the Soviet Union desires the
“speediest end to the conflict.”

6 April 1985- The U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar announces that he will
once again visit both Baghdad and Tehran on his upcoming ten-day tour of the Persian
Gulf.

8 April 1985- A day after visiting the Iranian government in Tehran, the U.N. secretary
general visits Baghdad. President Hussein reportedly tells him that “Iraq is ready to
sincerely and seriously cooperate in discussing practical solutions leading to a halt of the
fighting and a comprehensive settlement to the conflict.”

9 April 1985- Javier Perez de Cuellar leaves Baghdad saying that the gulf between the
two countries is “as wide as ever.”

20 April 1985- During a meeting with Ambassador William Eagleton, Tariq Aziz states
his strong opposition to congressional efforts to return Iraq to the State Department's
terrorism list, which he says would undermine U.S.-Iraqi relations and what Saddam
Hussein calls "the beautiful atmosphere between us."

30 April 1985- George Shultz asks Caspar Weinberger to expedite approval of the export
of a Sperry 1100/72 computer and other technology to Iraq. The State Department reports
that the intelligence community "has no evidence that Iraq has yet embarked on a nuclear
weapons program, or intends to do so."

3 May 1985- Citing an unnamed U.S. government official, The New York Times reports
that a shipment of Iranian arms containing more than 9,000 Soviet made AK-47s, several
million rounds of ammunition, rocket-propelled-grenade-launchers and land mines has
arrived at the port of Hungnam, North Korea en route to Nicaragua. The Iranian-
Nicaraguan deal is believed to have been the product of Prime Minister Mir Hossein
Mussavi’s visit Managua, Nicaragua in January 1985. When asked about the transaction,
President Reagan responded that it poses a “new danger” to Central America.

18 May 1985- Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal meets in Tehran with Iranian
Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati. Velayati tells the Saudi official that his country
will continue to wage a “just” war against Iraq.

23 June 1985- Ali Reza Afshar, the chief of staff of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, says
that the Ayatollah Khomeini has ordered Iranian troops to launch a “defensive” guerilla

28

war against Iraq and that “the Imam [Khomeini] has issued an overall order for a
defensive holy war.”

24 June 1985- e. robert wallach [sic] and Bruce Rappaport meet with National Security
Advisor Robert McFarlane at the White House to discuss Bechtel Corp.'s project to build
a pipeline for Iraq terminating at the port of Aqaba in Jordan. Rappaport is a friend of
Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and wallach is a friend of Attorney General Edwin
Meese. McFarlane approves the project and tells the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) that it is a matter of national security.

25 July 1985- House and Senate conferees accede to a request from the State Department
to delete language from amendments to the Export Administration Act of 1979, which
would have required the president to return Iraq to the list of countries supporting
international terrorism, or to certify within 90 days that Iraq does not support terrorism.
George Shultz had assured Representative Howard Berman that Iraq would be returned to
the list if any group supported by Iraq committed acts of terrorism.

July 1985- According to a 1992 Los Angeles Times story citing a State Department cable,
an official from a Brazilian arms manufacturing concern tells State Department officials
that his company unloaded U.S. military equipment, including TOW missiles, at an
airport in Iraq around this time.

1 July 1985- A Defense Department official states that his agency has "a number of
legitimate national security concerns in regard to high technology exports to Iraq...
there is a body of evidence indicating that Iraq continues to actively pursue an interest in
nuclear weapons .. . In the past, Iraq has been somewhat less than honest in regard to the
intended end-use of high technology equipment."

18 July 1985- The chargé at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad tells an Iraqi official that the
Reagan administration "went the extra mile to insure that Iraq was not put on the
[terrorist] list and does not expect to be embarrassed by subsequent Iraqi actions."

16 August 1985- The Iraqi government releases a report which says that constant attacks
by the Iraqi air force have “demolished” Iran’s oil shipping terminal at Kharg Island and
turned the once prosperous oil terminal “into ashes.” U.S. officials, however, doubt the
authenticity of Iraq’s claim.

20 August 1985- The first shipment of U.S.-made TOW missiles, comprising the early
phase of the Reagan administration’s arms-for-hostages deals, arrives in Tehran. Several
other shipments of TOWs, HAWKs and spare parts take place between now and October
1986.

13 September 1985- State Department officials confirm reports that Iraq is to purchase

forty-five American-made helicopters for “civilian purposes” in a deal reportedly worth
between $225 and $275 million.

29

27 September 1985- At a speech to the U.N. General Assembly, Jordan’s King Hussein
announces that consultation between the two superpowers is “necessary” to bring about @
an end to the Iran-Iraq war. Also during the General Assembly meeting, Iraqi Foreign

Minister Tariq Aziz pointedly blamed Iran for both initiating and extending the conflict.

Aziz said that “Tran’s undisguised objective—the toppling of the political and social

systems in Iraq and other countries in the region in which the Iranians want to establish

their own brand of backwards, barbaric rule,” is the cause of the war. However, Aziz

also said that “the first necessary step on the road to peace should be a meeting of the

Security Council attended by both parties to the conflict.”

3 October 1985- In response to Tariq Aziz’s speech at the U.N. General Assembly,
Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati delivers a speech at an undisclosed location
in which he denounces the United Nations, saying that the international organization is a
post-war alliance of victors that “does not represent the shared values of the majority of
its members.” He also calls the recent Geneva Summit meeting between the United
States and Soviet Union “highly suspicious.”

20 October 1985- In response to recent criticism over the failure to bring a peaceful
resolution to the Iran-Iraq conflict, U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar says
that the U.N. “simply must be made to succeed.”

7 December 1985- President Reagan discusses the hostages in Lebanon with his top
advisers. The extraordinary meeting takes place in the White House residence, and
includes the vice president, the secretaries of state and defense, the deputy director of the &
CIA (Casey is out of town), the White House chief of staff, the national security adviser
and his deputy. Weinberger’s notes reveal: “President wants to free hostages ... I argued
strongly that we have an embargo that makes arms sales to Iran illegal + President
couldn't violate it — + that ‘washing’ transaction thru Israel wouldn't make it legal.

Shultz, Don Regan agreed.” But Reagan is adamant. Weinberger’s notes go on:
“President sd. he could answer charges of illegality but he couldn't answer charge that
‘big strong President Reagan passed up a chance to free hostages’.” Implying that this
attitude could land him a prison term, Weinberger retorts, “visiting hours are Thursday.”

8 December 1985- Ali Akbar Velayati visits Prince Saud al-Faisal in Riyadh in an effort
to bring an end to the Iran-Iraq war. The official Saudi radio station announces that
progress is being made between the two leaders but no further details are given. A day
later, however, Prince Saud says that his attempts to convince Iran to stop the war have
failed.

12 December 1985- The Iranian delegate to the U.N., Said Rajaie-Khorassani, says that
he will attend a Security Council meeting on the Iran-Iraq war if the council were to
adopt the positions of the Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar—no use of chemical
weapons and no strikes on civilian areas. The Iranian delegate says, “I will just greet the
president of the Security Council and, if he holds a meeting regarding our issue, I will
attend that meeting.” Iran has not previously been willing to cooperate with the United
Nations.

30

31 December 1985- Iraq says that it is stepping up air raids against Iran for the upcoming
year with “hundreds of raids” against Iranian troops in retaliation for supposed Iranian air
attacks on civilian areas in Iraq.

1986

1986- According to Howard Teicher, “President Reagan sent a secret message to Saddam
Hussein telling him that Iraq should step up its air war bombing of Iran.” Teicher goes on
to say that “this message was delivered by Vice President Bush who communicated it to
Egyptian President Mubarak, who in turn passed it to Saddam Hussein.”

13 January 1986- The Iranian Navy stops an American merchant vessel in the Persian
Gulf in search of military equipment destined for Iraq. While the U.S. admits that the
search is legal, the Reagan administration responds by sending two armed Navy warships
to the Persian Gulf to escort the tanker, which is reportedly only carrying cotton, to its
final destination.

24 January 1986- According to a later Senate report, the CIA provides intelligence
regarding the Iran-Iraq war to Iran. Deputy Director for Intelligence Robert Gates is
informed that a Presidential Finding has been signed authorizing arms sales to Iran and
the sharing of intelligence with that country. Gates reports that he objected, saying that
"we were concerned about the Iraqi military situation and that I considered this a very
dangerous thing to do." He is subsequently put in charge of preparing the intelligence to
be provided to Tehran.

9 February 1986- Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi M. Kornienko visits Iran
to discuss an improvement in relations between the two countries. Upon the Soviet
delegation’s departure, Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament,
announces that Kornienko’s visit “will have a great effect on our relations with the Soviet
Union and the Eastern world... One can be optimistic in fields such as technical, military,
economic and possibly political relations.” He adds that there is now no such prospects
for Iranian relations with the United States.

10 February 1986- Iran launches a massive, three-pronged attack near the southern Iraqi
city of Faw capturing the island of Umm al-Rasas in the Shatt al-Arab waterway. While
Iraqi radio contends that Iranian forces were “wiped out, and the enemy only gained a
shaky foothold in some forward areas,” Tehran radio says that Iranian forces seized
“serious booty” and that Iraqi troops “sustained serious damage.”

12 February 1986- An Iranian military communiqué claims that the most recent Iranian
drive has reached the Kuwaiti border. An Iraqi military spokesman, however, described
the Iranian claim as “completely baseless.” Nonetheless, Chedli Klibi, the Tunisian
secretary general of the 22-member Arab League, says that “This is one of the most grave
developments since the beginning of the war... it deprives Iraq of access to the gulf, and
threatens Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.”

31

19 February 1986- The CIA provides Iran with additional maps depicting Iraq's troop @
disposition. On the same day, the Reagan administration condemns Iraq's use of chemical
weapons during Iran's offensive against the Faw Peninsula.

24 February 1986- The UN. Security Council passes a resolution calling for an
immediate cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war.

25 February 1986- Iran launches a new offensive in northeastern Iraq in an attempt to
threaten Iraq’s oilfields near Kirkuk. .

14 March 1986- A U.N. mission sent to Baghdad concludes that Iraq has used chemical
weapons “on many occasions.” In other developments, the Reagan administration warns
Iran that if they carry a military offensive into other gulf states, the U.S. would consider it
“a major threat to U.S. interests.” Likewise, Timothy Renton, British Foreign Office
minister of state, says that Britain will aid Kuwait if the Gulf emirate becomes threatened
by an Iranian military offensive.

20 March 1986-American Ambassador to the U.N. Donald Lowitz condemns Iraq before
the Geneva Convention on Disarmament charging that Iraq has “seriously violated
international law” with chemical attacks on Iranian soldiers.

April 1986- The NSC decides to allow additional intelligence about the outcome of
military operations to be provided to Iraq.

11 May 1986- Prompted by the nearly 200 reported incidents of attacks on merchant
tankers in the Persian Gulf since mid-1984, Iranian President Khamenei says in a meeting
with the Libyan oil minister that “We would like to see the Persian Gulf region in
complete security.” He also tells the Libyan diplomat that he hopes Gulf shipping will
“be considered separate from the war zone.”

12 May 1986- The U.S. Army Operational Group (of the Army Intelligence and Security
Command) produces a report on Chinese-Iraqi contacts concerning construction of a
nuclear power plant in Iraq that would be camouflaged from satellite surveillance.

14 May 1986- An American Naval vessel orders an Iranian patrol boat “to stand clear to
ensure the freedom of navigation” during a routine stop and search operation of an
American merchant vessel in the Gulf of Oman. The Iranians reportedly comply. The
incident, despite being described by an American official as “completely businesslike,”
prompts Ali Akbar Velayati to say on Tehran radio that “The Islamic Republic of Iran, as
the strongest power in the Persian Gulf, will not allow any foreign country, American or
non-American, to intervene in the region.”

22 May 1986- Ambassador to Iraq David Newton visits Eximbank and describes Iraq's
deteriorating military situation in the Iran-Iraq war, as well as the adverse effect on its
economy of early 1986 declines in oil prices. He expresses hope that Eximbank will

32

provide medium-term cover. John A. Bohn, Jr., representing Eximbank, responds that his
"enthusiasm for doing any new business in Iraq varie[s] from zero to not much." Newton
indicates he hopes the bank will "not take any action that would be at odds with current
US Government policy toward Iraq.”

23 May 1986- An Iranian delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Ali Reza Moaeri
visits Paris to meet with French officials. French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac said at a
luncheon after the meeting that France “is ready to normalize relations” with the Islamic
Republic, but that he also wishes to continue his country’s close ties with Baghdad.

25-28 May 1986- An American delegation led by former National Security Advisor
Robert McFarlane secretly visits Tehran to negotiate the release of American hostages
held in Lebanon. The delegation fails to meet with senior Iranian officials as they had
expected to do, and leaves without achieving a resolution to the situation.

5 June 1986- In an effort to keep chemicals out of Iran that could be used to help that
country develop chemical weapons, the United States imposes a ban of the export of
eight chemicals to Syria. Syria has supported Iran in the war with Iraq.

15 June 1986- Massoud Rajavi, the leader of the rebel Iranian People’s Mujahideen, an
Iranian group dedicated to the overthrow of the current government in Tehran, meets with
Saddam Hussein.

Summer 1986- On two occasions, CIA staff officers share intelligence with Iraq that
may have exceeded the scope of authorized intelligence exchanges, according to a later
Senate report.

8 July 1986- Iran again attempts to advance across the border into Iraq. Backed by
artillery fire and air assault Iran claims to have killed over 2,000 Iraqi soldiers. Iraq,
however, says that they have “‘annihilated” the invading Iranian force.

15 July 1986- At the Geneva Conference of Disarmament, Timothy Renton, a British

Foreign Office Minister, charges that Iraqi use of chemical weapons is responsible for
roughly 10,000 casualties, and that Iraq is also increasing it production of a number of
chemical gasses.

23 July 1986- Around this date, a briefing memorandum prepared by Richard Murphy
states that Iraqi setbacks in the Iran-Iraq war call for consideration of "possible steps the
USG might take to bolster the Iraqi will to resist, both psychologically and militarily" and
that the situation "raises questions as to whether the U.S. can do more to pressure Iran to
wind down -- or end -- the war."

August 1986- According to a 1992 Los Angeles Times report, a State Department cable

reports that Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. Bandar bin Sultan has acknowledged that the
Saudis transferred "U.S. origin MK-84 bombs to Iraq."

33

4 August 1986- According to the Los Angeles Times, Vice President George Bush, using
Président Hosni Mubarak as an intermediary, urges Iraq to expand its air attacks against &
Tran.

13 August 1986- State Department Spokesman Charles Redman says that while Iraq is
seeking a negotiated peace settlement, the continuation of the war is the result of the
“intransigence of Iran’s leaders.”

24 August 1986- Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini says in a speech that Iran
must fight until victory and “finish off’ Saddam Hussein. Khomeini also says that “We
should neither submit to imposed peace, nor to imposed arbitration” and that ““We should
continue the war until victory—and it is near.”

25 August 1986- Iran announces that it plans to resume the export of natural gas to the
Soviet Union. American officials see the move as one designed to put pressure on Iraq
because, while officially claiming neutrality in the war, the Soviet Union has been a
major supplier of arms to Iraq.

1 September 1986- Iran claims that in its recent offensive Iranian forces have “pushed
deep inside Iraq” killing and capturing hundreds of Iraqi combatants. Iraq, however, says
that it has inflicted “thousands” of Iranian casualties, destroyed the majority of Iran’s
attacking force, and knocked out hundreds of Iranian vehicles and weapons inside Iraq.

3 September 1986- Iranian naval forces reportedly stop two Soviet tankers in the Persian
Gulf in search of weapons headed to Iraq. This is the first time Iranian patrol boats have
stopped Soviet tankers.

23 September 1986- In a speech given to the United Nations General Assembly, Edward
Shevardnadze, the Soviet foreign minister, says that the Soviet Union considers both Iran
and Iraq “sincere friends” and that the Soviets are “making use of the possibilities
available to us to convince the parties to the conflict that they should make peace.”

1 October 1986- In a speech given to a group of Arab foreign ministers at the U.N.,
Secretary of State George Shultz criticizes the Soviets for failing to block the shipments
of arms to Iran. Shultz says that “We and Soviets officials agreed that we share a
common interest in seeing an end to the Iran-Iraq war. However the Soviets have not
acted as forcefully as we in moving to block arms re-supplied to Iran from countries with
which they have influence.”

2 October 1986- Iranian and French officials meet together at the U.N. for “extensive
talks.” After the meeting, which contained representatives from both countries, Ali
Akbar Velayati says that the new government in Paris is in a position to take more
positive steps towards Iran than ever before.

4 November 1986- In a speech marking the seventh anniversary of the takeover of the
U.S. embassy in Tehran, Hashemi Rafsanjani announces that Robert McFarlane, &

President Reagan’s former national security advisor, traveled to Tehran at an undisclosed
date “within the last two months” bringing American-made military equipment bound for
Iran. He claims the Americans were seized by Iranian authorities and expelled from the
country. Although some of the details are wrong, his revelations, echoing a published
report the day before in the Lebanese magazine Al-Shiraa, expose the Reagan
administration’s arms-for-hostages deals with Iran.

13 November 1986- Although he denies that the United States ever traded arms for
hostages, President Reagan says in a nationally televised speech that he did authorize the
transfer of what he characterizes as “small amounts of defensive weapons and spare
parts” designed to “send a signal that the United States was prepared to replace the
animosity between us with a new relationship.”

14 November 1986- Ali Khamenei denies that Iran ever received weapons from the U.S.,
calling Reagan’s claim “mere lies.”

16 November 1986-Secretary of State George Shultz says that he opposes giving Iran
any more American-made weapons. A day later, President Reagan says that he has
“absolutely no plans” to send more arms to Iran.

1987

11 January 1987- Reportedly stunned by the discovery of American arms shipments to
Iran, the Soviet Union issues its first statement on the affair since it was discovered that
the U.S. was sending American made weapons to Iran. In the statement, which was
issued in both Moscow and at the United Nations, the Soviets strongly condemn the U.S.
The statement reads: “The United States in reality is fanning the flames of the war and
provoking further bloodshed between the two neighboring countries. Washington is
trying to justify its political machinations and behind-the-scenes arms deals by references
to the ‘Soviet threat’ to the Persian Gulf countries.” The statement concludes by saying
that “Military methods only make the final settlement more distant and don’t bring it
closer” to a peaceful resolution.

18 January 1987- An Iranian military spokesman says that Iranian armed forces have
advanced “deep inside enemy lines” and are within 400 yards of the oil refinery at Basra.
Iraq, however, is continuing to bomb the Iranian cities of Isfahan, Tabriz, and Dezful
claiming that the Iraqi air force has conducted 296 bombings within the last day.

19 January 1987- Iranian warships begin using the Italian-made Sea Killer Missile in
night attacks against oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. In other developments, The New
York Times, citing a U.S. diplomat, reports that much of the population of Basra—Iraq’s
second largest city with over a million residents—has been forced to flee to other areas of
the country. One unidentified Asian diplomat says that “This is the most critical point in
the war to date... we’re approaching a 50-50 chance Basra will fall.” If Basra were to
fall, it is reported that American diplomats will consider sending some military
equipment and intelligence to the Iraqi government in Baghdad.

35

3 February 1987- Unnamed American military analysts tell Tae New York Times that
Iraq will not be able to reverse the recent political and military gains by Iran. This is in
contrast to American predictions earlier in the war.

10 February 1987- In a speech given at a mosque near Jamaran, Iran, Ayatollah
Khomeini vows to continue the “war until victory” and says that Iranian troops are
fighting for a “divine cause.” “Almost every day” Khomeini continued, “Iran is hit and
many children, youngsters, old men and ordinary people see their homes fall in on them,
but as soon as they clamber from the rubble they speak of the need for us to make war
until victory.”

11 February 1987- In a specch at a rally marking the eighth anniversary of the Islamic
revolution, Iran’s President Khamenei says that “The aim of this war is to punish the
aggressor and root out aggression.”

11 February 1987- In a memo, a NSC staff official notes intelligence reporting a major
Bulgarian arms shipment to Iran, and recommends providing such information to Iraq
when it becomes available.

19 February 1987- NSC staff official Robert Oakley indicates that the U.S. is attempting
to "reassure and strengthen the moderate Arabs in face of the Iranian threat" and that Iraq
"is making better use of its weapons superiority. We are examining what more can be
done to help them within the limits of our no-arms policy."

14 March 1987- Iran installs the land-based anti-ship HY-2 missile system at two
locations on the Iranian side of the Strait of Hormuz. The HY-2 is a Chinese designed
missile system that fires Styx warheads which carry over 1,000 pounds of explosives and
have a range of 25 to 50 miles. American officials read the Iranian move as an attempt to
close off the Persian Gulf to shipping.

23 March 1987- The U.S. Navy offers to escort Kuwaiti ships carrying oil through the
Persian Gulf in order to counter any threat to the vessels from Iran. A month earlier,
Kuwait became the first Arab country to request outside support (reportedly from both
the United States and the Soviet Union) for ships transporting oil through the Persian
Gulf. The U.S., however, was the first to take up Kuwait on the offer. According to one
State Department official, one reason was that it would send positive “signals” to other
pro-Western Arab states. The United States has come under scrutiny form Arab regimes
since the revelation that the Reagan administration was covertly funneling military
supplies to Iran.

1 April 1987- The Reagan administration tums down an Iraqi request to buy C-130 cargo
planes and artillery radar from the U.S.

36

4 April 1987- Caspar Weinberger tells the U.S. Navy to bolster its forces near the Persian
Gulf. This, Weinberger believes, will help to fulfill President Reagan’s promise that
Arab oil will continue to flow to the Western world.

6 April 1987- After rejecting an earlier American proposal to escort Kuwaiti tankers
through the Persian Gulf, Kuwait proposes to register some of its vessels under both U.S.
and Soviet flags. The expectation is that Iran will be more hesitant to attack U.S. and
Soviet vessels. Kuwaiti ships have been targeted by Iran more than any other nationality.
U.S. officials say they are considering what they call a very “serious proposal.”

14 April 1987- The Soviet Union announces that it will lease three ships to Kuwait to
carry oil through the Persian Gulf. Soviet officials also say that there is a possibility
these ships will be escorted through the Gulf by Soviet naval vessels. In a conversation
with reporters, Gennadi J. Gerasimov, a Soviet spokesman, says his country reached the
decision because the U.S. has been “intimidating the countries of the Persian Gulf to
force them to invite the United States to become their protector.” State Department
officials say that Soviet “warships mean a political presence and the ability to intervene.
(The Persian Gulf) is an area we have defined as vital to U.S. interests.”

20 April 1987- For the first time in the war, Iraq agrees to let a United Nations team visit
and investigate claims that it has used chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers.

21 April 1987- Despite objections from Caspar Weinberger, the Reagan administration
agrees to allow the export to Iran of a $900,000 Swiss-made computer system designed
for use in an electric power distribution center in Tehran.

4 May 1987- Richard Murphy sets off on a trip to Iraq and six other Arab countries in an
attempt to reassure Arab countries in the region that the United States is on their side.
There had been considerable debate on that point since it was discovered in November
1986 that the U.S. was covertly supplying Iran with American-made military supplies.

7 May 1987- The United States begins an effort to persuade the United Nations to
impose a worldwide arms embargo against Iran. U.S. officials believe this will dry up
Iranian arms supplies forcing Tehran to the negotiating table.

8 May 1987- A Soviet freighter is hit at the southern end of the Persian Gulf by an
Iranian missile.

13 May 1987- A United Nations team sent to Baghdad to investigate chemical weapons
use reports that Iraq has begun using chemical weapons against Iranian civilians. In other
developments, Egypt breaks official diplomatic relations with Iran.

17 May 1987- Two French-made Exocet missiles fired from Iraqi jets hit the USS Stark

in the Persian Gulf killing thirty-seven American service men. White House spokesman
Marlin Fitzwater says that from now on, any Iraqi or Iranian aircraft “flying in a pattern

37

which indicates hostile intent will be fired upon, unless they provide adequate
notification of their intentions.” The Iraqis call the raid a “mistake.”

23 May 1987- American officials agree to let Kuwaiti tankers fly American flags while
traversing the Persian Gulf. While Iranian pilots have been careful not to hit American
ships in the past, they say that they will not cease attacks on Kuwaiti tankers even if those
ships are now flying American flags.

27 May 1987- While attending a meeting of NATO defense ministers, Caspar
Weinberger asks his counterparts to join in helping to protect tankers in the Persian Gulf.
NATO, however, turns down the request.

29 May 1987- The Reagan administration postpones plans to provide American military
protection to Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Persian Gulf in order to give the Joint Chiefs of
Staff time to decide what forces will be needed to carry out the mission. Many senior
military officers feel that if the U.S. does proceed with plans to put American flags on
Kuwaiti tankers, the U.S. may draw itself further into the conflict and possibly into war
with Iran. They also feel that, by re-flagging Kuwaiti tankers with American flags, the
U.S. will firmly place itself on the side of Iraq giving away its role as a neutral negotiator.
‘In other developments, Iraqi officials refuse to let the U.S. team investigating the
bombing of the American Naval vessel on 17 May interview the pilots of the plane that
fired the two missiles. Nonetheless, the American team sent to investigate the bombings
say that they are pleased with “the spirit of cooperation and forthrightness” offered by the
Iraqis. Rear Admiral David N. Rodgers, the head of the nine member American
delegation, says also that “We have reached a preliminary agreement... which will
automatically reduce the probability of further attac.

1 June 1987- The U.N. Security Council fails to agree to a U.S. proposal that would
impose an international embargo on selling weapons to Iran. One diplomat, who wishes
to remain anonymous, says that he think there would have been more support for the
U.S. proposal had the Reagan administration not decided to secretly sell weapons to Iran.

2 June 1987- Iran supplies its Navy with forty Swedish-made Cabin Cruisers. These 42-
foot long boats are powered by two diesel engines and can reach speeds of 55 miles per
hour. The reported purpose of these new boats is to allow Iranian forces to move swiftly
through the waters of the Persian Gulf dropping mines in front of commercial ships and
allowing Revolutionary Guardsmen on board to fire rocket-propelled-grenade launchers
at large tankers. The Iranian decision to put the boats into military use was prompted by
American and Soviet moves to protect Kuwaiti shipping in the gulf. As Foreign Minister
Ali Akbar Velayati put it, “Iran wl not allow the superpowers or any foreign forces to
interfere in the region.”

4 June 1987- President Reagan gives a speech at an economic summit meeting in

Venice, Italy in which he threatens both Iran and Iraq with an arms embargo if the two
countries refuse negotiations to end the war.

38

In other developments, Rafsanjani, the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament who has
also emerged as the country’s chief foreign policy maker, says in a news conference that
the Iranian tactic of “human wave” assaults has been wasteful and killed too many
Iranian soldiers.

21 June 1987- The U.N. Security Council agrees to a resolution calling for an immediate
cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war.

28 June 1987- The Iranian press reports that Iraq has dropped mustard gas in a
predominantly Kurdish region of northwestern Iran killing ten and wounding over 650
Kurds. “Most of the martyred and wounded people were children, old women and men,”
the official news agency wrote.

29 June 1987- Citing unnamed Reagan administration officials, The New York Times
reports that Yuli M. Vorontsov, the Soviet first deputy foreign minister, is visiting Tehran
to tell Iranian officials that if they promise not to attack Soviet ships in the Gulf, Moscow
will veto a U.S.-led initiative in the U.N. Security Council that would impose an
international arms embargo on Iran. Vorontsov also invites the Iranian government to
send a representative to Moscow to meet with Iraqi officials in a bid to negotiate an end
to the war. Iran, however, rejects the Soviet invitation.

July 1987- The NSC, at the urging of the State Department, directs the Defense
Department's Defense Technology Security Administration to be "more forthcoming”
regarding license approvals for Iraq.

20 July 1987- The U.N. Security Council unanimously passes another resolution calling
for a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war. This resolution becomes known as Resolution 598
and initially calls for an international arms embargo against both Iran and Iraq if either
side decides not accede to a cease-fire within two months. The Iranian delegate to the
U.N., however, rejects the Security Council motion calling it worthless and saying that it
would be ignored by his government. In sharp contrast with the Iranian point of view, an
Iraqi government spokesman in Baghdad says that “Our primary impression regarding
the text of the resolution is positive.” George Shultz says that the U.S. “is determined that
this mandatory resolution not become an empty effort.” The chief of the Soviet
delegation to the U.N., Aleksandr M. Belonogov, says that the “concentration of armed
forces of third parties in the area continues (with) dangerous consequences of increased
foreign military activity and presence in the conflict area.” This is an apparent reference
to the high number of U.S. naval warships in the Persian Guif.

22 July 1987- Three U.S. warships escort two American flagged Kuwaiti tankers through
the Straight of Hormuz, well within range of being struck by Iranian surface-to-surface
missiles pointed at the gulf, without incident. Many in the Reagan administration feared
Iran would launch the missiles at the convoy prompting an American military response
which would bring the U.S. into a war against Iran.

39

23 July 1987- Ali Akbar Velayati visits Bonn to meet with West German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl. The Iranian foreign minister says later that his talks with the West
Germans were “constructive and productive” and he promised to help free two West
Germans held by pro-Iranian Islamic militants in Lebanon.

24 July 1987- A Kuwaiti tanker escorted by an American Naval warship hits a mine
while traversing through the Straight of Hormuz. Though Iran does not claim
responsibility for the attack attributing it to an “invisible hand,” the Iranian press calls the
incident “an irreparable blow to America’s political and military prestige.”

27 July 1987- George Shultz meets with Tariq Aziz in Washington and asks the Iraqi
government to abstain from any new attacks on Iran. Shultz believes that if Iraq were to
halt its attacks on gulf shipping, Iran would follow suit.

4 August 1987- Iran and the Soviet Union reach an agreement in which the two countries
would cooperate on the building of oil-pipelines from Iran to the Soviet Union, joint
shipping in the Caspian Sea, and, according to the official Iranian news agency, the
“expansion of cooperation in the arena of power, steel, and oil refining ... [as well as]
plans to build a railroad linking the Soviet Union with the Persian Gulf.”

10 August 1987- In spite of Secretary Shultz’s earlier requests, Iraq begins bombing
attacks on the Iranian oil-fields at Tabriz. Iran responds by vowing to make the Persian
Gulf “a killing field for aggressors.”- Shortly thereafter an American-owned oil tanker
hits a mine while entering the Gulf of Oman from the Straight of Hormuz. This marks the
end of an informal cease-fire agreement that had lasted twenty-five days.

26 August 1987- Nizar Hamdoon says that Iraq will resume air attacks against Iran if the
United Nations does not invoke an international arms embargo against the Islamic
Republic for not accepting a cease-fire agreement and peace negotiations. Thee days
later, Iraq attacks two Iranian merchant vessels in the Persian Gulf. An Iranian military
spokesman vows “a crushing response to the Iraqi attacks.” Over forty ships in the Gulf
will be hit by both sides within the next two weeks.

1 September 1987- The United States asks the U.N. Security Council to impose an
international arms embargo on Iran if it does not accept a comprehensive cease-fire
agreement by the end of the week. Two days later the U.S. delegation postpones this call
for a global arms embargo until U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar returns
from his trip to the Persian Gulf region where he will meet with leaders in both Baghdad
and Tehran in an attempt to convince both sides to accept a cease-fire.

13 September 1987- While meeting with the U.N. secretary general in Tehran,
Rafsanjani says that Iran would accept a cease-fire if Iraq, and Saddam Hussein, were
identified as the aggressor by the U.N. Rafsanjani is quoted by the Iranian press as
saying that “The only clear and practical way to solve the problem of the Iran-Iraqi war is
that the aggressor will be identified. In this framework we are ready to cooperate.”

40

15 September 1987- While meeting with Iraqi officials in Baghdad, the U.N. secretary
general is reportedly told by Saddam Hussein that the United Nations needs to take
“punitive measures” against Iran.

22 September 1987- Speaking in front of the U.N. General Assembly, Iranian President
Ali Khamenei rejects a U.N. call for a cease-fire with Iraq and calls President Reagan’s
earlier speech “a pack of lies.”

December 1987- When the staff director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
is briefed on U.S. sharing of intelligence with Iraq, it reportedly marks the first time that
"the ... Committee ... was made officially aware of the sharing arrangement.”

2 December 1987- Sarkis Soghanalian and Hughes Helicopter executives Carl Perry and
William Ellis are indicted on charges of conspiracy to violate the Arms Control Export
Act by smuggling 103 Hughes combat helicopters equipped with TOW missiles to Iraq.

24 December 1987- All fifteen members of the United Nations Security Council declare
themselves ready to accept U.N. Resolution 598 calling for a cease-fire in the war. The
Council, however, stops short of agreeing to a U.S. proposal which would impose a
global arms embargo on Iran if that country does not accept the U.N. sponsored cease-
fire, but all agree that they are willing to take further measures against Iran if the
government in Tehran does not comply. Both China and the Soviet Union were
previously opposed to Resolution 598. Many Western diplomats believe Chinese
opposition to the U.N. proposal stemmed from the fact that Beijing was supplying Iran
with Chinese-made weapons. The Soviets, on the other hand, had, until today, said that
they would support the proposal only if the U.S. were to pull all of its warships out of the
Persian Gulf. Rafsanjani said that the Security Council’s move is the wrong way to end
the war and that any measure that would enforce a global arms embargo on Iran “would
only serve to make the Iranian nation more impatient to reach final victory.”

1988

6 February 1988- While in Baghdad to meet with Saddam Hussein, Gaibnazar Pallayev,
the head of the Soviet delegation in Iraq, announces that the Soviet Union is now
prepared to fully accept the American proposal that would impose an arms embargo on
Iran if that country fails to accept a U.N. sponsored cease-fire.

23 February 1988- George Shultz meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze in Moscow to discuss, among other things, U.N. Resolution 598.
Shevardnadze informs Shultz that the Soviet Union is ready to impose an arms embargo
on Iran if the government in Teheran refuses to comply with the U.N. sponsored cease-
fire. While the two leaders agree to impose the embargo on Iran, they decide to delay
carrying it out for 30 to 60 days in order to allow Secretary General Javier Perez de
Cuellar to make another effort to end the war.

41

5 March 1988- Citing unnamed State Department officials, The New York Times reports
that Mohammad Mahallati, Iran’s permanent representative to the United Nations, hands
to the Security Council an unsigned statement on paper without letter-head announcing
that Iran is ready to accept a U.N. sponsored cease-fire. U.S. officials read the Iranian
move as a final attempt to halt the international arms embargo on Iran.

6 March 1988- Iranian rioters attack the Soviet embassy in Tehran and the Soviet
consulate in Isfahan after the Iranian press accuses the USSR of supplying Iraq with
Soviet-made Scud-B surface-to-surface missiles that were reportedly used in attacks on
the Iranian capital. Officials in Moscow deny that they supplied the missiles to Baghdad.

6 March 1988- An American warship in the Persian Gulf fires on what is believed to be
Iranian speedboats moving towards one of the U.S. Navy’s supply barges. Later that day,
an American helicopter on a reconnaissance mission in the Gulf is fired on by Iranian
armed forces. ,

7 March 1988- Aleksandr M. Belonogov, a Soviet delegate to the United Nations,
proposes to the Security Council a new measure to end the war. The Soviet proposal
includes the appointment of a special representative to negotiate with both sides and a
resolution calling for an end to missile attacks on civilians. American officials read the
Soviet move as an attempt to prolong the U.N. decision on a global arms embargo on Iran
which is expected soon. .

8 March 1988- Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xuegqian tells President Reagan that China
will support a global arms embargo against Iran.

41 March 1988- In a truce signed in Ankara, Iran and Iraq agree to halt attacks on each
other’s cities.

21-26 March 1988- Iraq kills over five thousand Iraqi Kurds in chemical weapons
attacks. Iraq reportedly used the weapons after the Iranian military captured the northern
Iraqi town of Halabja, which is occupied mostly. by Iraqi Kurds. While Iraq offers no
official comment, the Iraqi ambassador in London says that it was Iran, not Iraq, which
used the weapons. Mir Hossein Mussavi, the Iranian Prime Minister, says that the Iragi
attack is “a disgrace for the Middle East.” Referring to Saddam Hussein, the Prime
Minister continued to say that his country will continue the war against Iraq until “the
root of mischief is eliminated from the region.”

1 April 1988- According to reports, Iran claims that an additional 75 people are killed
and over 100 injured in Iraqi chemical attacks in northern Iraq. Ayatollah Khomeini,
Iran’s supreme leader, urges his country to continue the war against Iraq despite the
threat of chemical attacks because “hesitation today will lead to enslavement tomorrow.”

29 April 1988- President Reagan orders the American Navy to use military force to
defend “neutral” ships in the Persian Gulf if they come under attack from Iranian

42

missiles, Until now, only American ships could be protected militarily from Iranian
attack.

16 June 1988- France and Iran restore official diplomatic relations.

1 July 1988- Tariq Aziz admits that Iraq has used chemical weapons in the war against
Iran but maintains that Iran was the first to use chemical weapons in the war. This is the
first such admission by an Iraqi official since allegations of the weapons’ use first
surfaced in 1984.

3 July 1988- The USS Vincennes shoots down an Iranian passenger plane, Iran Air 655,
in the Persian Gulf, killing all 290 civilians aboard. A U.S. Navy spokesman says that
the ship mistook the Iran Air Airbus A300 for a hostile Iranian F-16. Iranian Foreign
Minister Ali Akbar Velayati says that “The United States is responsible for the
consequences of its barbaric massacre.” Tehran radio reported that Iran “will not leave
the crimes of America unanswered” and that “we will resist the plots of the Great Satan
and avenge the blood of our martyrs from criminal mercenaries.” Supreme leader
Khomeini says that “We must all be prepared for a real war and go to the war fronts and
fight against America.” The State Department says that the incident will have “no direct
impact” on American escorting of Kuwaiti tankers while President Reagan says it is an
“understandable accident.” Like Reagan, Saddam Hussein calls the incident a
“regrettable accident.” Iranian officials at the U.N. seek an official condemnation of the
United States.

15 July 1988- The Soviet Union asks the United Nations to call for the removal of U.S.
Naval vessels from the Persian Gulf.

17 July 1988- In a speech marking the 20" anniversary of Ba’ath Party rule, Saddam
Hussein announces that fraq will give up all the land it has captured inside of Iran.
Hussein also says that his country “stands at the edge of victory” and that the Iraqi
military has inflicted “material and moral” damage on Iran. He nonetheless reiterates
Iraq’s conditions for peace, which include “a complete and comprehensive unconditional
withdrawal” by both countries and a pledge that both Iran and Iraq will bring “stability
and security to the region.”

18 July 1988- A letter from Iranian President Ali Khamenei to U.N. Secretary General
Javier Perez de Cuellar announces that Iran is prepared to fully accept an official U.N.
sponsored cease-fire. While the Iraqi delegation remains skeptical of the Iranian
acceptance, the Reagan administration calls the move a “major breakthrough” and says
that it could lead to a reduction in the size of the U.S. force in the Persian Gulf.

20 July 1988- Ayatollah Khomeini says that he personally endorses a cease-fire. The

United Nations announces that it will send missions to both Tehran and Baghdad to begin
working on a formal cease-fire.

43

22 July 1988- On the same day that both sides agree to send their foreign ministers to the ®@
UN. for peace negotiations, Iraq launches a new offensive on the border against Iran in ~
what many believe is an attempt to improve Iraq’s negotiating position in the U.N.

sponsored talks.

25 July 1988- The Commerce Department's Bureau of Export Administration finds 29
export applications for Iraq totaling about $500 million. The Department indicates that
there are "seven cases that appear to be of special concern": one involving Iraq's
Geological Survey, one for the University of Mosul involving remote sensing equipment,
one for the Ministry of Defense involving use of photographic data, an information
system for the General Establishment for Survey, one involving "[Excised] cargo trucks"
for the Ministry of Defense, another for the Ministry of Industry, and one involving
commercial surveillance cameras for the Technical and Scientific Material Division.

30 July 1988- Negotiations begin between representatives from Iran and ia as at the
United Nations.

6-7 August 1988- On 6 August Saddam Hussein announces that he will accept a cease-
fire in the war if Iran agrees to direct talks immediately following the truce. A day later
’ Tran accepts Iraq’s compromise proposal.

20 August 1988- At 7:00 AM local time in Baghdad an official U.N.-sponsored cease-
fire goes into effect. Three hundred and fifty U.N. peace-keepers spread out along the. =
740-mile border between Iran and Iraq to begin to monitor the agreement. @

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The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988
Reader of Declassified U.S. Documents

Memorandum, Zbigniew Brzezinski to the President, “NSC Weekly Report
#122,” Top Secret, December 21, 1979

Memorandum, Zbigniew Brzezinski to the President, “NSC Weekly Report
#156,” Secret, October 3, 1980

Memorandum, Zbigniew Brzezinski to the President, “NSC Weekly Report
#157,” Top Secret, October 10, 1980 :

Presidential Directive, Jimmy Carter, “Persian Gulf Security Framework,”
Secret, January 15, 1981

Cable, U.S. Interests Section Baghdad to State Department, “Iraq Reacts
Angrily to U.S. Condemnation of CW Use,” Confidential, March 7, 1981

Cable, American Embassy Cairo to State Department, “Sadat Confirms
Egyptian Arms Supply to Iraq,” Unclassified, March 31, 1981

Talking Points, for Alexander Haig, State Department, Top Secret, circa April
1981

Cable, U.S. Interests Section Baghdad to State Department, “Meeting with
Tariq Aziz,” Confidential, May 28, 1981

Cable, State Department to U.S. Interests Section Baghdad, “U.S. Policy on
Arms Sales and Transfers to Iraq and Iran,” Secret, June 3, 1981

Cable, U.S. Interests Section Baghdad to State Department, “Staffdel
Pillsbury’s Visit to Baghdad,” Confidential, September 27, 1981

Cable, State Department to U.S. Interests Section Baghdad, “De-Designation of
Iraq as Supporter of International Terrorism,” Confidential, February 27, 1982

National Security Study Directive (NSSD 4-12), The White House, “U.S.
Strategy for the Near East and Southwest Asia,” Secret, March 19, 1982

Cable, American Embassy Tel Aviv to State Department, “Reports of Alleged
U.S. Arms Supplies to Iraq via Egypt -- Possible Items on the Agenda For
MINDEF Sharon’s Visit,” Confidential, May 24, 1982

Cable, American Embassy Tel Aviv to State Department, “Begin Claims Iraq
“Had Prepared’ A-Bombs Prior to IAF Attack on Reactor,” Limited Official
Use, May 25, 1982

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Memorandum and Attached Report, Henry S. Rowan, National Intelligence
Council, to Geoffrey Kemp, National Security Council, “The Iranian Threat to
American Interests in The Persian Gulf,” July 20, 1982

Cable, U.S. Interests Section Baghdad to Commerce Department, “Helicopters
and Airplanes for Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform,”
Classification Unknown, September 20, 1982

Memorandum, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to Secretary of Defense,
“Sale of Helicopters to Iraq,” Classification Unknown, January 1983

Memorandum, W. George Jameson, CIA Assistant General Counsel, to Stanley
Sporkin, General Counsel, “Restrictions on Exports to Iran,” Secret, January 7,
1983

Cable, State Department to U.S. Interests Section Baghdad, “Visit of Iraqi
Foreign Minister,” Secret, January 15, 1983

State Department Memorandum, L/EB to EB/FPG, “CCC-Blended Credits for
Sale of Wheat to Iraq and Syria,” Classification Unknown, February 3, 1983

State Department Memorandum, Richard McCormack to Secretary of State,
“U.S. Credit Possibilities for Iraq,” Secret, March 16, 1983

Cable, State Department to U.S. Interests Section Baghdad, “U.S. Credit
Possibilities with Iraq: Follow-Up to February 14, 1983 Secretary-Mammadi
Meeting,” Confidential, March 16, 1983

Cable, George P. Shultz, “Secretary’s May 10 Meeting with Iraqi Foreign
Minister Tariq Aziz,” Secret, May 11, 1983

Cable, State Department to U.S. Interests Section Baghdad, “Message from the
Secretary for FONMIN Tariq Aziz: Iraqi Support for Terrorism,” Secret, May
23, 1983

Intelligence Assessment, CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “The Iraqi Nuclear
Program: Progress Despite Setbacks,”, Top Secret, June 1983

Cable, U.S. Interests Section Baghdad to State Department, “Militarization of
Hughes Helicopters,” Confidential, June 8, 1983

Cable, U.S. Interests Section Baghdad to State Department, “Visit of Tariq Aziz
to Cairo,” Confidential, July 6, 1983

National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 99) with Cover Memorandum,
The White House, “United States Security Strategy for the Near East and South
Asia,” Top Secret, July 12, 1983

Intelligence Assessment, CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “Moscow’s Tilt
Toward Baghdad: The USSR and the War Between Iran and Iraq,” Top Secret,

August, 1983 &

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State Department Memorandum, Nicholas A. Veliotes and Jonathan T. Howe to
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, “Iran-Iraq War, Analysis of Possible U.S. Shift from
Position of Strict Neutrality,” Secret, October 7, 1983

State Department Memorandum, Jonathan T. Howe to Secretary of State, “Iraq
Use of Chemical Weapons,” Classification Unknown, November 1, 1983

Cable, State Department to U.S. Interests Section Baghdad, “Background on
Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons,” Classification Unknown, November 10, 1983

Cable, State Department to U.S. Interests Section Baghdad, “Deterring Iraqi
Use of Chemical Weapons,” Classification Unknown, November 10, 1983

State Department Memorandum, Jonathan T. Howe and Richard W. Murphy to
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, “Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons,” Classification
Unknown, November 21, 1983

National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 114), The White House, “U.S.
Policy Toward the coe War,” Classification Unknown, November 26,

1983

Cable, State Department to U.S. Interests Section Baghdad, “Rumsfeld Visit to
Iraq,” Secret, December 7, 1983

Cable, U.S. Interests Section Baghdad to State Department, “Rumsfeld Visit to
Iraq,” December 10, 1983

Cable, U.S. Interests Section Baghdad to American Embassy Amman, “Talking
Points for AMB Rumsfeld’s Meeting with Tariq Aziz and Saddam Hussein,”
Secret, December 14, 1983

Cable, American Embassy Rome to State Department, “Rumsfeld’s Larger
Meeting with Iraqi Deputy PM and FM Tariz [sic] Aziz, December 19,” Secret,
December 20, 1983

Cable, American Embassy London to State Department, “Rumsfeld Mission:
December 20 Meeting with Iraqi,” Secret, December 21, 1983

Cable, American Embassy London to State Department, “Rumsfeld One-on-
One Meeting with Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Tariq
Aziz,” Secret, December 21, 1983

Cable, U.S. Interests Section Baghdad to State Department, “Traqi Economic
Situation,” Secret, December 21, 1983

State Department Memorandum and Attached Proposed Letter, Richard W.
Murphy to Lawrence S. Eagleburger, “EXIM Bank Financing for Iraq,”
Confidential, December 22, 1983

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Cable, State Department to American Embassy Amman, “Rumsfeld Mission:
Meeting with King Hussein in London, December 21, 1983,” Secret, December
23, 1983

Letter, Lawrence S. Eagleburger to William Draper, Secret, December 24, 1983

Cable, U.S. Interests Section Baghdad to State Department, “Follow-Up on
Rumsfeld Visit to Baghdad,” Secret, December 26, 1983

Cable, U.S. Interests Section Baghdad to State Department, “Meeting with
Tariq Aziz: Expanding Iraq’s Oil Export Facilities,” Secret, January 3, 1984

Cable, U.S. Interests Section Baghdad to State Department, “[Excised] Iraqi
Pipeline Through Jordan,” Secret, January 10, 1984

Cable, State Department to American Consul Jerusalem, “Follow-Up Steps on
Iraq-Iran,” Secret, January 14, 1984

State Department Memorandum, David T. Schneider and Jonathan T. Howe to
Secretary of State, “Easing Restrictions on Exports to Iraq,” Classification
Unknown, January 30, 1984

Memorandum, State Department to George Kuzmycz, Commerce Department,
“Commerce Validated Export License Application(s),” Classification
Unknown, February 14, 1984

State Department Memorandum with Attached Talking Points, “Briefing
Senator Boschwitz on Truck Sales to Iraq, Confidential, February 14, 1984

Memorandum, Export-Import Bank Board of Directors, “Country Review and
Recommendations for Eximbank Programs,” Classification Unknown, February
21, 1984

Cable, U.S. Interests Section Baghdad to State Department, “Iraqi Warning Re
Iranian Offensive,” Confidential, February 22, 1984.

Cable, State Department to U.S. Interests Section Baghdad, “U.S. Chemical
Shipment to Iraq,” Secret, March 4, 1984

Memorandum with Cover Note, James Placke to Various Addressees, ‘Press
Statement: Iraq’s Use of Chemical Weapons,” Secret, March 4, 1984

Memorandum, State Department to ETRD -- Vehicles File, “Notifying
Congress of [Excised] Truck Sale,” Classification Unknown, March 5, 1984

Cable, U.S. Interests Section Baghdad to State Department, “Ismet Kittani’s
Reaction to U.S. Chemical Weapons Statement and Next Step in U.S
Relations,” Unclassified, March 7, 1984

Cable, American Embassy Vienna to State Department, “Iranian War Wounded
in Vienna,” Confidential, March 13, 1984

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Cable, State Department to U.S. Mission Geneva, “UN Human Rights
Commission: Item 12: Iranian Resolution on Use of Chemical Weapons by
Iraq,” Confidential, March 14, 1984

Cable, State Department to American Embassy Amman, “Kittani Call on Under
Secretary Eagleburger,” Secret, March 18, 1984

Cable, State Department to American Embassy Khartoum, “Briefing Notes for
Rumsfeld Visit to Baghdad,” Secret, March 24, 1984

Cable, American Embassy Manama to State Department, “Middle East
Mission: U.S. Efforts to Stop Arms Transfers to Iran,” Secret, March 24, 1984

Cable, U.S. Mission UN to State Department, “UN Report on Chemical
Weapons Use in Iran/Traq War: Consideration in Security Council,”
Confidential, March 28, 1984

Draft Statement, National Security Council, “Revised Working Paper,”
Unclassified, March 29, 1984

National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 139), The White House,
“Measures to Improve U.S. Posture and Readiness to Respond to Developments
in the Iran-Iraq War,” Top Secret, April 5, 1984

Cable, State Department to American Embassy Amman, “Chemical Weapons:
Meeting with Iraqi Chargé,” Confidential, April 6, 1984

Cable, U.S. Interests Section Baghdad to State Department, “Bell Discusses
Possible Helicopter Sale to Iraq,” Confidential, April 12, 1984

State Department Memorandum, Dick Gronet to Richard T. Kennedy, “Dual
Use Exports to Iraq,” Confidential, April 27, 1984.

Letter, Richard Nixon to Nicolae Ceausescu, Classification Unknown, May 3,
1984

State Department Memorandum, Dick Gronet to Richard T. Kennedy, “U.S.
Dual-Use Exports to Iraq: Specific Actions,” Confidential, May 9, 1984

Memorandum and Attachments, Charles Hill, State Department, to Donald P.
Gregg, The White House, “Eximbank Financing for Iraqi Export Pipelines,”
Confidential, June 12, 1984

CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “Near East and South Asia Review,” Secret,
June 22, 1984

Cable, U.S. Mission UN to State Department, “Alleged U.S. Chemical
Weapons Shipment to Iraq,” Unclassified, July 6, 1984

Cable, U.S. Mission UN to State Department, “Alleged U.S. Chemical
Weapons Shipment to Iraq,” Unclassified, July 17, 1984

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DIA Defense Estimative Brief, “Prospects for Iraq,” Classification Unknown,
September 25, 1984

Briefing Paper, State Department, “Iraqi Illegal Use of Chemical Weapons,”
Secret, November 16, 1984

Cable, State Department to American Embassy Baghdad, “MEMCON:
Secretary’s Meeting with Iraqi DEPPRIMMIN Tariq Aziz, November 26, 1984,
10:00 A.M.,” Classification Unknown, November 29, 1984

Cable, State Department to American Embassy Santiago, “Arms Flow to Iran —
Chilean Cluster Munitions?” Confidential, December 27, 1984

Cable, American Embassy Santiago to State Department, “Arms Flow to Iran —
Chilean Cluster Munitions?” Confidential, December 28, 1984

Cable, American Embassy Amman to State Department, “Hussein on
Mubarak’s Visit and Their Joint Trip to Iraq,” Confidential, March 19, 1985

Cable, American Embassy Baghdad to State Department, “Views of The
Jordanian and Egyptian Ambassadors on Iraq: The War, The Peace Process,
and Inter-Arab Relations,” Confidential, March 28, 1985

Department of State Memorandum, Richard W. Murphy and William Schneider
to Secretary of State, “Letter to Secretary Weinberger on U.S.-Iraqi Relations
and Advanced Technology Exports to Iraq,” Secret, April 28, 1985

Letter, George P. Shultz to Caspar W. Weinberger, Secret, April 30, 1985

Cable with Cover Note, George P. Shultz to Robert C. McFarlane, “U.S. Policy
Toward Iran: Comment on Draft NSDD,” Top Secret, June 29, 1985

Cable, American Embassy Baghdad to State Department, [Title Obscured],
Confidential, July 18, 1985

Memorandum and Attachment, John M. Poindexter to the President, “Covert
Action Finding Regarding Iran,” Classification Unknown, January 17, 1986

Cable, CIA Deputy Director John McMahon to Director of Central Intelligence
William Casey, “Present Status in Saga Regarding the Movement of Tow
Missiles,” Top Secret, January 25, 1986

Memorandum, George P. Shultz to the President, Secret, February 6, 1986

Cable, American Embassy Baghdad to State Department, “Under Secretary
Schneider’s Call On Minister of Trade Hassan Ali: Technology Transfers,”
Confidential, February 12, 1986

PROFS [White House E-mail] Message, Bob Pearson forwarding Message
from Ken DeGraffenreid to Donald Fortier and John M. Poindexter,
“Intelligence Exchange with Iraq,” Top Secret, February 24, 1986

92) Memorandum, Nicholas Platt State Department to Donald P. Gregg White
House, “Proposed Vice Presidential Trip to the Middle East,” Confidential,
February 27, 1986

93) Briefing Papers, State Department, “Gulf War Update; U.S. Attitude Toward
Iran; The Gulf War,” Secret, February 27, 1986

94) Cable, State Department to American Embassy Baghdad, “Maps,” Confidential,
March 10, 1986

95) State Department Memorandum, Daniel J. Dzurek to Berry and Wagner, “Iraqi
Military Survey Proposals Relating to U.S. Mapping Agencies, Report on Ms.
Voigt’s Discussions in Baghdad, January 25, 1986,” Confidential, March 21,
1986

96) Notes, State Department, “Defense Mapping Agency Mapping Exchange with
Iraq,” Classification Unknown, March 25, 1986

97) Intelligence Assessment, CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “Is Iraq Losing the
War?” Secret, April 1986

98) Memorandum, Clayton Norris, “Interagency Review for Iraq,” Classification
Unknown, April 24, 1986

99) Cable, Armacost to Secretary of State, “Arms Sales to Iran,” Secret, May 3,
1986

100) Memorandum, George Cave, “Account of Robert MacFarlane Mission to
Tehran,” Secret (with declassified version attached), May 30, 1986

101) State Department Memorandum, Allen Wallis to Secretary of State, “NEA’s
, Memorandum on Iraq,” Secret, July 15, 1986

102) State Department Memorandum, Richard W. Murphy to Michael H. Armacost,
“Traq: CPPG Meeting of Wednesday, July 23,” Secret, July 23, 1986

103) Cable, State Department to American Embassy Baghdad, “USG Support for
Iraq During the War,” Secret, July 26, 1986

104) PROFS [White House E-mail] Message, Howard Teicher to John M.
Poindexter, “Meeting with Bandar,” Secret, August 13, 1986

105) Cable, State Department to American Embassy Cairo, “Briefing Material for
Ambassador Wisner: Iran-Iraq,” Classification Unknown, August 28, 1986

106) Cable, State Department to American Embassy Baghdad, “Unauthorized
Transfer of MK-84S,” Secret, September 13, 1986

107) PROFS [White House E-mail] Message, Dennis Ross to John M. Poindexter,
“Expanding Intelligence to Provided to the Iraqis,” Classification Unknown,
October 3, 1986

108) Cable, American Embassy Baghdad to State Department, “Greek Transfer of
Ammunition to Iraq,” Secret, November 4, 1986

109) Research Paper, CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “Soviet Policy Toward the
Middle East,” [Excerpt], Secret, December 1, 1986

110) State Department Memorandum, Richard W. Murphy to Under Secretary
Armacost, “U.S.-Iraqi Relations: Picking Up the Pieces,” Secret, December 5,
1986

111) Talking Points, for George P. Shultz, State Department, Secret, December 15,
1986

112) PROFS [White House E-mail] Message, Dennis Ross to Frank C. Carlucci,
“Response on Waite and Status of Iran-Iraq War,” Classification Unknown,
January 20, 1987, 9:56:41

113) PROFS [White House E-mail] Message, Frank C. Carlucci, “Response on
Waite and Status of Iran-Iraq War,” Secret, January 20, 1987, 13:21:31

114) PROFS [White House E-mail] Message, Dennis Ross, “Response on Waite and
Status of Iran-Iraq War,” Classification Unknown, January 20, 1987, 16:07:34

115) Cable, William A. Cockell to Colin L. Powell, “Tran-Iraq,” Secret, January 21,
1987 :

116) Cable, CLA Directorate of Intelligence, “Middle East Asia Brief [Excised] for
21 January 1987,” Secret, January 21, 1987

117) State Department Memorandum, Richard W. Murphy, H. Allen Holmes and
Under Secretary Armacost to Secretary of State, “U.S. Policy on Third-Country
Transfers of U.S. Arms to Iraq,” Secret, February 4, 1987

118) Note, Robert B. Oakley, “President/FCC Meeting with [Excised],”
Classification Unknown, February 19, 1987

119) Cable, American Embassy Baghdad to State Department, “Official-Informal
EXIM,” Confidential, February 19, 1987

120) Cable, State Department to American Embassy Baghdad, “Official and
Informal: Economic and Financial Questions - Iraq,” Confidential, February 19,
1987

121) Memorandum and Attachments, Melvyn Levitsky to Donald P. Gregg, The
White House, “The Vice-President’s March 2 Meeting with Iraqi Ambassador
Nizar Hamdoon,” Confidential, February 26, 1987

122) CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “Near East and South Asia Review,” Secret,
March 1987

123) Letter with Cover Note, Richard W. Murphy to A. Robert Abboud,
Classification Unknown, March 5, 1987

124) National Intelligence Daily, Director of Central Intelligence, Top Secret, May
9, 1987

125) Cable, State Department to American Embassy Baghdad, “Iraqi Aircraft Attack
on U.S. Naval Vessel,” Secret, May 17, 1987

126) Memorandum, CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “Iran-Iraq: Lull in the Gulf
Anti-Shipping War,” Secret, June 17, 1987

127) National Intelligence Daily, Director of Central Intelligence, Top Secret,
December 2 1987

128) National Intelligence Daily, Director of Central Intelligence, Top Secret,
December 19, 1987

129) National Intelligence Daily, Director of Central Intelligence, Top Secret, March
1, 1998

130) National Intelligence Daily, Director of Central Intelligence, Top Secret, March
21, 1988

131) Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, Director of Central Intelligence,
“Impact and Implications of Chemical Weapons Use in the Iran-Iraq War,” Top
Secret, April 1988

132) National Intelligence Daily, Director of Central Intelligence, Top Secret, April
5, 1988

133) National Intelligence Daily, Director of Central Intelligence, Top Secret, April
8, 1988

134) National Intelligence Daily, Director of Central Intelligence, Top Secret, April
13, 1988

135) Cable, CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “European Brief [Excised] for April 20
1988,” Secret, April 20, 1988

136) Cable, CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “Middle East Brief [Excised] for April
20 1988,” Secret, April 20, 1988

137) Memorandum, CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “Iranian Reaction to recent
Military Setbacks,” Classification Unknown, April 21, 1988

138) National Intelligence Daily, Director of Central Intelligence, Top Secret, April
23, 1988

139) Terrorism Review, CIA Directorate of Intelligence, [Excerpt] “Shootdown of
Tran Air 655: Will Iran Retaliate?” Secret, July 28, 1988

140) National Intelligence Daily, Director of Central Intelligence, Top Secret, @
August 20, 1988

141) National Intelligence Daily, Director of Central Intelligence, Top Secret,
August 23, 1988

142) National Intelligence Daily, Director of Central Intelligence, Top Secret,
August 25, 1988

143) CIA Directorate of Intelligence, “Near East and South Asia Review,” Secret,
August 26, 1988

144) National Intelligence Daily, Director of Central Intelligence, Top Secret,
August 30, 1988

145) Cable, American Embassy Baghdad to State Department, “Minister of Industry
Blasts Senate Action,” Confidential, September 13, 1988

146) Memorandum, CIA to [distribution list attached], “Response to National
Security Review-10: U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf,” Secret, March 3,
1989

147) Memorandum, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, “Update for DDCI:
Iran-Iraq Peace Talks,” Secret, April 12, 1989

148) Cable, American Embassy Santiago to State Department, “Iran-Corfo Scandal,”
Confidential, February 28,1990

149) Senate Executive Report, “Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of
Central Intelligence,” October 24, 1991

150) Affidavit, Howard Teicher, “Declaration of Howard Teicher,” Unclassified,
January 31, 1995

10

° “a,

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a
MEMORANDUM ae
””
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
~IOP_SECRET
TAp-SECREL December 21, 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI as
SUBJECT : NSC Weekly Report #122

1. Opinion

Difficult Choices in Iran. Let me just add the following to our
discussions this morning, because I know that this matter is very
much on your mind.

(1) It may well be that Khomeini cannot be moved by economic
pressures in which case military action, which is merely an ex-
tension of economic pressure (blockade or mining), will not move
him either. In the meantime such action could provoke widespread
international reactions against us and thus be self-defeating.

Because of that, we need to consider military actions
which contribute to his downfall, and thus secure the release of
hostages as a consequence of attaining the other objective: his
downfall. I have set up a very small, tightly held group “to see
whether we could somehow mesh covert political action designed
to create an alternative to Khomeini with a series of military
steps which contribute to that end. In other words, our military
options would not be primarily either punitive or designed to
apply economic leverage but would be more deliberately geared
to attaining a political objective.

(2) In that connection, I will think further about some
forms of military action which give us more direct bargaining
leverage. Khomeini is not entirely immune to military threats,
as we already know because he apparently was influenced by our
very secret threat of November 23. You felt strongly today that
taking the islands would be the wrong course of action, and you
may well be right. My only point was that we ought to think
of some military steps which have the effect of imposing a

~LOP—-SECRET— SANITIZED
Review December 21, 1999 £.0.12958, Sec.3.6
Reason: NSC°1.13(b) e

Classified and Extended By 2%. Brzezinski

fhe weed fe ast telery Trig

win fo yo SIt€ Cee” 1, ae

protracted humiliation on Khomeini, which can only be terminated &
through the release of our hostages. Taking some territory, such

as the islands, might have that effect; perhaps mining would also;

in any case, as above, I will be seeking to define for you some
military options which reinforce our political strategy rather

than being either retaliatory or merely an extension of ‘economic
pressure.

(3) With regard to Iraq, in addition to the military aspects
that we discussed this morning, I have checked with Cy Vance,
and he agrees with the notion that it might be useful for Jim
Schlesinger to pay a personal visit to Iraq early in 1980 and to
engage the Iraqi leaders in a wider discussion. I am so informing
Schlesinger. . ’

2. Vance-Brown-Brzezinski Luncheon

Cy, Harold and I reached the following decisions at our weekly
luncheon today:

-- DOD Proposals for Improving Covert Action: In response

to a proposal from the Department of Defense, we agreed to es-
tablish a screening committee to review, expedite and stimulate ,
better covert action proposals. The Committee will meet prior

to SCC meetings and will be authorized to return inadequate &
proposals to CIA for revision if it deems them inadequate for
SCC review. The committee will be composed of David Aaron,
Robert Komer and Ronald Spiers. (S)

-- Sale of French Computer IRIS-80 to USSR: We agreed that

Cy will protest the sale of this advanced computer to the French

Ambassador here. Meanwhile, I will be in touch with my counter-
part in the Elysee, Jacques Wahl, to indicate that French handling
of this matter could affect our attitude on sensitive elements

in our relationship -- including certain obvious kinds of coopera-
tion. We noted that a decision on a telephone switching system
now pending at COCOM is also part of the problem. (S)

"== IBM Computer Supplies to KAMA River: Also with respect

to technology transfer, Harold Brown agreed to look into licenses
for IBM computer parts and supplies to the KAMA River plant in
light of recent publicity and concern over the military signifi-
cance of truck production at the plant. (C)

3. National Security Affairs Calendar (attached)

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‘MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE . #6

WASHINGTON

SECRET WITH

ATTACHMENT October 3, 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI ais a
SUBJECT: . NSC Weekly Report #156

1. _ Opinion

Long-Term Implications of the Iran-Iraq War. The war is likely

to be one of attrition. Iraq has bitten off more than it can
chew, not to speak of digesting. Iran will not acquiesce to this.
Accordingly, the conflict will be destructive not only to the two
protagonists but potentially to the region as a whole. Protracted
warfare could generate more tensions and at some point it could
involve the other Gulf states. That prospect gives rise to a
number of questions:

-- Can Iran live without Khuzistan?
-~- Which way will Iran go politically?

-- How will the Soviets exploit the likely feelers from Iran
for military help, as well as Iraq's appeals for the replenishment
of its military stock?

-- When will the Soviet Union step forward as the peacemaker
and how can we prevent it from becoming the "guarantor" of the
region's stability?

-- Will Saudi Arabia. and the other Gulf states gravitate
toward Iraq?

~- Will Shia passions promote increasing unrest in Kuwait,
Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia?

-- What will be the effect on all of that on Israel's willing-
ness to compromise?

-= Finally, what will all this do to our position in the region?

“SECRET WITH

TOR—SECREPSCODEWORD :
arm 7 DECLASSIFIE

Review October 3, 2000 = 0.12958, 20.3.6
Extended by Z. Brzezinski 7 = \-
Reason: NSC 1.13(a) (£) ven lula Mey Senne

‘et

td

In this short memo I do not propose to address all of these question
but I list them to highlight the scope and the gravity of the problem
that we now confront. So far, we have responded well, and I think

you are entitled to claim greater public credit for this than so

far has been given. We have openly committed ourselves to keep

the Strait of Hormuz open; we have protected our position in Saudi
Arabia; and we have not tilted to either of the protagonists. We

have thus avoided a break with the Arabs, while keeping our options
open with the Iranians.

The threat to the security of the Gulf gives us also a unique oppor-
tunity to consolidate our security position in a manner which even

a few weeks ago would have been not possible. The Saudis and the
other Gulf states are much more inclined to seek U.S. military
presence since they have become very anxious about their longer-
term security. While we should not appear over-eager in proffering
our military assistance, we would miss a major strategic opportunity
if we fail to exploit this. Accordingly, I am very much in favor

of expanding our present military role, especially in terms of air
defense systems and major presence, along the lines of Harold's
recommendations.

Looking beyond these immediate steps regarding the Persian Gulf,

we need to initiate both more subtie and more covert initiatives
regarding Iran. . While reinforcing our position in Saudi Arabia,

and while not clashing with Arab aspirations (and thus while not &
openly opposing Iraq), we should actively seek new contacts with
Iran to explore the possibility of helping it just enough to put
sufficient pressure on Iraq to pull back from most, if not all, of
its current acquisitions. Only by attempting to do this can we

make the needed effort to safeguard Iran from Soviet penetration

or internal disintegration.

To accomplish this task will not be easy, especially in the current
circumstances. The Iranian leadership at the very top is irrational
and fanatical. The radicals, moreover, have also a stake in keeping
tensions high with the United States. Nonetheless, there must be a
great.many Iranians, including in the present leadership, who must
realize that the present fate of Iran is the by-product of its.
isolation from the United States. If encouraged, they might either
be able to put enough pressure on Khomeini to alter his position

or to take action to alter the existing power arrangements in Tehran.

Our present contacts with the Iranians are primarily through the
Swiss and the Germans. That may be good enough insofar as the
hostage issue is concerned, but I suspect that it will not suffice
insofar as the longer-term strategic issue is concerned. I think
there are four governments which could be enlisted for the kind of
dialogue I feel we need to initiate: Algeria, Turkey, Pakistan,
and China. Each, in its own way, has some influence in Tehran,
and each has a reason to be sympathetic to our efforts. Certainly &

* “SpoREe— | 3

the last three should favor efforts to preserve the strategic line
south of the Soviet Union, running from the northern Turkish frontier
through the Caspian Sea to Pakistan. Even the Algerians have a stake
in an outcome which avoids the fragmentation of Iran (I attach at
Tab A an extremely interesting and revealing discussion of this
problem by the Algerian Foreign Minister, whom I had gotten to know
in the course of my visit to Algiers, and whose judgment I respect).

I do not believe efforts to use these governments can be initiated
through traditional diplomatic channels. Some genuinely private

and secret initiatives are needed, exploiting whatever ties of
personal confidence we have at the top levels of these governments.
These initiatives need to be orchestrated carefully, and they should
be focused on Iran's survival and not directly on the hostage issue,
though if successful they could have the effect of being helpful
not’ only on the longer-term strategic matter but on the more immed-
iate problem of the hostages as well. Only you can get this process
underway. ;

2. National Security Affairs Calendar (Tab B)

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* " MEMORANDUM

a WHITE HOUSE #7

WASHINGTON

October 10, 1980 re
f o
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI 1S . QO
_—
SUBJECT: Weekly Report #157

1. Muskie-Brown-Brzezinski Meeting

Ed, Harold and I reached the following decisions at our meeting
this week.

to the
you to

recent

On Greek reintegration into NATO, Harold will write
Greek Defense Minister. We will hold a letter from
Rallis until we hear from General Rogers.

We agreed on a message to be sent to the French summarizing
sensitive cooperation, spelling out our overflight requests

and reiterating our position on COCOM.

® 2. NSC Activities

Reactions to the Iran-Iraq War

The following is a brief summary of where various states stand
in their views of the Iran-Iraq conflict:

- Persian Gulf States. The initial wave of pan-Arab support
‘for Iraq has waned as the realities of regional vulnerabilities
have set in. The smaller Gulf states have become increasingly
concerned with the possibilities of an expanded war and of
Iraqi dominance of the Gulf. U.S. military presence -- naval
task forces, security agreements, and rapid deployments --
have prevented the spread of the war and have strengthened
the Gulf states diplomatically vis-a-vis Iraq.

Oman. Oman has made out well diplomatically. It has

garnered Iraq's favor without actually having to involve
itself in the conflict. All Iraqi aircraft which were.to
strike Bandar Abbas from Oman have been withdrawn. The

~TOP—SECRET

1986 BxC} LASEIED

Review October 10,

mobo

| Carne
TAH eC NARS. DATE

-BOP-SEERET | 2

The U.S.-Oman access agreement and the accompanying letter @
on Omani security have given Qaboos the confidence he needs

to be able to remain uninvolved. Oman is concerned with

Iranian intentions and has asked the U.S. for a statement

of our intentions, should Oman become involved in the war.

Oman has indicated interest in AWACS coverage.

~- UAE. The emirates have been consistently reluctant to
support Iraq in tangible ways. Some unauthorized Iraqi
aircraft landed in the UAE enroute to Oman during the first
days of the war, but since then, the UAE has not provided any
assistance. It is unlikely that any Iraqi patrol boats are

in the UAE, as was alleged early in the conflict. The Iranian.
Navy reports of MIGs in Dubai are unsubstantiated and, ac-
cording to DIA, are probably not believed even by the Iranians.
UAE has expressed interest in AWACS information and has offered
to expand its oil production.

-- Qatar. Qatar has been uncooperative with Iraq from the
outset, refusing the Iraqis overflight permission enroute to
Oman. Qatar has adopted a low profile throughout the conflict.

~~ Bahrain. As it has become increasingly apparent that

Iran is not succeedingin removing the perennial Iranian threat

to Bahrain, the Bahrainis have become restrained in their

support for Iraq. Bahrain is constrained by its large and
restive Shi'a population. The U.S. Embassy asserts that the e
presence of the U.S. MIDEASTFOR is a source of great comfort

to Bahrain. Bahrain has asked for AWACS information. Saudi
Prince Bander reports that Bahrain is willing to extend its
support for MIDEASTFOR in exchange for a security agreement.

-- Kuwait. Kuwaiti support for Iraq has been tempered by
historical Iraqi irridentist claims on Kuwait, fear of Iranian
reprisals, and a population which generally favors Iran in
the conflict. Kuwait has recently and reluctantly allowed
some Iraqi aircraft to be stationed in Kuwait. The U.S.

_ Embassy reports that Kuwaiti fears of an Iranian attack have
been greatly lessened by the deployment of AWACS to Saudi
Arabia and that, rhetoric notwithstanding, Kuwait expects
the U.S. to keep the Gulf open. Kuwait has expanded its oil
production in response to the shortfall caused by the inter-
ruption of Iraqi oil.

-- Saudi Arabia. After initial messages of support, Saudi

Arabia has moved to a far more balanced public posture, calling
for both sides to end the conflict. Deployments of Iraqi

bomber aircraft to Saudi Arabia have apparently ended. The

U.S. Embassy reports that U.S.-Saudi relations are especially
close now as a result of the renewed confidence Saudi Arabia

has in the U.S. security commitment. Iraqi sources indicate
dismay at the rapid shift of Saudi Arabia to the American e
security umbrella. Saudi Arabia has also expanded oil

production. ,

—TOPR_SECRET

ee

. \
e, wt

TOP_SECRET 3

~- Jordan. Alone among regional states, Jordan has adopted
an activist pro~Iragi profile. Insulated from Iranian
retaliation, King Hussein has offered direct Jordanian aid
and support for Iraq, including Jordanian troops, although
in recent days, Hussein has backed away from the offer of
direct Jordanian participation in combat. Aqaba has become
a major source of imported goods for Iraq.

- Extra-regional States. Most have adopted a neutral position,
hoping to stay away from the conflict. Austria has refused
to entertain Iranian requests for support. Turkey has refused
overflight permission for war materiel going to either bellig-
erent, a policy which will be more damaging to Iran. The UK, .
the FRG, Portugal, and Spain have all voiced concern to varying
degree over the use of their territories and airspaces by
the U.S. to support the AWACS deplovment, although the AWACS
decision itself has met with approval.

- Multi-national Naval Force for the Strait of Hormuz. Those
states which have been approached are willing for the most
part to cooperate on a navy-to-navy basis but are most
reluctant to agree at a political level. The UK, France,.
Australia, New Zealand, and Italy are all engaged, in one
form or another, in navy-to-navy discussions with the U.S.
Press converage shows split opinions in Europe about the
advisability and necessity of a multi-national naval force,
with the balance seeming to be in the direction of approval
of such a force. Assertive U.S..leadership in guaranteeing
the Strait has forced at least a modicum of support from the
Allies. The presence of a U.S. carrier battlegroup in the
Gulf of Oman at the outbreak of hostilities lent substantial
credibility to U.S. pronouncements about the Strait.

U.S.-Pakistani Relations after the Zia Visit

‘In reviewing your meeting: with President Zia, several things
stand out:

-- A cordial personal relationship was established. This
was the main object of the visit.

-- The Pakistanis went away believing that the Indians no
longer have a veto over the U.S.-Pakistani relationship. (We
would argue that they never did, but Zia clearly thinks that we
have turned a significant corner and that you confirmed this to

him.)

. -- On covert support of the Afghan nationalists, Zia is
as cooperative as he thinks he can be on a bilateral basis; the
Pakistanis do not, however, want us to get involved in organizing

ie 7 | pee we ee

4

other countries' support of the insurgents (hence Zia's faseruceicaae
tha e Europeans should approach him directly).
ce crmemmimmennesnensnsatt ttt iIIO 20 2aate tata

-- The Pakistanis want and probably expect large-scale
economic assistance. They put this in terms of debt relief.
I have little doubt, however, that they are expecting something
pretty significant for FY 82 bilateral assistance to be unveiled
after our elections. They did not ask for anything but oney
made their expectations known.

The net result of all of this would seem to be a relationship in
which Pakistan receives no military aid from us; makes routine
military purchases, but not of the kind that would heavily affect
our Indian concerns; expects substantial economic assistance;
pursues its nuclear projects; leaves us to figure out how to deal
with the Symington question; pursues its 2ll-azimuths foreign
policy, in which we play a significant but not dominant role;

‘ within that context continues to support the Afghan resistance;

and works on a relationship with us that may win some support
against India.

Since the appearance of the Pakistani policy design suits our
purposes adequately, we might as well follow it and thereby try
to reinforce it. In this context, we should:

-- Maintain the moderate level of rhetoric that we have gS
been following and hope that the Paks do the same. (Zia's state-
ments to the press and subsequent "inspired" Pak press commentary
are well within the acceptable range.)

-- Make an effort for something substantial (i.e. much more
than the planned $100 million) in the FY 82 assistance budget for
Pakistan. If we do not act soon, this situation will be completely
out of hand and we will be'talking about FY 83. This means that
we are going to have to make the decision to go for a repeal or
waiver of the Symington and Glenn Amendments. We will, of course,
wait until after our elections but must start to lay our plans
soon. :

3. Alert
Command Arrangements in the Persian Gulf

As might have been predicted, we have yet to coordinate and tie:

' together effectively our AWACS, HAWKS, and DDGs (guided missile

frigate) air defense capabilities in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.

The insurmountable problem is the command structure. AWACS is

from the U.S. but controlled through EUCOM in Stuttgart. For

reasons I have not learned in detail, control over AWACS activities
and control over HAWK activities have proven almost impossible

to coordinate or tie together. That probably relates to AWACS @

-~POP—SECRET—

popenerse= | 5

coming from a U.S. command and the HAWK activities being tied
through USMTM in Riyadh. It is also an Air Force-Army problem.

The truly ridiculous problem, however, is that the guided missile
frigates with their impressive air defense capability must com-
municate with AWACS and HAWKS a few miles away by transmissions
back through Honolulo-JCS~-Stuttgart-Riyadh, e.g. all the way around
the world! The same is true for putting the F-l4s into the air
defense system with AWACS.

4. National Security Affairs Calendar (attached)

TO:

SUBJECT:

UNGEACCICIED

Presidential Directive/NSC-63

The
The
The
The
The
The
The
The
The

NASHINGTON

January 15, 1981

Vice President

Secretary of State
Secretary of The Treasury
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of Commerce
Secretary of Energy

ee tA
Shey

Director, Office of Management & Budget
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Central Intelligence

Persian Gulf Security Framework

(U)

In my State of the Union Address to the Congress in January 1980, <r
called special attention to our interests in the Southwest Asia and

Persian Gulf region.

Afghanistan, I declared that:

Furthermore, in light of the Soviet invasiow of

"An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the

Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the
vital interests of the United States.
by the use of any means necessary, including military force."

(U)

It will be repelled

Subsequently, I have directed action to protect the Strait of Hormuz
and strengthen our key friends in the region in the face of risks

stemming from the Iran/Iraq war. It is U.S.
commitments and to defend our vital interests in the region as a whole

by:

strategy to meet these

-- making the Soviet Union aware that it will also face a wide
vange of economic and diplomatic sanctions on a worldwide
basis if it intervenes in the region;

-- assisting countries in the region: to deter and diminish
internal and external threats to stability; and to

@ MASsiien a

Reason for Eurensich. NSC 1.13 (e)

Partially Declaisifled /Reléased on E2735.
under provision§ of £.3. 12356
by ?. Reger, Naticnal Security Council

ws

contribute to deterring and resisting Soviet penetretion --
political, economic, or military;

-- diminishing radical influences in the region and enhancing
US security by working for progress toward a comprehensive
Arab-Israeli peace settlement;

ere has been considerable progress in improving our security posture
in the region and in shaping an effective security framework. To
ensure that this trend continues, I direct that the Persian Gulf ~
Security Framework be pursued as follows: (C)

oe

I. The Military Component

The Department of Defense has principal responsibility for
initiatives in this area consistent with the responsibility of the
Department of State. This component will include greater effort in
the following areas:

It. The Foreign Policy Component

The Department of State has principal responsibility for this
component, which will be carried out in terms of:

UNGEASSIFIEN

OinoeassirieD ~ - -

A. The Middle East Peace Process in which progress must be
achieved as rapidly as feasible. (S)

TII. Economic Issues

The Department of the Treasury, State, and Energy will share
responsibility in this area. Economic subcomponents are:

A. Oil Policy, to ensure availability of oi1 at reasonable
prices oat to reduce Western dependence on Gulf oil. (S)

B. Western Economic Assistance, in which our goal will be to
Relp address economic problems in the ~egion through multi-~
lateral and unilateral efforts. (S)

D. Economic Stability which is crucial to both the internal
and external security and to the political stability of
states in the region. It should be an integral component
of the security review process and taken into account in

any U.S. decisions concerning military and/or economic
assistance. (S)

‘IV. intelligence Issues

UMALACCICICN

UMGUSSED '

Resources Considerations

Each agency will be responsible for and will identify the” programs
in its area which are required for implementing this directive. In
addition, each agency will propos appropriate priority for these
programs. {(C)

The ‘Office of Management’ and: - Budget will. monitor agency prograns in
support ‘of ‘this directive, will insure that such programs are identi-
fiable,; and will insure. “that they are receiving an appropriately high
priority in all agencies. cc)

Coordination

Interagency coordination,.for: the: ~sequréty framework shall eaptinee to
be accomplished. by the Special ‘Coordination Committee. (C)

Ue Veni.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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TRANSCRIBED COPY FOLLOWS

2. (U) SENIOR IRAQI LEADERS HAVE REACTED SWIFTLY AND .
ANGRILY TO THE CONDEMNATION OF IRAQI USE OF CW BY DEPT PRESS
SPOKESMAN MARCH 5. ON MARCH 6., MINISTER OF DEFENSE ADMAN
KHARALLAH AT A PRESS CONFERENCE WITH FOREIGN JOURNALISTS
REJECTED OUR CHARGES CALLING THEM “HYPOCRITICAL." THAT SAME
EVENING IRAQI TELEVISION AND RADIO NEWS ANNOUNCERS READ
VERBATIM TEXT OF FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT UN #621591 IN
WHICH AMONG OTHER THINGS OUR STATEMENT WAS AGAIN DECLARED
"HYPOCRITICAL" AND CHARACTERIZED AS HAVING BEEN
"IMBALANCED" AND OVERLY DIPLOMATIC IN DEALING WITH IRAN’S
"AGGRESSION AGAINST IRAQ” THE MINISTGER’S STATEMENT WENT ON
TO DENOUNCE THE US POSITION AND SAID THAT IT WAS IN LINE
WITH PREVIOUS ALLEGED US [ILLEG] INTENTIONS TOWARD IRAQ.
THE STATEMENT CONCLUDED BY RECALLING USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS
AGAINST JAPANESE CITIES IN WW II TO SHORTEN THE WAR AND
REDUCE CASUALTIES AND SAID THE US IS "THE LAST COUNTRY WITH
THE RIGHT TO SPEAK ABOUT THE ETHICS OF WAR."

3. (U) LATER THE SAME EVENING, IRAQI TELEVISION CARRIED
THE SPEECH OF PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN TO THE AREA LABOR
CONFERENCE WHICH IS MEETING IN BAGHAD. IN HIS SPEECH, SADDAM
NOTED THE US CHARGES AND IMPLIED THAT THE US WAS SUPPORTING
IRAN BY REPEATING ALLEGATIONS WHICH WERE USED BY IRAN TO
COVER ITS BATTLEFIELD FAILURES. HE ACCUSED THE US OF TRYING
TO CURRY FAVOR WITH IRAN IN AN EFFORT TO BUILD BRIDGES TO iT

4, (C) THE IRAQIS APPARENTLY HAVE BEEN STUNNED BY OUR
PUBLIC CONDEMNATION.

eee? ear : B fi,
Department.of State TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

AN: 0810151-0145
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 CAIRO O7515 3115347
ACTION PH-09

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 AID-07 INR-10 SS-15 AF-10 CIAE-00

COMP-01 DODE-00 H-01 NEA-07 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 S$S0-0¢
HA-06 L-03 TRSE-00 OMB-01 SSM-05 INRE-00 ACDA-12

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eo---- eoeen nnn nn 351257 3115352 741

© 3114487 HAR 83
FH AHEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHOC IMHEOIATE 9766
INFO AHEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AHCONSUL ALEXANDRIA
AHEMBASSY AMHAN
_ AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEHBASSY DAMASCUS
USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE
© AHCONSUL JERUSALEM
AHEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AHMEMBASSY KHARTOUM : .
AHEMBASSY KUWAIT
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UNCLAS CAIRO 07515

E.0. 12065: NA

TAGS: MASS, EG, 12, XF

SUBJECT: SADAT CONFIRMS EGYPTIAN ARHS SUPPLY TO IRAQ

1. PRESIDENT SADAT TODAY PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED THAT EGYPT
HAS SUPPLIED IRAQ WITH MILITARY EQUIPHENT IN RESPONSE TO
IRAQ’S REQUEST. SADAT EXPLAINED THAT A “THIRD PARTY oe
HAD APPROACHED EGYPT ON IRAQ'S SEHALF TO REQUEST SPARE
PARTS. SADAT SAIO HE TOLD THE INTERMEDIARY TO ASK IRAQ

TO HAKE THE REQUEST DIRECTLY, WHICH IRAQ SUBSEQUENTLY DIO.
SADAT SAIO [RAQ CHOSE “LHPORTANT" (BUT UNSPECIFIEO)

UNCLASSIFIED }
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 CAIRO O7515 3115342 ix
@ EQUIPMENT FROM THE STOCKS OF THE ARABS ORGANIZATION FOR rs

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UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

INDUSTRIALIZATION.

2. EXPLAINING EGYPT'S ACTION, SADAT RECALLED THAT [RAQ
PROVIDED EGYPT WITH FREE MILITARY EQUIPHENT IN 1973,
INCLUDING “LUNA~ SURFACE TO SURFACE MISSILES, AFTER INDIA
‘MAD REFUSED EGYPT*S REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE. FURTHERMORE,
SADAT SAID, IRAQ SENT A SQUADRON OF PLANES TO FIGHT WITH
EGYPT OURING THE 1973 WAR. SADAT SAIO HE REGRETTED EGYPT
COULD NOT PROVIDE CURRENT ASSISTANCE FREE OF CHARGE, AS
{RAQ HAD DONE. HE ADDED FINALLY THAT EGYPT TOLD IRAQ THAT
EGYPT MAINTAINS A STANCE OF POLITICAL NEUTRALITY I8=THE -
IRAN-IRAGQ CONFLICT SINCE IT OPPOSES FIGHTING BETWEEN
ISLAMIC SOCIETIES. ATHERTON

UNCLASSIFIED

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1. AS WE DISCUSSED 3592! EAST TRIP, I PROPOSED To
PRESIDENT SADAT, PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND CRCWN PRINCE FAHD
THAT WE ESTASLISH A PRIVATE CHANNEL FOR THE CONSIDERATION oF
PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE MATTERS OF CONCERN TO YOU AND TO THEM.
2. EACH OF THE THREE PICKED UP ON THE PROPOSAL AND ASKED FCR
EARLY MEETINGS. LAST WEEX, I SENT MY COUNSELOR, 3UD MCFARLANE
TO CAIRO AND RIYADH TO OPEN THE DIALOGUE WITH THE SAUDIS AND
ES{PTIANS. HE HELD EXTREMELY USEFUL MEETINGS WITH BOTH SAAT
AND FAHD--IN FACT, SADAT KEPT ED MUSKIE WAITING FOR AN HOUR .
AND A HALF WHILE HE EXTENDED THE MEETING.
3. IT IS CLEAR THAT YOUR POLICIES OF FIRMNESS TOWARD THE
SOVIETS HAS RESTCRED SAUDI AND EGYPTIAN CONFIDENCE IN THE
LEADERSHIP CF THE U.S. 30TH WENT MUCH FURTHER THAN EVER
BEFORE IN OFFERING TO BE SUPPORTIVE. SADAT OFFERED TO HOST

A_FORWARD HEADQUARTERS FOR THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE (RDF)

aad INCLUDING A FULL-TIME PRESENCE OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL.
HE ALSO ELASCRATED HIS STRATEGY FOR PUTTING A MAJOR EGYPTIAN
FORCE INTO LI3YA TO INTERDICT QADHAFI'S ACTIVITIES IN CHAD. :
FRANKLY, I BELIEVE HE COULD EASILY GET OVEREXTENDED IN SUCH
AN UNDERTAKING AND WILL TRY TO MODERATE HIS AMBITIONS ON THIS

. SCORE.

s FAHD WAS ALSO VERY ENTHUSIASTIC TOWARD YOUR POLICIES. AS
A MEASURE OF HIS GOOD FAITH, HE INTENDS TO INSIST ON A COMMON
OIL POLICY AT A FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH HIS ARAB COLLEAGUES
WHICH WILL INCLUDE A SINGLE PRICE AND A COMMITMENT TO NO
DROP _IN PRODUCTION. ALSO OF IMPORTANCE WAS FAHD'S AGREE~

MENT_IN PRINCIPLE TO FUND ARMS SALES TO THe PAXISTANIS AND

Pig AUC DBweAKsl D212 wate
Fr | AT a TA TN TT TE

Td

OTHER STATES IN THE AREA.
§. BOTH SADAT AND FAHD PROVISED CTRER BITS oF USEFUL INTELLIGENCE

(E:G. IRAN [5S XECEIVING MILITARY SPARES FOR U.S. EQUIPMENT FROM

?
+

ISRAEL). IT WAS ALSO INTERESTING TO CONFIRM THAT PRESIDENT
Cc

meee.

ARTER GAVE THE IRAQIS A GREEN LIGHT TO LAUNCH THE WAR AGAINST
JRAN THROUGH FAHD.

6. THESE CHANNELS PROMISE TO BE EXTREMELY USEFUL IN FORGING
COMPATIBLE POLICIES WITH THE SAUDIS AND EGYPTIANS. 30TH MEM
VALUE THE "SPECIAL STATUS" YOU HAVE CONFERRED ON THEM AND 30TH
VALUE CONFIDENTIALITY.

7. I. WILL FOLLOW UP WITH CAP WEINBERGER AND BILL CASEY ON
THESE MATTERS.

8. NEXT WEEX I WILL OPEN ANALAGOUS EXCHANGES WITH PRESIDENT
ZIA OF PAKISTAN AND BEGIN OF ISRAEL. TI WILL KEEP YOU
INFORMED.

$. THE LARGER MESSAGE EMERGING FROM THESE EXCHANGES HCWEVER,
TS THAT YOUR POLICIES ARE CORRECT AND ARE ALREADY ELICITING

THE ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORT OF IMPORTANT LEADERS ASROAD.

a

TEXT OF TELEGRAM 81BAGHDAQ01446

ADP628 :
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BAGHDA 01446 01 OF 02 2817522 x
ACTION SS-30 -

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 sSSO0-00 /031 W
~—~331371 2817572 /46 |

O 281255Y MAY 81

FH USINT BAGHDAD.

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1853

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN e
ANEMBASSY LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 BAGHDAD 1446

-_ DECAPTINNE®

E.0. 12065: RDS 1 5/28/01 (EAGLETON, UrELIES L.) OR-M .
TAGS: PEPR, US, IZ
SUBJ: MEETING WITH TARIQ AZIZ

1. (C — ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: IN A MEETING WITH RCC IDEOLOGUE AND FOBEIGN
POLICY SPOKESMAN TARIQ AZIZ, BOTH SIDES EXPRESSED SUPPORT
FOR EFFORTS TO PROMOTE BETTER US-IRAQI RELATIONS. TARIQ
AZIZ GAVE THE IMPRESSION IRAQ WOULD MOVE QUICKLY TO
RESTORE DIILOMATIC RELATIONS IF A NEW US HIDDLE EAST POLICY
WAS, IN THE IRAQI'S VIEW, MORE BALANCED. HS WELCOMED

AN INCREASE IN US-IRAQI TRADE AND WIDER CONTACTS IN GOVERN-
MENT AND PRIVATE SECTORS. HE SUGGESTED CONCENTRATING ON
PROHOTING US-IRAQI UNDERSTANDING AS A PRELUDE A

DETAILED DISCUSSIONS OF THORNY ISSUES SUCH AS THE ARAB-
ISRAELI CONFLICT. HE SAED USINT'S REQUEST TO OPERATE A

2
e

DECLASSIFY {MR Cases Only

Non-Responsive inte

TRANSMITTER TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE DEPARTMENT WOULD BE #

APPROVED. IN CONCLUSION, HE ASKED THAT I CONVEY. HIS E

PERSONEL BEST WISHES TO SECRETARY HAIG ALONG WITH

TRAQ'S DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. END SUMMARY. & é r

3. HAVING MADE THE REQUEST FOLLOWING MY RETURN FROM >& ee

CONFIDENTIAL # : a

CONFIDENTIAL fi ~~ -
we fh R

PAGE 02 BAGHDA 01446 01 OF 02 2817527

WASHINGTON .CONSULTATIONS, ON MAY 28 I HAD A ONE~AND~A~- :
HALF HOUR MEETING WITH RCC MEMBER TARIQ AZIZ. THIS
IS HIGHEST LEVEL IN THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT OUR BAGHDAD MISSION
HAS HET WITH SINCE THE 1967 BREAK IN RELATIONS.
TARIQ AZIZ HAS CCNSTDERARLY MUKE C).OUC WITHIN IRAG'S
LEADERSHIP THAS FORMLGN GINISLER HiEMADI AND IS IFE
HIGHEST LEVEL 3POKESV?FN OF FOPEIGN POLICY AFLER
SADDAM HUSSAIN. AS AN TRAQI CHRISTIAN, HE IS NO THREAT
TO THE LAT ER AS HE COULD NOT ASPIRE TO SUPREME
PAGE NO. 1

TEXT OF TELEGRAM 61BAGHDA001446

DEADERSHIP.

4. AFTER OPENING PLEASANTRIES, TARIQ AZIZ SUGGESTED
THAT I BEGIN WITH A DESCRIPTION OF THE ATMOSPHERE

IN WASHINGION. I EXPLAINED IN SOME DETAIL THE APPROACH
OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, EMPHASIZING CONSTANCY,
RELIABILITY AND BALANCE AND A DETERMINATION TO
STRENGTHEN U.S. ARMED FORCES AND PLAY AN APPROPRIATE
ROLE IN OPPOSING SOVIET DESIGNS, PARTICULARLY IN THE
THIRD WORLD. I ALSO DESCRIBED THE CENTRAL POSITION

OF THE TERRORISM ISSUE IN U.3. ATTITUDES. I REFERRED
TO SECRETARY HAIG'S RECENT VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST
AND REPEATED SOME OF THE BRIEFING GIVEN FOREIGN
MINISTER HAMMADI BY DAS DRAPER. I EXPRESSED THE U.S.
GOVERNHENT'S SATISFACTION WITH THE POSITIVE TREND IN
U.S8S.-IRAQI RELATIONS. NOTING THAT WE DID NOT BELIEVE If
WAS NORMAL FOR THESE RELATIONS TO REMAIN SEVERED, I
EMPHASIZED THAT WE DID NOT WISH TO PRESSURE THE IRAQI
GOVERNMENT ON THIS ISSUE AND THAT MEANWHILE THERE WAS
MUCH TO BE DONE WITHIN THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK. I DE- :
SCRIBED OUR NEUTRAL POLICY ON THE IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT,
WHICH CAUSED US TO REFRAIN FROM SELLING TO OR LICENSING «
ARMS FOR EITHER SIDE. I SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THE
IRAQI CONCERN OVER HELICOPTER DELIVERIES FROM ITALY,
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BAGHDA 01446: 01 OF 02 2817522

NOTING THAT THESE LICENSES HAD BEEN OBTAINED AND PAY-

‘MENT MADE PRIOR TO THE TAKING OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES AND

THE OUTBREAK OF THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR.

5. TARIQ AZIZ REPLIED AT LENGTH, OPENING WITH THE
STATEMENT THAT TRAQ WOULD CONTINUE TO PROMOTE BETTER
RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND HIGHER LEVEL CONTACTS IN
WHICH EACH SIDE COULD EXPLAIN ITS VIEWS. AS IF IT WERE
UPPERMOST IN HIS MIND, HE SAID HE HAD HEARD FROM

THE HEAD OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, AT THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY, OF THE UNFORTUNATE CANCELLATION OF
A U.S. TRADE MISSION AT THE LAST MOMENT. "WHAT
HAPPENED WAS NOT INTENTIONAL." IRAQ WISHED TO IN-
CREASE ITS TRADE WITH THE U.S. AND TRADE MISSIONS
WOULD BE WELCOME IN THE FUTURE.

6. TARIQ AZIZ SAID THAT THE NATURE OF THE U.S.-IRAQI
RELATIONSHIP NOW SEEMED TO BE UNDERSTOOD ON BOTH SIDES.

IRAQ FOR ITS PART SOUGHT A WIDER UNDERSTANDING BASED ON
INCREASED CONTACT. IN THE PAST IRAQ HAS BEEN AVAILABLE FOR
CONTACTS, VFOR EXAMPLE BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER DURPNG HIS TRIPS
TO NEW YORK. IPAC H?S ALSO WEI COME! U.S. CONGRSSSREN? AND OSH
OFFICIALS. NEVKRIdELSS CONTACTS Hi.VE BEEN FEW IN .
COMPARISION WITE OT FR COUNTRTES. MORE SUCH CONTACTS

WOULD BE USEFUL.

PAGE NO. 2

ates

TEXT OF TELEGRAM 81BAGHDA001446

& 7. ON U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS, TARIQ AZIZ RECALLED
THAT IN 1975 SADDAM HUSSAIN HAD TOLD DAVID ROCKEFELLER
THAT THE RELATIONSHIP WAS LIKE A DOOR WITH TWO KEYS,
THE FIRST INVOLVING IRAQ“U.S. RELATIONS AND THE
SECOND, ARAB-U.S. RELATIONS. THE FIRST KEY WOULD
TURN WHEN THE U.S. STOPPED INTERFERING IN IRAQI
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, SUCH AS COLLABORATING WITH THE
SHAH IN SUPPORT OF BARZANI'S REVOLT. HE COULD OF-
FICIALLY TEL ME THAT THE FIRST KEY WAS NOW TURNING.
THE SECOND ONE, HOWEVER, WAS AWAITING THE OUTCOME
CONFIDENTIAL
ae CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BAGHDA 01446 01 OF 02 2817522

OF U.S. HOLICY DELIBERATIONS. THIS LED TO A
_ LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE
CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT WHICH TRAQ CONSIDERED TO BE A
CHALLENGE fO ARAB PUBLIC OPINION. ARGUED THAT
: IT WAS NOT IN THE §.S. INTEREST TO MAINTAIN A ONE-
fe SIDED POLICY AND INDICATED THAT IF U.S. POLICIES

CONFIDENTIAL

NVVZCZ

& . PAGE NO. 3

ie

TEXT OF TELEGRAM B1STATE 143542

@»=
SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 143542
ORIGIN SS-30

“€

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SS0-00 /030 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN: WNHOWELL:JVW
APPROVED BY NEA:PCONSTABLE
INR/OD: HCOHEN
S/S-O: JETAYLOR
Hmmm (54165 030151% /63
O 0301052 JUN 81
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT BAGHDAD INMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 143542 .

EXDIS DECAPTIONEN

B.0. 12065: RDS-2,3 6/1/01 (CONSTABLE, PETER)

TS authosity to.
or { ) C OADR

TD
CLASSIFY as {358
{1 DOWNGRADE TS 10 ( 1S or{ }C OADR

TAGS: PEPR, MASS, US, IZ, XF

SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY ON ARMS SALES AND TRANSFERS TO TRAD

- AND IRAN
©... BAGHDAD 1446

2. WE NOTE THAT IN COURSE OF MAY 28 MEETING WITH TARIO .
AZIZ, HE ONCE AGAIN VOICED SUSPICION THAT SOMEHOW U.S.

ARHS AND SPARE PARTS ARE BEING ACQUIRED BY IRANIANS.

WE HAVE NO SPECIFIC INFORMATION IN THIS REGARD. WE WILL ¢

WANT YOU, HOWEVER, TO FIND AN EARLY OCCASION IN CONVERSA- 5

TION WITH APPROPRIATE IRAQI CONTACT TO WEAVE IN THE bs

FOLLOWING POINTS, SERESSING OUR CONCERN THAT GOI HAVE

ACCURATE UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY ON. SALES 8 :

DECLASSIFY [MR Casae Caly:
‘DECLASSIFY EQ Citations

Ch
-Respaneive info

AND TRANSFERS OF ARMS TO TRAQ AND IRAN. TO THE EXTENT
SECRET
SECRET

. PAGE 02 STATE 143542

POSSIBLE, YOU ‘SHOULD ASSURE THAT THIS REAFFIRMATION REACHES
AZIZ.

3. -- RESTATE U.S. POLICY AND PRACTICE AS EXPLAINED
PREVIOUSLY TO C0%, MOP RECENT.” IN RFSPONSE TO IRAQI
QUERY REGARDING I'VALL[AN I@AnSFERS (STL.TE 122538).

-- ADD THAT WE RECOGNIZE THAT PRIVaTE AwLS MuLCHANTS,
Qu POSSIBLY AMERICANS, MIGHT BE ATTRACTED BY
PAGE NO. 1

©

eee eee

*

TEXT OF. TELEGRAM SLSTATE 143542

*

POSSIBLE SALES OPPORTUNITIES GROWING OUT OF CONFLICT
SUCH AS THAT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN.

-- WE ARE CONCERNED THAT PRIVATE ACTIVITIES NOT FEED
RUHORS OF CHANGES IN OR EXCEPTIONS TO THE U.S. POSITION
OF PRINCIPLE WITH WHICH THE TRAQIS ARE FAMILIAR. WE
ALSO WISH TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT IRAQ NOT PROCEED ON TEE
' BASIS OF ANY MISUNDERSTANDING THAT INDIVIDUALS OR FIRMS
HAVE APPROVAL OF USG FOR SALES OR TRANSFERS OF U.S.-
CONTROLLED MILITARY ITEMS.

—-- THE U.S. CANNOT CONTROL THE ACTIVITIES OF U.S. :
CITIZENS OR RESIDENTS OUTSIDE THE U.S. WE ARE SIMILARLY

UNABLE TO EXERCISE CONTROL OVER MILITARY ITEMS MANU-

FACTURED ABROAD WHICH ARE NOT SUBJECT TO U.S. CONTROLS

REGARDING THIRD~COUNTRY TRANSFERS. WE CAN AND DO ASSURE

THE IRAQIS THAT THE U.S. HAS NOT APPROVED

ORCONDONEDANY MILITARY SALES TO IRAQ OR IRAN.

HAIG

SECRET

NVV2CZ

‘PAGE NOC. 2

ECE

Depariment of State TELEGRAM

COMP SOENTIAL

ANS O8L09S6-9129
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 32 GAGHOA O2977 27425172
ACTION NEA-11

IMFO OCT-01 AQS-09 AID-07 INR-10 S515 CSAE-00 ITA=11
OODE-96 H-Gt NSC+O5 ASAE-00 HA+96 L-93 TRSE-90

PR-€3 PA-01 OMa-08 SSM~-93 SAL~O01 ACDA-32 SSH-02
SP-82 SPRS-92 7143 & :
woccccwwcworwmomneQGiTES 2712582 745
QR 271107 SEP Bt

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FA USIAT BAGHOAD
TO SECSTATE WASHOC 2586 DEPERTOONT oF fxs AsCDC
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ANEMBASSY KUMALT - : PREST te . i
USLG RIYADH re ys earn ee
AMEMBASSY SANAR - am MH PLA.
AMEMBASSY TEL A¥IY¥ ; a eon ow te tinet)
CONF {OE NT I AL BAGHDAD 2577 ~ mee eat Sear.

E.0. 12065: GOS 9/27/87 CPILLSAURY, MICHAEL)
TAGS: PEPR, 12, OREP CPELLSBURY, MICHAEL)
SUGJECT:STAFFOEL PiLiseurr‘’s VIStT TO BAGHDAD

REF: BAGHDAD 2557
1. CCOMFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. STAFFOEL PILLSBURY PREPAREO THE FOLLOWING PRIOR TO
HIS DEPARTURE FROM BASHOAD SEPTEMBER 24.

3. Om SEPTENBER 23, DEPUTY SPEAKER OF THE IRAQI PARLIANENT,

BAHAA AL-DIN AHNEO, CHALAMAN GF THE HEALTH COMMETTEE And .
CONFIDENTIAL :
CONF SDENTIAL

PAGE G2 BAGHOA O2577 Z7t2517
THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMITTEE OM INOUSTREES AND ENERGY,

CONF IBENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RECELVYED STAFFOEL PILLSBURY FOR THQ MOURS IN THE

PARLIAMENT BUILDING TO PRESENT THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE

FIRST YEAR OF THE IRAQE PARLIAMENT. THEY STRESSED

THE ROLE OF THE PARLIAMEAT IM REVIESING THE GOYERNMENT’S

BUOSET AMO ANNUAL PLANS AS WELL AS THE PARLIAMENTS

ROLE [N MEETING WITH FOREIGN CELEGATIONS WHICH IS

FACILITATED BY THEIR SEPTEMBER 1960 WENBERSHIP IN THE a
UNTER-PARLIANENTARY URION. IN RESPONSE TO PILLSBURY'S

QUESTLONS, THEY VOICED SUPPORT FOR AWACS SALE TQ SAUDE

ARABIA AND IMOQICATED AM (MNTEREST IN VISITING US CONGRESS :
IM WASHINGTON AT SOME FUTURE UNSPECIFIED CATE. aj)
STAFFDEL‘S SURPRISE, THEY EXPLAINED THAT OMLY :

Ph peor

THE ATNQSPHERE WAS PLEASANT AND FASENOLY.

WHILE OFSIRE TQ IMPROVE US-IRAQI RELATIONS HAS REPEATED, :
A FAREWELL COMMENT WAS THAT US POLICY TOWARD THE MIODLE

EAST [MN THE PAST HAS BEEM “KEEPING THE ISRAELIS HAPPY.

ISRAEL HAS DONE SHATEVER IT COULD TO STOP IRAQ"S PROGRESS

BECAUSE THEY KNOW THEIR OAYS WILL BE KUNSEREO WHEN KE
SUCCEEO.*

%. AT SUGGESTION OF IRAGI OFFICZAL ESCORT, PELLSBURY

WAS OREVEM TO RECENTLY FINISHED PANORAMA OISPLAY BUILDING
NEAR CTESIPHON ARCH WHERE BLOODY SATTLE SCEMES FROM

“G37 AO DEMONSTRATE ALLEGORICAL LESSONS FOR HUNDREDS

OF VISITORS IN EVIDENCE, EXPECIALLY MALE TEENAGERS Ik
QUASI-UNIFGRN. ELEPHANTS REFERREO JO (N GUIDE TEXT AS

“PERSIAN ARMOR CORPS* ARE SHOWN SEING BLINDED BY SPEARS
CONF IQERTIAL

CORK” [OENTIAL
PAGE 63 BAGHDA 02577 2712512

WITH THEIR TRUNKS CHAPPED OFF BY THE ARAB FORCES.

OR. PILLSBURY CONMENTED THAT IT #AS A TRULY MOVING
SCENE. GUTCOME OF BATTLE WAS POINTEOLY EXPLAIKED TO

BE ARAB VICTORY AND EXECUTION OF PERSIAN CORMAMOER
AFTER NAJOR REINFORCERENTS ARRIVED FROK SYRIA. PAMORANA
OISPLAY WAS PAINTEOY 22 MORTH KOREAN ARTISTS AFTER
SENIOR UNNAMED IRAQIS WERE IMPRESSED GY SIMILAR PANORAHA
EN MOSCOW SHOMING NAPOLEON'S DEFEAT.

rae

CONFIDENTIAL

Ce
UNCLASSIFIED RELEASED

Department of State TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL :
° AN: 0D820107-0451

CONFIDENTIAL
PASE 01 STATE 053009 ;
ORIGIN NEA-1L1 : .
INFG OCT-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-12 O1C-02 CIAE-00 EB-08
EA-19 DODE-90 H-01 10-18 NSAE-00 COME-90 PH-09
PA-O1 MCT-02 ICAE-00 SP<-02 SPRS-02 7685 R
DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN! WNHOWELL 7 ‘
APPROVED BY NEA:PCONSTABLE
EB/EWY SKMONTGOMERY

BENLES CROSS

coenesewonann "066746 2723282 765
o P 2722352 FEB 82
FH SECSTATE uASHOT eo
TO USINT BAGHOAD IHMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE
INFO AHEHBASSY AKHAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SEIRUT PRIORITY:
AREHBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDUA PRIORITY:
WSLO0 RIYAOH PRIORITY ° =
AMEMBASSY HANAMA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ABU DHASI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY
AMENBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY ° -
AMEHBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIGRITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
ANEHBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

-ANZMBASSY ROHE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY ,
AHEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY :

ANEMBASSY NEW DELHL PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY

USHISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 _ STATE "053099 a a Dp —
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY , Office of FOl, Privacy, & Classification Review

Review Authority: MORIN, LAURENT
(23/8

CONF SOENTIAL

a an UNCLASSIFIED

CONF ZDENTIAL
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY ;

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 083009

E.0. 32065: SOS 2/27/88 (CONSTABLE, PETER?
TAGSSPINS, EEWT, PHC, SOPN, 12

SUBJECT? DE-DESIGNATION OF IRAQ AS SUPPORTER OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TERRORISH

. 1. (€U) ADDRESSEES WILL KO DOUBT HAVE SEEN MEDIA REPORTS
THAT [RAQ {S NOT RPT NOT INCLUDED ON THE CURRENT LIST OF
COUNTRIES REPEATEDLY. SUPPORTING INTERNATIONAL-TERRORISA
WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION {8 SUBMITTING TO CONGRESS. THIS
DECISION 15 THE RESULT OF THE’ ANNUAL REVIEW UNDER THE
TERHS OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT (FENWICK ~AHENDMENT)

“AND 1S INCLUDED IN A PACKAGE OF CHANGES IN EXPORT CONTROLS
UNDERTAKEN BY THE ADMINISTRATION. FOLLOWING IS PRESS -
RAG OKLYS FEBRUARY 26 DEALING WITH QUESTION OF

LY.

Ze ra) BEGIN PRESS GUIDANCE:

Q: WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE DEFARTHENT OF COMMERCE HAS -
INFORMED THE CONGRESS THAT [RAG IS NO LONGER DESIGNATED
A “SUPPORTER OF INTERNATIONAL TERROR{SN* UNDER THE EXPORT
a ACT (FENWICK ANENORENT >. WHAT DOES THIS

At AS IS REQUIRED SY LAW, ANO IN ORDER 70 ADMINESTER THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE EXPORT’ ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 197
CONFIDENTIAL .

CONFIDENTIAL ;

PAGE 03 STATE 053009 :

THE SECRETARIES OF STATE ANO. COMMERCE ANNUALLY REVIEW
WHICH FOREIGN COUNTRIES REPEATEOLY PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. THE MOST RECENT REVIEW DETER-
MINED THAT; TRAQ'S RECORD SINCE THE LAST LIST OF COUNTRIES
WAS ISSUED IN DECEMBER 1980 DID NOT WARRANT [TS- CONTINGED
INCLUSION ON THE LIST.

GQ: WHAT COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED AS SUPPORTERS OF
TERRORS SH?

At THE COUNTRIES SO DESIGNATED ARE: SYRIA, PEOPLE'S
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

. | UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

areata tae R&PuBLIC OF YEREN (SOUTH YEMEN), LISYA, AND
uBA.

G: .DOES ERAG’S DE-DESIGNATION MEAN THAT WE Witt NOW BE
ABLE TO EXPORT SUCH ITEMS AS GENERAL ELECTRIC ENGINES
FOR IRAQ*’S {TALIAN-BUILT FRIGATES? 7

As: WE HAVE NO PLANS TO ESTABLISH A MILATARY SUPPLY .
RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ. [T HAS BEEN OUR POLICY SINCE THE
BEGINNING OF THE [RAQ<IRAN CONFLICT NOT TO SUPPLY MILI-
TARY EQUIPMENT TO ESTHER SIDE. EXPORT LICENSE APPLICA-
TIONS FOR [TEMS SUBJECT TO NATSONAL SECURITY CONTROLS
WILL CONTINUE TO BE REVIEWED CONSISTENT WITH OUR PRACTICE
THROUGHOUT THE IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT. {T HAS BEEN OUR
PRACTICE TO BLOCK, THE EXPORT OF OUAL-USE [TEMS, SUCH AS
MARINE ENGINES INTENDED FOR THE IRAQI NAVY, WHICH WOULD
CONTRIBUTE TO THE WAR-MAKING POTENTIAL OF EITHER SIDE.
THESE ENGINES ARE CLEARLY IN THIS CATEGORY.

Q: WHAT SALES SUBJECT TO THE LICENSING PROCEDURE SET
bonne IN THE ta AMENDBENT ARE CURRENTLY PENDING FOR
2

A: 6IT wouLo BE EFNAPPROPRIATE TO COMMENT CN ANY. SPECIFIC
SALES THAT ARE CURRENTLY PENGING, HOWEVER, ALL APPLICA-
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 stite 953009

TIONS FOR LICENSES UNDER NATIONAL SECURITY Renee. WILL
CONTINUE TO BE REVIEWED ON A CASE-SY-CASE’ BASIS IN THE
LIGHT OF OUR POLICY OF NOT SUPPLYING MILITARY EQUIPHRENT TO
EITHER PARTY IN THE IRAQ-fRAN CONFLICT. BEFORE APPROVING
ANY SHIPMENT OF ITEMS UNDER NATIONAL -SECURITY CONTROLS,

WE WOULD REQUIRE FIRMA ASSURANCES THAT THESE ITEMS wOULO

BE USED FOR CIVILIAN PURPOSES ONLY OR WOULD HAVE TO SATISFY
OURSELVES THAT THEY WOULD NOT MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBU-
TION TO TRAQ’S WAR-MAKING POTENTIAL.

. Qt DOES THE MOVE TO DE-DESIGNATE [RAQ HAVE ANY IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT?

As NO, ‘THIS DECISION FALLS STRICTLY WITHIN THE REGUIRE~
MENTS OF THE EXPORT ADHINISTRATION ACT. U.S. POLICY

ON THE [RAQ-IRAN CONFLICT IS TO ENCOURAGE AN EARLY END
TO THE FIGHTING AND A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THE OLSPUTE.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

an UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

WE HAVE SOQUSHT TO LIMIT THE SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT ANDO.
PREVENT -A SPILLOVER OF FIGHTING [NTO NEIGHBORING COUN-
TRIES. [T AAS SEEN OUR POLSCY NOT TO SELL MILITARY .
EQUIPMENT TO EITHER IRAQ OR IRAN. LRAQ*S ee eueeiaae cae
WILt NOT AFFECT THESE POLICIES, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO -
REVIEW APPLUUCCATLONS FOR THE EXPORT OF ITEMS SUBJECT-TO
NATIONAL SECURITY CONTROLS TO IRAQ TO PRECLUDE THE SHIP-
MENT OF [TEMS WHICH WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCE [TS
MILITARY CAPASILITY. .

END PRESS GUIDANCE.

3. (C) BAGHOAD FOR EAGLETON: DECISION TO RENOVE IRAG
FROM LIST 15, AT THES POINT, FOR THIRTY DAY PERIOU ONLY,
WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE WILL BE QUESTIONING. AND SOKE -
DISAGREEMENT {N THE CONGRESS WITH WHICH WE WILL HAVE
CONF IDENT IAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 053009

TO DEAL. AT THE SAHE TIME, WE REALIZE THE DIFFICULTIES
THAT WOULD ENSUE, INCLUDING IN PURSUIT OF OUR OBJECTIVE
OF ENCOURAGING FURTHER [MPROVEHENT IN ERAQ'S PERFORMANCE
IN THE IMPGRTANT QUESTION OF TERRORISH, SHOULD IRAQ BE °
RESTGREO TO THE LIST AT THE ENO OF THIRTY OAYS. WE. WILL
BE WORKING TO AVOIO THIS DEVELOPMENT. UNTIL INSTRUCTED-
FURTHER, YOY SHOULO GO NO FURTHER IN ANY DISCUSSION THAT
HAY ARISE WITH TRAQIS THAN TO RESTATE OUR STRONG OPPOSI-
TION TO ACTS OF OR SUPPORT FOR TERROSIM AND ORAW, AS
APPROPRIATE, ON ABOVE PRESS GUIDANCE [N RESPONDING TO
QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS ACTION AND [TS {MPLICATIONS.

4. FOR BERN: EMBASSY SHOULD ASK MFA TO PASS FOREGOING

TO SPP TEHRAN FOR ITS INFORMATION AND USE WITH IRANIAN’
AUTHORITIES AS APPROPRIATE. HAIG

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

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CONFIDENTIAL

AN: 0820270-0562
CONFIDENTIAL ‘,

“PAGE Of TEL AV O7718 Of OF 02 2415452
ACTION NEA-ii—

r

INFO OCT-00 ADS-30 AID-07 INR-10 EUR-12 SS-10 CIAE-00

H-0% f0-15 NSCE-00'NSAE-90 $S0-00 HA-06 L-03 | '
TRSE-00 PH-09 ‘PACOT": SSM-03 I[NRE-00 SAL-01- ACDA-12 :
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wore cennn en ece ner o266735 2H15592 /4S
0 2H1S342 MAY 82 2FFH4- -
FM AHENBASSY TEL AYIY
TO SECSTATE WASHOC SHMEDIATE 5373
SECDEF WASHOC IMMEDIATE
INFO DIA WASHINGTON'OC// PRIORITY : | .
AMEMBASSY AMMAN ‘INMNEDIATE |
USINT BAGHDAD™“IMHEDTATE ‘l
AMEMBASSY. BEIRUT ‘PRIORITY S;
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY SS

@ AMENBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE ; Soe
AMEMBASSY: DAMASCUSZPRIORITY 7 | i ;
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE Fe
AMEMBASSY:"JSIODA PRIORITY S
AMEMBASSY: KUWAIT PRIORITY |
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY : *\
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY \
USLO RIYADH PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
USCINCEUR YAIHINGEN PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 07718 a Sn ‘
USCINCEUR FOR POLAD, NEA FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS a
£.0. 12065: GOS 5/24/88 (BROWN, MILL:JAM A) OR-M

TAGS: MASS, PEPR, IS, EG, [Z, IS, US
SUBJECT: REPORTS OF ALLEGED U.S. ARHS SUPPLIES

TO IRAQ VIA EGYPT~-POSSIBLE ITEHS ON THE AGENDA “
FOR MIHDEF SHARON *§ VISIT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL :

PAGE 02 TEL AVY O7718 O1 :90F 92 2415482

@ 1. (C> THE ISRAEL! MEOIA HAVE ONCE AGAIN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONF-IOENTEAL

STARTED -TO FOCUS ON ALLEGED U.S. SHIPMENT OF
ARMS TO 'IRAQ,ACCORDING TO THE FOLLOWING MAY 24
MAARIY REPORT’ BY. ILAN KFIR, “JERUSALEM SOURCES"
HAVE LET. IT GE KNOWN THAT THE UNITED STATES

HAS ACCELERATED ‘ITS ARMS SHIPHENTS TO EGYPT, AND
MUCH OF -THE “AMERICAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT SS BEING
PASSEO:“ON -GY* EGYPT DIRECTLY TO IRAQ. THESE
SOURCES “ALSO REPORTEOLY SAY THAT THE UNITED STATES
tS ENCOURAGING EGYPT TO DELIVER SOVIET ARHS, .
INCLUDING SOVIET-HADE FIGHTER PLANES AND SPARE__
PARTS, TO IRAQ:3N ORDER TO'SEVER THE LINK
BETWEEN ‘IRAQ“ANOITHE SOVIET: UNION AND TO

CREATE A PRO-AMERICAN "ARAB FRONT COMPRISED

OF EGYPT, SAUDI: ARABIA, JORDAN AND IRAQ. (FYI:
A PROMINENT ‘ISRAEL TELEVISION REPORTER TOLD
EMBASSY “PRESS ‘ATTACHE ‘TODAY THAT THE STORY IS
BEING OELISERATELY PLANTED BY OFFICIALS IN THE
HINSSTRY OF DEFENSE. ENO FYI.) FOLLOWING IS
AN EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF THE KFIR ARTICLE.

2. (LOU) CONMENCE TEXT: - @

THE UNITED STATES 3§ SPEEDING LARGE QUANTITIES OF
ARMS TO ‘IRAQ, THROUGH THE -INTERMEDIARY OF EGYPT.
IT WAS LEARNED IN JERUSALEM THAT THE UNITED STATES .
HAS RECENTLY ACCELERATED ITS ARMS SHIPHENTS TO
EGYPT, ANDO THAT MUCH OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY

Fer edie IS. BEING PASSED ON BY EGYPT DIRECTLY 70
IT HAS FURTHERMORE BECOME KNOWN IN ISRAEL THAT THE
UNITED STATES 1S ENCOURAGING EGYPT TO DELIVER ARMS,
INCLUDING SOVIET-HADE FIGHTER PLANES ANO SPARE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONF E0ENTIAL

PAGE 03 TEL AY O7718 O1 OF 02 2415452

PARTS, TO TRAQ.

THE LARGE-SCALE ARMS TRANSACTIONS, VIA EGYPT, BETSEEN

THE UNITED STATES ANO IRAQ AROUSE CONCERN IN

JERUSALEM. PROMINENT POLITICAL SOURCES IN ISRAEL

TAKE A GRAVE VIEW OF THE AMERICAN-EGYPTIAN-CRAQI

“CONNECTION” AS WELL AS OF THE AOMINISTRATION'S

AIM TO CONCLUDE A HAWK MISSILE TRANSACTION WITH

JORDAN.

US ARMS DEALS WITH IRAQ AND THE PROGRESSING CONTACTS

WITH JORDAN WILL BE RAISED AT DEFENSE MINISTER &

CONFIDENTIAL

COAFIDENTIAL

ARTEL SHARON'S TALKS THIS WEEK IN WASHINGTON ANO
AT BEGIN'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN NEXT MONTH.

IN JERUSALEM IT IS ASSESSED THAT THE UNITED

STATES SS ATTEMPTING TO EMPLOY THE IRAQ-IRAK WAR

SO AS TO SEVER THE “LINK SETWEEN IRAQ AND THE SOVIET
UNION AWD TO CREATE A PRO-ANERICAN ARA® FRONT,

TO COMPkiSE EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, JOROAN AND IRAQ.

PRIME MINISTER MENAHEM BEGIN ANO FOREIGN MINISTER
YITZHAK SHAHIR HAVE DECIDED TO LAUNCH AN ALL-OUT —=
DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE DELIVERY OF

AMERICAN WEAPONS TO JORDAN AND IRAQ.

DEFENSE MINISTER ARIEL SHARON, WHO CONFERREO WITH THE
PRIME MINISTER PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR
WASHINGTON,: :WILL CLEARLY CONVEY TO THE
AOMINISTRATION LEADERS THAT ISRAEL CANNOT ACCEPT

THE FACT THAT. SOPHISTICATED WEAPON SYSTEMS,
PARTICULARLY MOGSILE ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES, BE
STATIONED AT A DISTANCE OF ONLY TENS OF KILOMETERS
FROM ITS MAIN POPULATION CENTERS AND AIRPORTS IN

THE HEART OF THE COUNTRY.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
COKF IDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TEL AY 07718 02 OF 02 2415472
ACTION NEA-{1

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 AIN-07 INR-10 EUR-12 SS~10 CIAE-00
H-01 10-15 NSCE-90 NSAE-00 SS0-00 HA-06 L-03
TRSE-00 PH-09 PA-01 SSH-03 INRE-00 SAL-01 ACDA-12
SSN-02 ICAE-00 SP-02 MCE-00 SPRS-02 /107 w.

Soret erowenenwowonSG6T64 2415592 /51 .

O 2415342 MAY B82 ZFF-4 <r

FM AKEHBASSY TEL AYI¥

TO SECSTATE #ASHOC SHHEOIATE 5574

SECOEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO DIA WASHINGTON OC// PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEOLATE |

USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY SONN PRIORITY | :

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY OAHASCUS PRIORITY

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIODA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY. PARIS PRIORITY

USLO RIYAOH PRIORITY

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN PRIORITY

CONF IDENT IAL SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 07718

END TEXT.
BROWN

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CONFIDENTIAL

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 TEL AV 07806 2516257
ACTION NEA-11

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10-15 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SS0-00 fHA-06 L-03 TRSE-00
PH-09 PA-01 INRE~00 OES-09 FACDA-12 ICAE-00 SP-02
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INFO OIA WASHINGTON DC// IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDOA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEHBASSY PARIS IHHEDIATE

USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USUN NEM YORK IMMEDIATE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEL AVIV 07806
NEA FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS

E.0. 12065: N/A

TAGS: PEPR, PNUC, PARM, IS, IZ {

SUBJECT: BEGIN CLAIMS IRAQ “HAD PREPARED” A-BOHBS PRIOR
: TO IAF ATTACK ON REACTOR

REF: FBIS TA 251139
Lt. IN REMARKS AT MAY 25 CORNERSTONE-LAYING
CEREMONY IN WHICH HE STRONGLY REASSERTED THE GOI'S
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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PAGE 92 TEL AY 97806 25162572
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MINISTER GEGIN ALSO REPORTEDLY COMMENTED THAT IRAQ “HAD
PREPARED™ THREE ATOMIC BOMBS PRIOR TO THE ISRAELI
AIRSTRIKE ON ITS NUCLEAR REACTOR LAST YEAR. THERE
FOLLOWS RELEVANT EXCERPT OF ISRAEL RADIO REPGRT
CONVEYED REF FSIS:

COMMENCE EXCERPT: THE PRIME NINISTER REYEALED FOR THE
FIRST TIME THAT THE IRAQI LEADER, SADDAM HUSAYN, HAD
PREPARED AT THE NUCLEAR REACTOR! IN BAGHDAD THREE ATOM
BOMSS. THE PRIME MINISTER SAIDITHAT HAD THE IRAQIS
USED THESE THREE BOMBS SOME 600/000 PEOPLE IN ISRAEL
WOULD HAVE BEEN KILLED OR WOUNDED. THEREFORE, HE
ORDERED THE AIR FORCE IN JUNE, ABOUT AG

SOMB THE NUCLEAR REACTOR IN BAGHDAD. END EXCERPT.

2. COMMENT. WE NOTE THAT HEBREW VERS BEGIN EMPLOYED

IN CONNECTION WITH THE THREE ALLEGED IRAQI ATOMIC

BOMBS WAS “HEKHIN.” THIS IS MOST COMMONLY TRANSLATED

AS “HAD PREPARED,” AS RENDERED ABOVE, BUT 1S

SUFFICIENTLY AMBIGUOUS TO MEAN ALSO “HAD BEEN PREPARING™--

WHICH WOULD SEEM TO BSE CLOSER TO THE MARK. ENO COMMENT.
SROWN ‘

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LM TED OFFscShL USZ

SR TRO eine

MEMORANDUM FOR: © Gaoffrey Kemp, Senior Staff ——.
l . National Security Council

‘ »
i al sl

ae I thought ft would be useful to addrass American
interests at stake in the Iran-Iraq war and possible
subsequent developments, and uherefore wrote the at-

tached note.
4 w
—
Henry 5. Rowen
Chairman
National Intelligence Counci)
Attachment

Date 29 July 2
Fin Se

fo

ot 20 July 1982

ae - The trantan Threat to American Interests in the Persian Gulf

ae
The conselidatian of power in Teheran by the Istami¢ Republican

Party and its apparent intent to spread its Istamic revolution ta its
Arab neighbors could inflict grave damage on American interests and
those of its alifes. What the InP seems to intend and may achieve -~
absent adequate countervailing power -- is not only the replacement of
Saddam Hussein but also the Baathist reqime by a fundamentalist Islamic
one. This afw fs to be achiaved by the defeat of Iraqi forces defending
Basra and, 7f this is not sufficient to bring about the dasired change
in Baghdad, then military conquest of at Teast the southern, Shia
populated part of Iraq will presumably be sought. It may also be an IRP
ain ts occupy this region, incTuding the Shia holy cities of Karbala and
Naja?. Further possibte aims include arousing the Shia populations of
Bahrain, Kuwait, and other Guif states and the replacement of these
regimes with ones more compatible with Teheran. More broadly it appears
ts seek dominance over the Persian Gulf region,

The importance of the Guif region te the US resides largely in fts
ofl. it contains about 35% of known world of7 reserves, 35% of the non-
Communist world's production capacity and 25% of current output. The
Power to interrupt the supply of this flow entails tha power to wreak
havoc on the etonomtes of the West. Even given today's of] “gtut", the
interruption af of] supplies from the Gulf area -- allowing for the use
Of all shut-in praducttan capacity elsewhere in the warld -- woytd
reduce the non-Communtst world of] supply by about 26%. Such an
interruption, if prolonged for months, wauld result fn a fall im

> eel

a TELE LT Pr
qr
Cie

parC ar aC Ee

worldwide ecanomic output comparable to the Great Depression of the
+. : 19303 in the US. More broadty, whoever is in control of the Gulf's 12
mi tlion barreis a day of current output (20 million barrels a day af
capacity) and 500 billion barrels af reserves is in a position to have a
very large pelitical a well as economic influence on the world.
iran's, irag's and Kuwait's of] supply alone comprises 10% of current
ron-Comtunist world production and 18% of patential production.

Could Iran achieve such a pesttion of influence? tn the sbsence af
outside military support for Kuwait and other Gulf states, an Iranian
defeat of Iraq would set inte motion forces for accommodation with anti-
Western qnals <= whether by overthrow of axisting regimes or
accommodation by them, It is imaginable that it could help bring inte
powar fundamentalist recimes of such anti-Western animosity, hostility
against neighbors, or internal incoharance that oi] supplies could be
seriously disrupted, For example, the coming to power of the mullahs fn
Tran foltowed by the Iran-Iraq war caused combined 9f1 production from

, Iran and Iraq to decline from 8 4#BD in 1978 to a little over 2 MMED in
1981. The world economy would have been even more damaged by this
decline than 3% was bot for the ability and willingness of Saud? Arabia
to increase production by several mitlion barrels a day. But now Saudi
Arabia is in the "target zone,”

Wictary by Iran in Iraq would not only enable its forces easily ta
take Kuwait and its large of] facilities, again in the absence of
outside support, but alse to exert influence without an outright
invasion of Saud? Arahia. If Iraq’s Shias cowa to Vife politically in
response to Iran's success, there 1s also iikely to be a reaction among
Kuwait's minority (250,000 out of a 5.5 million total) Shia

«Je ,

-

a

poputabion.. Moreover, the Shia population of Saudi Arabia is

Concentrated nearby -~ in tha main ofl-producing areas.

. Instability might also, or jnstead, proceed via ether paths.
Altholigh President Assad's, like Saddam Hussein's, hold on power is
sustained through tisht internal controts and brutal repression, Assad’s
power has bean threatened by Sunni fundamentalists {the Moslem
Brotherhood). OCespite the recent: brutal crushing of their revolt in
Hama, if Saddam Hussein were to fall, and, esnectally if the Baathist
regime in Baghdad were to be thrown out, the axanole could give heart ‘to
these who fervently want to end Assad's and the Syrian Haathists hold on
power. In Jordan, King Hussein fears the ®LO, Assad and, increasingly,
muslim fundamentalism, And in Riyadh, the memory of the attack on Mecra
fs no doubt being refreshed by the challenge from Khomeini. In short,
assuming Iranian success (and perhaps even without it) the next months
or several years may see 4 géneral avertorning of regimes in the Guif
region and beyond, both "radical" and “moderate.”

Ta call attention to these possibilities 1s not to predict their
happening. The Iraqis may held against the Iranians until they get
dJiscauraged and give up -~ although thay are Jikely to keep trying for
some time to come, The Shias in [rag and elsewhere may remain in their
thousand-plus year passive, largely apolitical state, perhaps because
Avab-Persian hostility will dominate over co-religiqus feelings. The
Arab raqimes' tenacity of contro] may withstand a)1 challenges.

However, we cannot Ge at 211 sanguine that events will develop fn a
favorable way to cur interests. We-may soon be faced? with a situation
in which a significant proportion of the of] supplies to the Wast are

«Jn «

‘a

a:
& 3
: e heavily influenced by Iran or by political forces hostile to the West or

by forces unable or uninterested in maintaining the flow of ait.

Oats situation, it is the first instinct of the Gulf Arabs to
Mopt'2 Tow profile, ta hope that the threat will recede or, ff act,
that money will propitiate it. If these means work, then our interests
will be served Sy and Targa. tf not, then the determining factor for us
is what we might be able to do te protect then,

Of the two threats that have been described above, military and
poTities!, the former is less difficult for us to affect than the
latter. However, the threats are not independent. If Iraq were nat
threatened with Iranian invasion, the possibility of Saddam Hussein's
fall or the replacement of the Baathist party by ¢ fundamentalist regima
and the politicization of fits Shias probably would mst be serious
possibilities. Tf Kuwait, Saud? Arabia and the other shaikdoms can
obtain military protection, their internal vuTaerabiTity is also be
likely to be reduced. .

These governments da not see it this way -- sa far. Evidently they
betieve that the domestic political costs af inviting outside,
espacialiy US, military protection excesds the potential benefits.
However, 1) they may soon change their minds if the Iranians win against

Iraq; |

[this protection might not have to be dominantly American at

NTE Mel Ss cant <A he ae 4 Sm MOL we Dm BRS ENN Lee,»

eel?
ts oy

Bo Fy a
7 ee a '

& ee ae on the ground. Perhaps a combination of Jordanian, Egyptian,
- or Baltéztant, even Turk#sh or some European foreas, might be palatable.

avis

The essential point is the Tikely nead for such protection and possibly

. very soon.

Finally, cons ideratton needs ta be given to possible actions by the
® Soviets in the event of Iranian successes. They seem to have no goad

woves available in the region at the moment. Securing a more far-
reaching agreement with Assad is ona possibility and aiming For renewed
cooperation with = post~Saddan Hussein regime in [raq 19 another -- but
a Jong-shot. The third possibility suggested by this analysis is that
Iran's conflict with the Arabs may cause it to need and to seek militery
support from the Soviet Unton: whatever incentfve it has for deing this
might be enhanced by the direct involvement of the "Great Satan" on
behalf of the Arabs.

Henry S. Rowen

i
$
3 {
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sunnany THE DIRECTOR OF AGRICULTURAL: AVIATION MAS (NVITED

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END SUMMARY. ae

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RAMININUH LOAD CAPACITY ARE ENVISIONEO AS (JHE EKITIAL PURCHASE. i

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PILOTS. ALTHOUGH
TEHAVE HELICOPTER
EJ PART OF THE DEAL.°¢
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if

MAN CHOPPERS :
ING. FERTILIZING AND
PER £8 1000 HOURS.

iTHe DEPARTMENT EMPLOYS{s0 ECHANICS AND 30
' Se letiare HAYE COKHERCIALILIGENSES, THEY DO K
j LICENSES FOR WHICH THE TRAIKIMG PACKAGE WILL
; SOKE PILOTS KAYE SEEN feel In THE S

i 2320 SOVIET DESIGNED, POLIS: BULL TE AGING FO
+ ARE “CURRENTLY DEPLOYED FOR CROP SPRAYINGs: Ot
SEEDING. MAXIMUM LIFE CYCLE UOC HOURS PER CHO
INSSERVICE USE AT AMY ONELTINE {S A IMAXIAUH 0
OF-SPARE PARTS KAS PLAYED! HAVOC WITH DOW TIHES HEAC ENGINEER
STATED THAT ALL CHOPPERS ‘OF THIS TYPE ARE ONLY BEING CONSTRUCTED 1H
POLAND AND. WITH CURRENT -PROGLEMS METHIN} POLAND, ‘SPARE PARTS
DELIVERIES ARE AT LEAST ONE YEAR BEHINO.EACCO
DIRECTOR, SOME PILOTS WHO} HAI : A Agee FOR:

NESSED LACK OF

RECEIVED. eae oe

$ S $ bo tetttaneg
S. THE DIRECTOR STATED: THAT HE EXPECTED TO GRAQUALLY REPLACE
ALL 20 POLISH CHOPPERS! WITHIN THREE !TO FOUR Ye RS. AFTER SOHNE
PROBING, THE OSRECTOR AGREED THAT CURRENT INVE TORY WAS BASED
UPON AN AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM! THAT HAS BEEN OORHANT. WITH NEWLY
AWARDED LARGE LAND REQLAHATION PROJECTS, Kia: DITSONAL ‘FUNDING

OF AGRICULTURAL SELF- FFICLENCY PROGRAMS (FARMS), AIR FLEET 15
EXPECTED TO TRIPLE CEG: AIRCRAFT) TO«ABSORB THEI DEHKAND FOR PEST {
CONTROL. AS ONE PILOT REMARKED, UPCOMING H/AJOR] JOBS WILL.

UNCLASSIFIED ~ =F ' 4
UNCLASSIFIED |
PAGE 03 BAGHOA | O37 2097152 | f

Sead

: r
INCLUDE TWO CRAFTS IN OPERATION HOR: A PERIOD OF 2 AND ONE HALF
MONTHS, COVERING A HINTHUM OF 1290 DONUM.

6. ALL ENQUIRIES, INCLU ING: :CATABOQUES, TECHNICAL AND OPERATING
INFO SHOULD BE KALLEO/O [RECTED TU: THE OLRECTOR OF THE !.
AGRICULTURAL AYIATLON OBPARTHENTH ABU GHRALB. BAGHDAD, IRAQ.
TEL. S55-0601 TELEX: 21 22, IK ;

EAGLETON ]

LUE

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“

WASHINGTON DC 2330!

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: ' +n reply refer to:
Sues” 3~-18015/82 ©

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INTERNATIONAL 5
SECURITY AFFAIRS Ott kee: ea,

teeoad
e
s

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY 777: a's 1633

SUBJECT: Sale of Helicopters to Iraq

Reference the sale by Hughes Helicopter of 60 commercial
helicopters (30 Hughes 500D and 30 Hughes 300C) to Iraq which was
recently reported in the Washington Post (attached). Defense was
not consulted on this sale. The helicopters are considered com
mercial and fall under the export control requirements of the
Department of Commerce. The Department of Commerce, in some
instances, will send export license <equests with foreign policy
implications to the Department of State for review. However,
Commerce believes it is not required to submit export cases to
the DOD for review. Thus, Defense does not have an opportunity

& to approve such licenses unless State brings them to our atten-
tion.

Moreover, because these helicopters weigh less than 10,000
pounds, the sale was made under-a general destination export
license, and Hughes Helicopter did not have to obtain specific
approval for this sale. Under the general destination export
‘license, sales are consummated without case-by-case review.
Therefore, no special staffing of this sale occurred within the
Department of Commerce or State.

The 500D is a 3,000 pound helicooter used primarily for
transportation, agricultural, and construction type efforts. The
300C is a 2,000 pound helicovter used primarily for training and
law enforcement activities. The sale is valued at $25 million.
Hughes Helicopter has advised us that six helicopters have been
delivered and the remaining will be available for shipment upon
the conclusion of some financial actions related to the contract.

DEPARTMEN] OF STATE isjepcjcor LLY pare./2-/2//93
(X) RELEASE ( ) DECLASSIFY | MR Cases Only:

, txCISE { ) DECLASSIFY EO Citations
( doy IN PART
( «.sTE Non-Responsive tnfo

; ; -—__—_—___.____ TS authority to.

paieesi ( ) CLASSIFY cs + )Sor( pC OavrR
emptions Dow: } so;

ALCAGHMGN () NGRASE TS tof) Sor ( ) C VADR

e.
Prepared by: Hrs Blundel 1/0PS-C/59760/29Dec82/mp (S)

Atete. ASN/ISH PNASN/ISA RAC Gen Gast

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE K (3,

we

~-Farlially DetlasSitied 7Relésied on 3

a ee suey A2tonal Security Counell ; ul Poet 6) Vv i i iL i
i]

484

AP? LACED Doawes 7%

. UNc. te (133)
its oct 83-00176. ; a

eee yah?
Ce.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Stanley Sporkin EK, G
General Countel gle
FROM: W. Geerge Jameson -
Asaistant General Counse¥
SUBJECT: Restrictions on Exports to Iran (S)

2. At your request, I spoke with James H. Michel, a Deputy
Legal Adviser at the Department of State, to determine if there
are any legal restrictions on CIA's providing equipment to, or
othervise “trading with, Iran. Sased upon peior research end ays
conversation with Jim Michel, it is my conclusion that these atq
no legal prohibitions applicable to CIA. You should Be avare -~*.:
thet U.S. laws merely restrict the private transfer of defense
articles on the U.S. Munitions Control List, although e general

Olicy embargo is in existence to guard against actions that
might violate U.S. neutrality in the Iran-Icaq conflict. (§)

2. the question arose becaus

seer Agency officials have stated
State Department has legal concerns because of @& general eadbargo
on transactions with Iran. Although &f did not present any spe-
cific facts to Mr. Michel, and spoke of Ican only in general
terns, he confirned our view that the embargo is a matter of
policy, and that the restrictions on transfers to Iran are those
contained in 0.8. export control laws, in pacticuler the Aras
Export Control Act. These laws do not prohibit all exports, Sut
establish a licensing scheme for approval of exports hy private
parties on a case-by-case basis. The executive orders iasued
ducing the hostage crisis to prohibit virtually all commercial
dealings with Iran have been cescinded. (S)

3. You may recall that last yeac the State Department's
Legal Adviser adéressed CIA's authority to transfer acts aii

at time we, State, and the Attorney General concluded a
CIA's authocities under the National Security Act of 1947 enable
the Agency to tranafer arms notwithstanding arms control laws
that might preclude euch transfers 1f made by other parties. I i
did not coise this with Mr. Michel yesterday, but I believe the -

“j CL BY 675623
eetwilied / Rw Aq a Rae DECL OADR
Under rovisisn§ of £4 toace tee AAS VAAL

Pr DERV COL 1-62

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485

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titre

goine is san valid CTA is not subject to those teqet con~
Str aiates (8) -:: : af ae
4. Although ¢ there is no broad. lege) Cecoleien hae would

preclude ‘CIA's passing defense arti to Iran in the courses of
an authorized intelligence activit

Furnishing aras de-
spite the 0.5. position of neutrality @ Iran~Iraq.conflict
could be ‘conaldered @ non-neutral ect end affect the legal dis-
pute over U.S. refusal. to export tranian-owned military equipment
cucrently in the United States. The U.S. position: is that. tran :

does: not meet the criteria foc an export license. under the Arms
Export Control Act, in pact because it is « belligerent in an
international conflict with respect to which the 0.8. has main-
‘ tained neutrality. Agency Sealings with Yean at this time could
i weaken ‘the 0.5... position. °(5)_

s. In contlusicn: ‘there’ ‘are no general legal restrictions ‘
that would preclude the CIA from providing i reg to Iran as-
proposed. Rather, the relevant. constraints involve policy con-
siderations that may have to be verses before undertaking the :

mentetey? Brcweted:: (S)-

2

+g

ee BL nN—Coerig § 8 eens Fe eerm §s dd ee ers FF emer

SECRET

22

.

PRE 51
ORIGIN SS-7S

STATE 832663

18FO OCT-2H COPY-DL ADS-B = SSU-BR 225 B -

DRAFTED BY WEAsARN: DLMACK: COS
APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY
EUCTsRASAYRE . 7

WER: WAVEL COTES

WE As DISCUNE LER

PsQRAPALL tsuss)

SSO: RANDALL, JR.
PstSEAGLEBURGER

S/SSURREMER 154

O'R s8H0enr Jan 33
£0 SECSTATE WASHOC
OLUSINT "BAGHDAD FAMEDIATE -
(NFO axtiinsSY aman

ANEMBASST J15DK

USELO AIYADH

SECRET STATE Biz563
ExDIs :

E.0. 12356: DEGLs GAnR
TASS PEPR, US, fz . .
SUBIECT: VIS{T OF tAAGs FOREIGN MHHISTER

aniateconielinieen tattle nteetenesaenita ack ee casameeaae

REF: BAGHDAD £246 OLOTALY
$. tS = EXTine text. ‘

2 YOU SHOULD CKFORM DEPUTY PRIME MIMESTER AZIZ axD
FORE GK MINISTER HAMNADI THAT THE SECRETARY WOULD EF
PLEASED TO RECCIVE THE LATTER 1K WASHINGTON SHOULD
WASHADS BE dH THE GS ARN BL ABLE TO VESIT WASHINGTON,
Cel OMY: «GIVEN THE AGSEHCE OF RELATSOMS AND THE
“CONTINUING SENSITIVITY OF THE TERRORISH ESSUE, WE PESTER
Rot WE GFFER AX ACTUAL ERVITATION TO Matai. ERD Fvt,
THE SECRETARY Witt BE TRAVELING CUT CF THE COUNTRY UxTIL
FEBRUARY $2. YOU SHOULD TELL THE IRAQIS THAT IF MAHAD?
WERE CR TRE U.S. AFTER THAT GATE WZ WOULD ARRANGE
APPOINTHERTS OH & DATE CONVENIENT 16 GOTH THE SECRETARY
ABD THE FOREIGH MINISTER. FY: WE UNDERSTAND THE
CARNECIE FOUNDATION WOULD BE INTERESTED (8 MAVING OR,
MannAD! SPEAK IW (TS "FACE TO Fact” PROGRAN IM
WASHINGTON. SUCH AN SUVITATION OF SinsdaR ONES FaOH

OTRER FOREIGH AFFAIRS GROUPS, COMAINED W118 PERSOHAL
BUSTRESS, COULD CONSTITUTE THE STATES FURPOSE FOR BES
TRIP. YOU SMCULD GECIDE WEISER AND VIEW TO tATRODUCE
THIS IDER IW YOUR DISCUSSIOHS OF A POSSIBLE HARIADS
visit. exo Fy.

2. DR. RAMNADI SHOULD BE FOREWARRED OF THE CONTROVERSY
THAT COELD ATTEND BIS VISIT. BY EARLY FEERUARY, THERE
MAY GE SNAP CONGRESSIONAL OLBATE O4 Ta UESTeOW OF
TRRG) SUPPORT FOR TERRORSSH, UNDOUBTEMLY, SUNE VILL
CHARGE THAT QUE VELCOMING CF AN ERAT LEADER AT OF ASDOT
THAT TIME VOULO SIGNAL A LACK GF SERIOUSHESS OW THE
TESRORISH ISSUE, 10 PREVENT THIS, UE UOULD LIAE to USE
ThE VISIT AS ANOTHER STEP IH OUR GIPLOMATEC EFFOATS cH
TEES ISSUE, AS VELL AS AL OPPORTUNITY FOR A BRODER
REVIEW OF CUE ALLATIONS. THUS, 17 WOULD BE ESPECIALLY
DESIRALE FOR Wc FORLIGH MIMASTER TO SPEAR DISECTLY TO
INTERESTED AENBERS CF CONGRESS tH OROLR TO APPRECIATE tat
SERIOUSHESS WITH SICH JHE CONGRESS, AS QWFLE AS THE ,
EXECUTIVE BRARGH, VIEWS THC ESSUE OF ipl, Pa a (ti
ISTERHAT SONAL SERZORISH, is

E1725 158258T #61,

ec

‘Depatiment of: Stet: ae TELEGR

ais

BUTEDING x2

ost

4. A180, We ARE CONCERNED JHAT EFFEAIS RE HIDE TG

© POATRAY & MAIMAD] VISIT AS EWIDENCE OF & US, EMBRACE oF

AM EREHY CF (SRAEL. THES UOULD EPMNURASS SpE AND
RAUSE QUESTIONS ADOUT TRE U.S_ CoNTMITHENT To sSRari“s
SECURITY THAT 15 CENTRAL 30 IME PEACE PROCESS. WE aur
PREPANEO TO FACE TRIS PROSLER, RUT WE UOULO MOPE THAT THE
AUADIS WOULD BL COUSCLOUS OF NTS MESPOMSISILGTY TO MELE.
CONTRIBUTE TO THE POSITEVE ATHOSHRERE OF THE VESIT. tc
LEAVE TO YOU UOY TO GET THIS DLFFICRT PORT actoss TO
THE ifhai$. .

S. ANY SICKIFICANT STEP EY THE 1RAOtS PRIOR TO THE WistT
1 STOP OPERATIONS OF LACK JUKE AND VAY 18 WORLD, OF
COURSE, GREATLY SEPROVE THE ATROSPRERE OF THE WISIT as
SELL AS THE PROSPECTS THAT THE VISIT ITSELF WOULD LEAD 10
_ WPROVENENT OF RELATIONS. ; :
G. _ PLEASE ADVISE AS SOON AS RANNADI PROPOSES ANY TRAVEL
PLENS,

2, REFTEL REPEATED IMFO atta, JeDDA, RIVADM, — SHILTZ

Caption removed; :
transferred te O/FADRC

Cat. B - Transferred te O/FADRE
with additional access.

cantrolied by S/S
Cat. C~ Caption and custody
retained by §/S

weeve
wetes

oe

-

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

wrasamgten, 0.0. 30570

February 3, 1983

TO: EB/FPG s
FROM: L/EB .
SUBJECT: CCC-Blended Credits for Sale of

Wheat to Irag and Syria

At your request, I have attempted to identify statutes
which may restrict the authority of the Commodity Credit
Corporation to provide financial assistance for certain
transactions with Irag and Syria. This assistance would
provide favorable financing by means of the blended credit
Program for the sale of wheat to these two nations.

My legal research did not include evaluation of the
authority to provide blended credits generally. Rather,
my search was limited to identifying restrictions which
would specifically apply to. Iraq and/or Syria. However,
I did speak to of
the U.S.D.A. General Counsel's orrice to assure myseif
that they hed carefully evaluated the general authority
of CCC in this area.

I reviewed the following statutes:

(1) Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act;

(2) Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1982;

(3) Export Adminstration Act of 1979;

(4) Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended;

(5) Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act of 1979.

T also reviewed the index of Legislation on Foreign

Relations Through 1981 in an effort to identify other

pertinent statutes.
isjercjcoR f Osis:

R t OF STATE hanes
ELEAS + : OECLASSIFY [MR Cases Only:
EXCISE J pe L.A DSIFY EO Citatwons eas
| | OENY te gases cae: ‘
SLETE Non-Respunsiee into _—- eee au'hortty
Lon Eaeceusrs { ] CLASSIFY o {18 or ! : UADR
PA Exempuons { ) OOWNGRADE TS to ( } Sor, }C OAR

oT

- 2-

To the best of my knowledge, listed statutes would
constitute the sources for any restrictions applicable to
transactions with specific nations such as Irag and Syria.

My review indicates that none of the statutes would bar
or otherwise restrict the contemplated transactions. They
are either totally silent with respect to country-specific
restriction (i.e., numbers 1 and 2}; dependent on an existing
list of countries to whom exports are barred {(i.e., number 3);
or dependent upon the use of appropriated funds (i.e., numbers
4 and S). I note that my determination regarding the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 is based upon the opinion of
Bets that
that Act 1s inapplicable, with which I-concur on the basis
of my independent review. I also note that my determination .
is based upon the indication of ‘that the blended
credit program does not involve appropriated funds, but rather
Graws upon the non-appropriation borrowing authority of CCC.

61-458

F j 1 H9QDA4- 1344

Cable sent PY, oc8 3/56/%3-080u: 49 part ent af State” SIOPALIS-: $(¢

ACTION MEMOHANDY, RELEASED IN PART

ue hae “

ORIG (RASA) ENT FEE ; 5 B 93,0

copies Cc 3 ¥716 AS SZ mi
TO: The Secretary

S/S FROM: EB - Richard McCormack /¢ sp

TMA SUBJECT: US Credit Possibilities for Iraq 44

$/P ISSUER FOR DECISION

Whether to approve the attached cable (Tab A) outlinina
the limited possibilities for U.S. financial support for
exports to Iraq. .

sor{ )C GAGR

M/CT ESSENTIAL FACTORS
RF (rs)
In your Pebruary 14 meeting with Iraqi Minister of State
Hammadi you undertook to provide Iraq information on of ficial
U.S. financing possibilities in support of U.S. exports to Iraq.

ee
rmase
Gras

>a

kb pate. (/u fA

Irag's financial position has araduslly worsened since
@ the heqinning of the war in 1960 and is likely to grow more
serious over the next six months. With reduced, although
‘ still substantial, aid from the Gulf, Ifraq faces a current
account short-£all of as much as $10 billion this year. This
situation undoubtedly motivated Hammadi to mention to you that
' the US should consider providing credits, loans and technical
| cooperation to support U.S. exports to Irag, which have
approached one billion dollars in each of the past two years.

ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS

EO Citations _
_. ? 3 sutnority Lo.
{ } Sir ¢ ) C OADR

_OGWNGRADE TS tol}

Ig /FPC]/COR

|) DECLASSIFY {MR Cases Only:
[ ) CLASSIFY? as

CLASSIFY
IN PART
sive Info

{

(94 DE

{ ) DELETE Non-Resp

There are two possibiliti.s for US official credit for :
Iraq: (a) Eximbank programs; (b) CCC blended credits or ’
guarantees for agricultural exports. Secondarily, the US {
attitude in the IMF could affect Iraq's ability to obtain
access tO IMF resources. Finally, although commercial bank
financing is beyond USG control, we could take some minor
steps in support of Iraa's prospects in private credit markel.s. u

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
} RELEASE
pd EXCISE

( , DENY

{

A. Eximbank Programs

Eximbonk is discouraging the few inquiries from US eMay
exporters regarding Iraq because of the war's effect on gk :
Irao’s economy. This decision was hased upon the Export- we ae
Import Bank Ant requirement that there b> "a reasuvieble | a4 :
assuranc® Of repayment” o ‘Other off.efal credit agekciess
have aneree "ix kin ak: Payment: and sERn ER OCe: ‘problems # v 8

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Equally problematic is section 520 of the Foreian
Agsistance Appropriations Act of 1979 which prohibits
Eximbank €unding to any government which harbors terrorists.
I. has concluded that if an Iraqi government entity were
involved in an Eximhank transaction, then the guestion of
whether Iraq was harboring terrorists would have to be
decided. However, an area of ambiguity exists with respect
to the issuance of FCIA insurance for the benefit of a U.S.
exporter or U.S. bank where the importer is a private
foreign national.

Section 520 language originated in a 1977 amendment
proposed by Senator Heinz. With the Eximbank Act up for
renewel this year, @ section 520 case, on the heels of a
Chaffee Amendment determination for Argentina, could oal-
vanize Congressional support to circumscribe the Admiri-
stration's flexibility to ensure that Exim loans are con
Siastent with our foreian policy. Because Heinz will be a
key Senator on the Eximbank renewal we would hope to
avoid a section 520 case, Given legislative requirements
and Congressional sensitivity, we have asked Eximbank to

refer any applications involving Iraq to State before taking
action.

§. CcC Blended Credit Program

office, L has concluded that there are no PAA or other
pertinent statutes which specifically bar a CCC proqram for
Iraq. In December, USDA approved $210 million in CCC credit
guarantees for Iragi imports of U.S. agricultural products.
On March 9, USDA announced a CCC blended credit package,
totaling $230 million, for a range of U.S. agricultural
exports, State successfully opposed a proposal to raise the
quantity of wheat in the package (and increase the total
package to $250 million),

Based in part on the opinion of the AIR General Counsel's |
$

Bl

SECRET
DECL: OADR

PBYNOAE- LAGE

Cc. U.S. Vote in the IMF

IMF assistance may be appropriate for Irag's current
balance of payment problems. We could give no blanket
commitment to support fraai applicet.ions, Since our decisions
are made on the viability of individual loans. Furthermore,
leaislation requiring that we “work in opposition” to any
extension of IMF financial or technical assistance to any
country that harbors terrorists would be an additional
constraint. For these reasons and because we would not want
{vag to tell the IMF the 1.8. in any way suagensted it epproach
the Fund, we have not included this subject in the cable.

C. Commercial Financing:

The Iragis probably doubt disclaimers that the USG
cannot swing loans for Iraq through frieneés in the private
sector. We might remind the Iraqis that the private sector
takes into account the state of political relations in
making its credit determinations. We could offer to arranae
consultations between Iraqi qovernment financial officials
and U.S. government and private international financial
experts.

RECOMMENDATION :

That you approve the attached cable which instructs
US Interest Section Chief Eagleton to inform the Iraqis
what we have done on CcC credits, explains the constraints
on Eximbank credits to Iraq and reiterates that the U.S.

private sector is influenced by the overall) state of our
relations.

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CONFIDENTIAL STATE 072051

exors (APTION REMOVED BY S/S (EK), case 9203288

E.0. 22356:DECL: OADBR

' TAGS: EAP, [2 ,
SUBJECT: US CREOLT POSSIBILITIES WITH [TRAQ? FOLLOW-UP
TO FEBRUARY 84, 3983 SECRETARY-HANNAOI NEETING

1, CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
CONF IOENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 92 (STATE 97205%

we w
i] ee e008 © vee ce

CONFIDENTIAL

——— rs

~ CUNFIGENTIAL

HAMMADI,. THE SECRETARY UNDERTOOK TO STUDY OFFICIAL US
FINANCING POSSIBILITIES IN S'PPORT OF US EXPORTS TO
IRAQ, YOU SHOULD DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING TO BRIEF IRAQI
OFFICIALS ON OFFICIAL US FINANCING POSSIBILITIES,
MAKING CLEAR THAT YOUR BRIEFING IS THE FOLLOW-UP TO
THE FEBRUARY 14 MEETING:

3. COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION (CCC) CREOITS:

~~ RECENTLY, TWO USG PROGRAMS HAVE SUPPORTED INCREASED ©
US AGRICULTURAL TRADE WITH IRAQ: CCC CREDIT GUARANTEES
CEXTENDED AT MARKET RATES> ANO CCC BLENQDEO CREDITS
CWHICH MIX BOTH GUARANTEES AND TNTEREST-FREE CREDITS).

~~ WE ARE PLEASEO THAT LAST DECEMBER IRAQI AND U.S,
AUTHORITIES SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED A $210 MILLION CCC
GUARANTEE FOR WHEAT, RICE AND BARLEY.

~~ MORE RECENTLY DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE REPRESENTA-
TIVES ANO {RAQI OFFICIALS CONCL'DED OISCUSSIONS FOR A
CCC BLENDED CREDIT PACKAGE OF $230 MILLION, $15 MILLION
ABOVE THE AMOUNT WE INITIALLY HAD ENVISAGED. THIS
PACKAGE INCLUDES NEW US AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS TO IRAQ OF
SOYBEAN MEAL, PROTEIN CONCENTRATES AND HYBRIO SEEO CORN
AS WELL AS PRODUCTS TRADITIONALLY EXPORTED. OUR ALLIES
ARE CONCERNED THAT SUCH OFFICIAL U.S. FINANCIAL SUPPORT
FOR U.S. FOOD EXPORTS TO [RAQ WILL UNDERCUT THEIR
POSITIONS IN THE IRAQI MARKET. THUS WE ARE CONCERNED
THAT WE FINANCE ONLY FOOD IMPORTS THAT ARE ADOITIONAL
TO TRAQ’S USUAL IMPORTS, AND WE DO NOT ENVISION LARGE
INCREASES IN THE CCC PROGRAM IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

4. EXIMBANK CREDITS:
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF LDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 972051

~- THERE ARE CONSTRAINTS ON EXIMBANK CREOITS POSED BY
SECTION S20 OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE APPROPRIATIONS ACT
OF 1979, WHICH PROHIBITS EXIM FINANCING TO ANY COUNTRY
WHICH GRANTS SANCTUARY TO INTERNATIONAL TERRGRISTS. THIS
PROVISION OF U.S. LAW IS SEPARATE FROM THE EXPORT
ADMINISTRATION ACT'S ANTI-TERRORISH PROVISIONS, WITH
WHICH THE GOI [sS FAMILIAP.

ad

:
wt w& te

=< THE SG “RAS, MARE NO ‘OETERATWAL TONEREGERD ING -LEAG AND

eG €66 & CBO G CY oo

CONFIDENTIAL

” CONFIDENTIAL

THE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 520. SUCH A DETERMINATION
WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE SHOULD ANY EXIMBSANK ASSISTANCE

BE SOUGHT REGARDING A TRANSACTION WHICH INVOLYES AN
IRAQI GOVERNMENT ENTITY.

~~ WITH RESPECT TO THE AVAILABILITY OF EXIMSANK
ASSISTANCE FOR TRANSFERS INVOLVI4G A PRIVATE IRAQI
INDIVIDUAL OR FIRM, THE LEGISLATION ALSO MAY PRECLUDE
SUCH ASSISTANCE. IN ANY CASE, CONGRESSIONAL SENSITIVITY
ON TERRORISM ISSUES MAY NECESSITATE A DETERNINATION AS
TO SECTION S20 APPLICABILITY TO [RAQ.

“Se PRIVATE SECTOR CONCERNS:

-- AN IMPORTANT FACTOR (XK BOTH EXIMBANK ANO PRIVATE
SECTOR CREDIT POSSIBILITIES IS CREDIT ANALYSTS’ ASSESS-~-
MENT OF THE OVERALL STATE OF US-IRAQ RELATIONS, AND THE
EFFECTS OF THE WAR ON THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN IRAQ.

-- THE US PRIVATE SECTOR MAKES ITS OWN CREDIT ASSESSMENTS
BASED PARTLY ON THE BILATERAL ENVIRONNENT AND THE

OVERALL STATE OF RELATIONS SETWEEN GOVERNMENTS. THE

USG CAN NOT TELL COMMERCIAL BANKS OR PRIVATE BUSINESS

WHAT TO DO. WE OO PUBLISH INFORMATION FOR U.S. BANKERS
AND BUSINESS THAT EMPHASIZES THE FAVORAGLE LONG-TERM
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR IRAQ. CNOTE: YOU MAY WISH TO
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 94 STATE 072051
LEAVE A COPY OF THE 1983 ORAFT FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS.”

-- US BANKS HAVE SEEN PLAYING A LEADING ROLE IN CONSORTIA
TO PROVIDE COMMERCIAL FINANCING TO [RAQ. OFFICERS OF
THESE BANKS OCCASIONALLY CONSULT WITH USG EXPERTS, WHO
NEITHER SEEK TO DISCOURAGE LOANS TO [RAG NOR POSE
POLITICAL OBJECTIONS TO THEIR DEALINGS WITH IRAQ.

-- THERE HAVE NOT BEEN HANY RECENT APPLICATIONS BY US
BUSINESSES OR BANKS TO EXIMGANK. THE KAR, THE OIL
SUPPLY AND PRICE SITUATION, ANDO THE OVERALL STATE OF
OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS ARE UNDOUBTEDLY FACTORS
INFLUENCING US EXPORTERS AND FINANCIERS WHO OTHERWISE
NIGHT BE INTERESTED SN EXPANOING THEIR DEALINGS WITH
IRAQ. hy YG | :

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-- NE Sig hous Bucs in ase By” reed) es
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AUTHORITIES ON IRAQ*S ECONOMIC SITUATION. WE WOULD BE
PLEASED TO ARRANGE CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN IRAQI ECONOMIC
AND FINANCIAL OFFICIALS AND US GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL EXPERTS.

~- WE FAVOR INCREASED CONTACTS BETWEEN U.S. AND [IRAQI
BUSINESSMEN, FINANCIERS, ANO TRADE OFFICIALS. THOUGH
OUR LIMITATIONS ON VISITOR VISAS FOR IRAQIS HAVE BEEN
BASED ON STRICT RECIPROCITY, RECENTLY WE HAVE UNILATER-~
ALLY LIBERALIZED LIMITATZONS ON VISAS TO ERAQI BUSINESS-~
HEN ANO OTHER NON-IMMIGRANTS. RECIPROCAL LIBERALIZATION
BY IRAQ WOULD FACILITATE BILATERAL CONTACTS AND FURTHER

SIGNAL INCREASED GOI INTEREST [N DOING BUSINESS WITH
PRIVATE AMERICANS. :

G. FYIt WE WILL PROVIDE SEPARATELY FOR USINT'S INFORHA-
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 0S STATE 72051

TIGN BACKGROUND ON POSSIBLE CONSTRAINTS WE SEE ON ([RAQT
BORROWING FROM [SRD AND OR OMF END FYI. SHULTZ

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Key Judgments
deformation available
as of | May 1983

was used in this report.

The Iraqi Nuclear
Program: Progress
Despite Setbacks

The damaging Israeli airstrike on 7 June. 1981 against the Osirak reactor
at Iraq's Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center dealt a significant setback to
the Iraqi nuclear program but probably did not change Iraq’ 's long-range
nuclear ambitions. The reactor containment vessel and adjacent control
room, both above ground, were destroyed, although the many reactor
components located underground suffered little or no damage. Iraq's short-
range options for acquiring fissile material—cither by producing plutonium
in the Osirak reactor or by diverting its highly enriched fuel—have been
¢liminated-until rebuilding gets done, But Iraq’s longer range program to
build a significant and broad-based domestic nuclear capability—and
probably an eventual nuclear weapon ae still moving forward

Jraq has been working hard to acquire—primarily from Italy-—the neces-
sary fuel cycle (uranium supply, fuel fabrication, reprocessing, and waste
treatment) to support a reactor and’to extract plutonium. Iraq wants to
continue riegotiations to purchase a natural-uranium power reactor, which,
if acquired, would be the source of much larger quantities of Cam
than could be produced in Osirak.

iii an

We still see no identifiable nuclear weapon program in Iraq. But Iraq has
made a few moves that could take it in that direction, in addition to serving

its broad purpose of eventual nuclear independence. If foreign assistance in
vital areas such as the manufacturing and testing of high explosives and the
design, fabrication, and testing of nuclear weapons could ‘be obtained, Iraq
possibly could have a viable design completed on paper within a few years.
Unless they receive significant added foreign help, however, the Iraqis will
not be able to produce the material for a nuclear weapen before the 1990s.
Attaining that capability, even then, depends critically on the foreign
supply of a nuclear reactor—preferably a power reactor—of substantial
size fairly soon

Contents

Page
Key Judgments ” ; iti .
Introduction t 1
Status of the Iraq] Nuclear Program Before the Iran-Iraq War 2
oe 3
Direction of the Iraqi Nuclear Program After the Jranian Attack 4,
Effects of the Israeli Attack (7 June 1981) 6
Status of the Iraqi Nuclear Program Beforchand 6

= Physical Effects of the Attack 7
Effects on the Iraqi Program sis : q
Traqi Reaction 7
"Ee, 9
: eee, ver : ey
Prospects for Continued Foreign Assistance * 10
Rs - 10
a: 11
Other Countries : ; 12
Prospects for Iraqi-Developed Nuclear Weapons , aa 12
Reactors for Plutonium Production = 12
Plutonium Fuel Cycle . . 43
Other Possible Acquisition of Fissile Material . 14
Nuclear Weapon Development 14

The Iraqi Nuclear
Program: Progress

Despite Setbacks

Introduction

Iraq's nuclear R&D program was started with the
establishment of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commis-

sion (IAEC) in January 1959, In August of that year, *

the Sovicts agreed to provide Iraq with a thermal
research reactor (IRT) rated at 2 megawatts thermal
(MW1), a radioisotope production laboratory, and
other seems feelin (The reactor was upgraded

in 1978 to 5 MWt, and subsequently to 10 MW.)

Subsequently, the LAEC established the Nuclear Re- .

search Institute (NRI}' near the village of Tuwaitha
as the location for the Soviet-built facilities (figure 1).
NRI came to be recognized as the most important
Iraqi scientific research facility. By way of recogni-
tion, Iraq apparently decided that projects and facili-
ties buile at the institute would be designated “Tam-
muz.? The Soviet equipment and assistance came ~
earlier than any other foreign aid to NRI and were
called simply the Tammuz project!

—

%

On 18 November 197
ce agreed to provide Iraq with two
‘nuclear research reactors, hot cells, and supporting
facilities.’ The French assistance has been referred to
as the 17 Tammuz project.‘ The 40-to-70-MWt
French-supplicd Osirak reactor has been designated
by the Iraqis as the Tammuz-1; the smaller, 800-
kilowatt-thermal (kWt) French-supplied Isis reactor
has been designated Tammuz-2. Each of these reac-
tors was to be fueled with about 12'kilograms (kg) of

* The NRI bas been referred to successively as the Baghdad

Nuclear Research Center, the Iraqi Nuclear Center, and
now the Tuwaitha Nuclear Rescarch Center.
®Tammuz: the — (uly) of the iraqi i

es: radi

postirra
toires” (buildings, workshops, laboratories); and experimental de-
viees—-IRENE, MARINA

Comsip ctions
avales et Industriclles de fa Mediterrance (CNIM), and Bouygues
Offshores (BY) I

93-percent-cnriched uranium. Such material is nor-
mally referred to as highly enriched uranium (HEU)
and could be used in nuclear weapons,

_On S April 19762QICRARINEIOMERRE: Trac

signed a contract with Italy for a radiochemistry
laboratory, which was completed in April 1978. On 8
February 1978, Iraq signed a contract with the
Htalians for four additional facilities (Mow completed):
a& radioisotope production laboratory (RPL), 2 materi-
als testing laboratory, 2 chemical engineering labora-
tory, and a fuel fabrication laboratory (FFL). The
FFL has been referred to as the 30 Tammuz project.
We do not know whether the other Italian-built
facilities’ are also"part of this project, or are designat-
ed by their own specific project name and number.

*The Italian organizations involved with constructing the laborato-
ties at Tuwaitha are SNIA-Techint, CNEN (Comitato Nazionale
per TEnetgia Nuclearc}), AMN (Ansaldo Meecanico Nucleare), and

Status of the Iraqi Nuclear Program
Before the Iran-Iraq War

One Israeli concern during this time was the potential
for storage and accumulation of highly enriched
uranium fuel in Iraq. The French, too, exhibited

the French tried to convince Baghdad to accept 2 new,
low-cnriched (7-percent) fuel called “caramel” for ©
fature shipments in place of 93-percent-enriched fuel.

But ihe Iraqis refused to accept the change. There-

“We do not know how many of these Italian and French workers °
Ps selena ilar pehmserasoor mage — fore, in June 1980 the French shipped a load of highly

the Italian firm SNIA-Techint and the French firm Technicatome.

“Fop-Socrot.. 2 - 4

aaede

enriched uranium (comprising the first core load
destined for Osirak), There have been no additional
shipments. The French claim that caramel fuel is
proliferation resistant, because the process for ex-
tracting plutonium from spent caramel! fuel is more
difficult than extraction from standard reactor fuel.

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Effects of the Israeli Attack
(73one 1981)’

Status of the Iraqi Nuclear Program Beforehand - ‘
A few months before the Israeli airstrike; the Iraqi
nuclear program was stil] at a rudimentary stage, as
indicated by extensive purchases of instruments and

m other equipment abroad. Pakistan, by way of compar-
ison, was much more advanced

The Iraqi ‘Atomic Energy Commission qiganilitiiate , At this time, Iraq appeared to be‘attempting to
eee. price quotations at this _ develop its basic nuclear physics program.
time from a Swiss firm for two 500-gram containers i
of 99.5-percent purity calcium metal. Calcium metal
is an excellent reducing agent and would most likely
be used to reduce uranium, zirconium, or plutonium
halides to uranium, zirconium, or plutonium metal.
Calcium metal in such a high-purity form has no
oO other uses than as a reducing agent. Iraq has been’
interested in obtaining a facility to convert uranium,
at least, to the metallic form. Both metallic uranium
-and metallic plutonium can be used as reactor fuel or
in nuclear explosives. Zirconium alloys are used as a
- cladding for reactor fuel elements

The IAEC has been trying to upgrade its computer

capabilities since 1975. Iraq's National Computer

. Center has recently expressed interest in acquiring the
~_- Japanese ACOS-900 or ACOS-1000 computers for

” Baghdad University. We suspect that, if the comput-

ers are acquired, they will be used by the IAEC: The

Japanese computers are comparable to the IBM 3081

- and 3033 computers in performance and price, and
they could be useful in mie weapon research.

One area in which shown a great interest,
is the acquisition of
lasers and associated equipment. Because of the type
. of equipment being sought and because of an earlier
---- approach to the Italians for assistance in LIS, we —--~
suspect that Iraq is interested in developing an enrich-
. ment capability by this means. Even with some

0 oes a -
"8 ste Syst

Effects on the Iraqi Program .

Tragi Reaction. The Isracli attack clearly dealt a
severe blow to the Iraqi nuclear program, but does not
appear to have altered Iraq's long-term plans for
nuclear independence. Iraq has probably gotten over

' In addition to the earthen berms and.camouflage ° the initial disarray and morale problems caused by
netting fo protect against air attack, there was an the destruction of the Osirak reactor. It now appears
intense effort to acquire other security equipment to _ resolved to get on with its nuclear program, but with
Protect the facility from a possible ground attack. The more attention to covertness and physical security.
equipment sought,

included equipment to detect an illegal intrusion,

blastproof and airtight doors, metal and explosive Iraq's initial response to the Israeli attack was un-
detectors, and a perimeter security system. Such characteristically_xestrained. Baghdad, negotiating di-
activities may have been partially in response to a rectly with the United States, accepted a compromise
nou pages on the facility by Muslim extremists, UN Security Council resolution that simply con-

but wi demned Israel and called on Tel Aviv to place its
nuclear facilities under international safeguards. .
Credit for this moderate performance, however, was
dissipated soon thereafter when Iraqi President Sad-
dam Husayn appealed for international assistance to
help the Arabs acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent
to Israel. Saddam's clumsy attempt to focus world
attention on Israel's nuclear capability brought un-
wanted publicity to Iraq and made its Western collab-
orators more aware of the proliferation risks of sup-
plying Iraq with nuclear materials and technology.

I

Prospects for Continued Foreign Assistance

France and Italy are unlikely either to default on .
+ current Commitments to Iraq of to cut off all future
nuclear contacts. Neither country wants to take 2c-
tion that would damage good relations with Iraq, a
long-term source of oil ant! ETicrative market for
civilian and military goods, Both countries, however,
will probably be more sensitive in the future
proliferation problems and insist on tougher safe-
goards a

Traq’s oil leverage with its key nuclear suppliers has

been reduced in two ways. The stalemated war with
iran has resulted in sharply reduced oil exports and

has undermined Iraq's ability to use the oil weapon
against France and/or Italy. A second factor is that
world oil surpluses have made other suppl

tats

Shortly before the Israeli attack on Tuwaitha, accord-
ing to State Department reporting, SNIA-Techint
and the Iraqis had met to firm up final details of a .
feasibility study for Italian provision to Iraq of a
power reactor rated at about 300 megawatts electric
(MWe), equivalent to about 900 MW. The reactor,
involved—the Italian CIRENE, which exists only in

- prototype form-—is designed to operate on natural-
uranium fuel, although the prototype uses slightly
enriched uranium.‘ Because the Iraqis are developing
the capability to produce the necessary fuel (depend-
ent upon their obtaining the three “nonsensitive”

- laboratories), this reactor could give them access to
significant quantities of plutonium, starting in nine or
10 years. The Iraqis startled the Italians by asking for
a commitment to build the reactor—something the

* CIRENE: CISE reatiore a nebbia (CISE steara reactor). CISE is
a research institute in Italy

_ Finally RTGS.

Techint has submitted a bid and recently has been
selected as one of two final candidates for a power
reactor site feasibility study. This would be a rather
innocuous and unprovocative contract. Nevertheless,
it means that the company continues to pursue nucle-
ar contracts with Iraq @f ofily selectively). These’
contracts could lead to a progressively deeper invalve-
ment.

‘ In summary, Italy will remain the major supplier of

the Iraqi nuclear program. Despite the proliferation
risks, Italy probably wil! continue helping Iraq in
munterous areas of nuclear technology, possibly even
including reprocessing and plutonium chemistry. Be-
cause Jtaly is a major Iraqi arms supplier, it probably

could impese additional safeguards without endanger-'

ing | relations with Iraq.

Other Conntries

In addition to continuing its relationships with indus-
trialized Western supplier countries, Iraq probably
will put greater emphasis on strengthening nuclear
cooperation with other industrialized countries, and
with Third World countries in those situations where
. Western ability to influence nuclear transfers to Iraq
is even more limited, Iraq might also make greater
efforts 16 acquire nuclear materials covertly, but we
would not expect such efforts to be successful. No
other country, we believe, has been successful in
acquiring nuclear materials covertly.

Yraq has had nuclear contacts with both Pakistan and
Brazil, Iraqi-Pakistani nuclear contacts have taken
place from time to time over the past few years,
possibly including limited collaboration since the Is-
raeli attack. We do not know the exact nature of the
recent contacts, but they appear to have been related
to purchases of uranium and nuclear equipment.
Iraqi-Brazilian nuclear contacts have increased since
the two countries signed a cooperation agreement in

&
waoee :
ra . 24

* Reactors for Plutonium ‘Production

Iraqi options for acquiring fissile material—HEU or |
plutonium—for weapons are very much restricted.

The only routes that appear to offer any chance of -
success in the late 1980s to early 1990s ure: rebuilding
Osirak, building another research reactor, or building
a production reactor or a power reactor; all of them
sources of plutonium. The clandestine acquisition of
HEU or plutonium would be a very uncertain sption,

“a

As toan Osirak replacement, Iraq has several options:

it may abandon the Osirak project, rebuild Osirak

with French assistance, or build an indigenous reac-

tor. As noted earlier, it would probably take from one
of -

to three years for the French to rebuild Osirak; longer
if there were additional Israeli interference. Even if
the reactor were rebuilt, the French probably would

_ insist on substituting a lower enriched fuel. This step

would eliminate the problem of Iraq's diverting fresh
HEU fuel for bombmaking. Iraq still could produce
plutonium in the reactor cither by using the vacant

-positions in the reactor core or by building a blanket

around the core, Loading natural uranium into the
vacant core positions would produce only about 1 kg
of plutonium per year, even with the reactor operating
constantly at full power. Therefore, Iraq would have
to operate the reactor for several years to acquire
enough plutonium for a single device. Putting a
blanket around the core, however, possibly could

* produce as much as 10 ke of plutonium per yr.

In either case, Iraq would have to fabricate a large
number of natural-uranium fuel assemblies, irradiate
them, and reprocess them. We strongly believe that
building a blanket around the core would be very
difficult for Iraq to do without being detected by the

‘IAEA or the French. (In addition to LAEA inspection,
there would be a Frengh‘presence at the reactor for

many years.) Furthermore, the Iraqis would need an
abnormally large amount of French fuel (probably six
core loads instead of three or four) to keep the reactor
operating steadily at maximum power. The French
could not fail to note such abnormally large demands
for fresh fuel supply.

Iraq cannot currently construct a reactor itself, but -
Brazil or Spain might provide assistance. Brazil could
probably assist Iraq in building a research reactor, but
only in the range of 2 to 5 MWt—and Iraq already
has its 5-MWt Soviet-built reactor. The Spanish
could help Iraq build a power reactor with a consider-
ably higher power level (300-to-500-M We, or 90-to-
1,500-MWt, range), if that were what Iraq wanted.
This reactor probably would be a pressurized water
reactor (PWR). Even though it could produce a few
hundred kilograms of plutonium per year, it is almost
impossible to divert plutonium clandestinely from this
type of reactor. An overt diversion would be possible if" ”
Iraq were to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) and deny safeguards on the reactor.

=

However, Iraq would still be dependent on foreign
enrichment services and hence could not go into overt
diversion unless it intended to sacrifice further opera-
tion of the reactor.

Iraq might attempt to avoid safeguards by construct-
ing a reactor clandestinely. However, the project
would be difficult to carry ot clandestinely, especial-

* ly since Iraq would be dependent on Brazil or Spain to

conceal their own participation. With a facility of this
size, and large numbers of personnel and materials, it
is unlikely that it could be kept secret for long. In any
case, it would be very difficult to obtain enriched . -

_ uranium fue) clandestinely,

It is unlikely that Iraq could complete construction of
either e natural-uranium, heavy-water power reactor
type (such as the CIRENE) or a PWR before the
early 1990s, althougheone or.the other probably would
afford the best chance that Iraq has of acquiring
enough plutonium for a nuclear device. We do not
know the current status of negotiations between Italy
and Iraq on the purchase of the CIRENE. Jt ap-
peared, shortly after the Israeli attack, thet Iraq was
preparing to purchase a PWR; since then, negotia-
tions for this reactor appear to have stalled, After the
attack, Iraq may have reasoned that there was no
better time than the present to purchase a power
reactor, that a power reactor could provide access to
some plutonium, and that Israel would receive much
stronger censure if it were to bomb a civilian power
reactor,

Pistonium Fuel Cycle

Iraq has been working hard to acquice—primasily
from Itealy—the necessary fuel cycle (uranium supply,
fuel fabrication, reprocessing, and waste treatment) to
support @ reactor and to extract plutonium. The
IAEA confirmed a recent Iraqi request to place the

Italian-provided facilities at Tuwaitha under safe-
rvards. or
_ Iraq has produced boiling water reactor (BWR) and

PWR nuclear fuel! pellets at the fuel fabrication
, laboratory. Iraq also plans to fabricate PWR and ©
BWR fuel rods and test its ability to assemble one

PWR and one BWR fuel element. Iraq could use the
uranium that it ha’ clandestinely acquired to fabri-

cate reactor fuel. Iraq stil! would have to acquire the
fucl element fabrication facility that it has discussed

Other Possible Acquisition of Fissile Material
Iraq continues to show a great interest in obtaining
fissile material clandestinely—on the black market or
mae elsewhere. For example, in 1979 high-grade uranium

was offered to Iraq by swindlers. Whether it was

’ natural, depleted, or highly enriched is not known to
us; the proposed price, which is known, suggests

" highly enriched uranium. It is possible that Iraq has

-

acquired some uranium, but we do not believe that
any of it has been weapon-usable material. Dissatis-
faction with what have probably been boaxes so far
will not be likely to deter Iraq from further attempts.

¢ °
Although Iraq continues to show a great intcrest in
what we believe to be laser isotope separation re-
search, it is unlikely that Iraq could use this emerging
technology as a source of weapon-gratic material in
the foreseeable future.

Nuclear Weapon Development

No active effort to develop nuclear weapons in Iraq is
evident, but Iraq has shown an interest in several
areas relevant to the development of nuclear weapons.
As noted carlier, Iraq has shown a great interest in

’ upgrading its computer capability and acquiring’a

Japanese computer that is more than adequate for
nuclear weapons design. However, it is unclear wheth-
er Iraq is acquiring a computer specifically for this
purpose. Iraq has also shown interest in another area
that is more directly relevant to nuclear weapons—
converting uranium to the metallic form. Iraq also has
shown an interest in acquiring plutonium. In addition,
as noted earlier, Iraq has made attempts to acquire a
medium-range ballistic missile, possibly for 2 nuclear-
warhead delivery system. The project now appears to
be dormant mainly because of the inability of the
prospective suppliers to provide the missil

Even if Iraq acquired enough fissile material for an
explosive device, it still would need to design and
fabricate a nuclear explosive. We know of no indige-
nous program in this area, nor of the existence of any
Iraqi nuclear weapon design group. If foreign assist-
ance in vita] areas such as the manufacturing and
testing of high explosives and the design, fabrication,
and testing of nuclear weapons could be obtained,
Iraq possibly could have a viable design completed on
paper within a few years. There is no indication that a
forcign supplier is willing to assist Iraq in these areas.

: Considering Irag’s past successes with forcigu suppli-

ers and its potential oil leverage, however, we would
not totally dismiss the possibility of such foreign

14 “ e

sae
rage

JOS MESSAGE CENTEA

LUINTIY |
DEPARTMENT ray Se rer EXCISE vA

PRIORITY? ROUTINE ZYUW RUEHADAIL87 1591208
PR O810h1Z JUN 83
FM US INT BAGHDAD a * te ee e °
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIGRITY 5274 3.3%, * ee ee of
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 1'5 yy oe _ Pantipasgy “PARIS B 208 $ =
AMEMBASSY BONN O432 °-", * *-* - AMENBASSY “ROME OSES **
USCENTCOM ACOILL ‘AFB//POL AOs/

SONF ! DENT IAL BAGHDAD 1487

£.0. 12356: DECL: OAOR .
TAGS: PREL, AIL}, !Z. KS
SUBJ: MILITARIZATION OF HUGHES HELICOPTERS -

1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.

2. §N THE COURSE OF A WIDE RANGING piscussiont_ « Al
STATED THAT HiS GOVERNMENT

HAS BEEN APPROACHED BY THE TRAQIS TO MILITARIZE THE HUGHES

HELICOPTERS SOLO AND DELIVERED HERE EARLIER THIS YEAR. HE

STATED THAT THE UPGRADE SPECIFICALLY va THE INSTALLATION

eee
aee

OF HISSLE LAUNCHERS. THE APPROACH WAS VIA
EMBASSY IN WESTERN EUROPE (HE WAS NOT SURE WHICH ,

EMBASSY NOR WAS HE SURE WHICH OF THE TWO.HUGHES MODELS WERE 2 f

TO BE UPGRADED). HE ALSO INDICATED THAT _-LTURNED b

DOWN THE IRAQ REQUEST.

3. COMMENT: CONTACTING _ VIA EMBASSIES Bf
IN THIRD COUNTRIES 1S NOT IN ANO UF ITSELF UNUSUAL FOR

THE IRAQIS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT AILITARY PURCHASING

MISSIONS ACTIVELY WORKTHE WEST EUROPEAN MARKETS AND 4N Bl
APPROACH E (THERE WOULD BE POSSIBLE.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

¢ ) RELEASE { ) DECLASSIFY [MR Cases Only:
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( } OENY IN PART

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,

Department of State TELEGR:
\ A

CONF IOENTIAL

AN: 0830382-0780
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 1 BAGHOA 01696 0612182
ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 AID-07 INR-10 EUR-12 $S$-10
CIAE-00 E8-08 DODE-00 H-01 to-15 NSC-O1 NSAE-00
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OMB~01 STR-14 ACDA-12 SSN-02 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-O1
PRS-01 4139

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PR O61155Z JUL 83

Fe USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHOC PRIORITY S436
INFO AMEMBASSY AHHAN

AMEMBASSY ASU DHABI

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY JIODA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONOON

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

USELO RIYADH

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

CONF IOENTI AL SAGHDAD 1696

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E.0. 12356: DECL: OADR oe
TAGS: PREL, MASS, EFIN. 12. EG ‘a
SuBs: VISIT OF TARIQ AZIZ TO CASRO

1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER TARIQ AZIZ RETURNEO FROM
CAIRO ON JULY 5S. AS EXPECTED, THE PUBLICITY SUR-

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BAGHDA 01696 0612182 8
ROUNOING THE VISIT DOES NOT SUGGEST THAT THE IRAQIS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SERIOUSLY CONSIOERED RESTORING RELATIONS WITH EGYPT
AT THIS JUNCTURE. NEVERTHELESS, THE VISIT ITSELF
INDICATES THAT BAGHOAD HAS AGREED TO FURTHER UPGRADE
ITS TIES WITH CAIRO TO INCLUDE JUST ASOUT EVERYTHING
SHORT OF FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

S- SO SOON AFTER TARIQ AZIZ‘S RETURN, WE CAN ONLY
SPECULATE AS TO WHAT SADDAM'S REASONS WERE FOR
SENOING HIM TO CAIRO. THE IRAQIS AND EGYPTIANS
UNDOUBTEOLY REVIEWED REGIONAL ISSUES OF MATUAL
CONCERN SUCH AS ‘SYRIAN ACTIVITIES, GOTH WITH

REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF LEBANON ANO THE CURRENT
STRUGGLE WITHIN THE PLO. HOWEVER, THERE IS A

STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT THE DISCUSSIONS IN CAIRO
FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON BILATERAL- ECONOMIC ISSUES.
BAGHDAD MUST INSURE THAT IT HAS ACCESS TO A CON-
TINUING SUPPLY OF EGYPTIAN MUNITIONS AT A TIME

WHEN ITS FINANCZAL RESOURCES ARE SEVERALY LIMITED,
PARTICULARLY WITH NEW IRANIAN ATTACKS LOOMING. THE
IRAQIS HAVE SPENT MUCH OF THEIR OIPLOMATIC ENERGIES
OVER THE PAST NINE MONTHS WORKING WITH OTHER MAJOR
MILITARY SUPPLIERS -- THE SOVIETS AND THE FRENCH --
TO SECURE ADDITIONAL MILITARY SUPPLIES ON EASIER
CREOIT TERMS. SIMILAR OISCUSSIONS HAVE PROBABLY
BEEN HELO WITH THE EGYPTIANS.

4. THE ISSUE OF EGYPTIAN LASORERS IN [IRAQ WAS
EVIDENTLY A TOPIC OF DISCUSSION, AN INOICATION THAT
CAIRO HAS EXPRESSEO [TS CONCERN TO THE IRAQIS OVER °
‘THE TREATMENT OF THE ONE MILLION OR SO EGYPTIAN
WORKERS IN IRAG, PARTICULARLY, WE IMAGINE, WITH
REGARD TO THE AMOUNT OF FOREIGN CURRENCY THEY ARE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BAGHDA 01696 0612182

PERMITTEO TO SEND OUT OF THE COUNTRY TO THEIR
RELATIVES AT HOME. IN ORDER TO SECURE PROMISES

OF CONTINUED EGYPTIAN MILITARY SUPPORT, THE IRAQIS .
MAY BE COMPELLED TO MAKE SOME CONCESSIONS IN

FAVOR OF THE EGYPTIAN LABORERS ON THIS

ISSUE.

S. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
BOOINE

CONFIDENTIAL

SEGRET
. ITH Top

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

-_ 6
SUBJECT: |

Attached

Security

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON ~~ -

July 12, 1983

SECRET ATTACHMENT

HONORABLE GEORGE BUSH
The Vice President’

e
e

GEORGE P. SHULTZ
of State

THE
The

HONORABLE
Secretary

DONALD T. REGAN
of the Treasury

THE
The

HONORABLE
Secretary

CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
of Defense

THE
The

HONORABLE
Secretary

THE HONORABLE
The Secretary

DONALD P. HODEL
of Energy

THE
The

HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY

THE HONORABLE JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK
The
United Nations

GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY, JR.
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Director of Central Intelligence

United States Representative to the

SYSTEM II i
90859

od

National Security Decision Directive on
United States Security Strategy for the Near East

ang South Asia (S}

is the Decision Directive pursuant to yesterday's National

Council meeting. (U)

é ; WAZ.

Attachment PECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF
NSDD+99 “8 fsge-.
65 le $o-F-008 |
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‘Urdu TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

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COPIES

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, = ? $0859
‘ THE WHITE HOUSE
PennGsenst~ WASHINGTON
July 12, 1983
Nazdonal Security Decision
Dinective Number 99

United States Security Strate for
the Near East and South Asia (S4
The recent National Security Study, NSSD-4/82, reaffixmed the
. basic soundness of the purposes and objectives of our National
Security Policy toward the Near East and South Asia. The
derivative and complementary regional security interests,

objectives and strategy outlined in NSSD-4 are approved and
restated herewith: (0) :

U.S. Regional Interests

i
7 ¥.
2 wet] |

U.S. Regional Security Objectives
wae)
ee 2)
aie Fin ; -
saan 4

-- to obtain a comprehensive lasting peace between Israel and
her Arab neighbors and the resolution of the Palestinian problem

based upon the principles outlined by the President on September
1, 1982. (0) ;

~- to help resolve other regional conflicts that threaten our
interests. {(U)

-~- to strengthen regional stability by measures to improve
economic conditions and indigenous defense capabilities. (U)

yn) L . t.

Nw
DECL: OADR ‘ . cory F _ ae COFIES

_ ts)

Threats to U.S. Interests and Objectives

C

2

Strategic Planning for the Near East and South Asia

C

Cr ah I te CR RS rreme

7

seme Jet SEBRET se

i Sy :
- the technological, industrial, economic and military

strength which the US can bring to bear to assist other
countries. (0) . :

Strategic Concept for Near-Term ‘Planning

EC

7]

Cooveration with Other Countries

= ,

a (eset eC COP SEGRET

-- Cooperation with Arab Powers.

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Lae erke, Qeoferrenmote 6 oe

Implementation

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i. Moscow’s Tilt Toward
Baghdad: The USSR and the
‘War Between Iran and Iraq

Az lndefidgeace Aamspeest,

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Moscow’s Tilt Toward
Baghdad: The USSR and the
_. War Between Iran and Iraq

‘Ab fntdliigence Assessment

Thit paper wat prepared by ¢ of ihe.
Office of Soviet analssip. The weacixvies were : cuomapile
by «of he Office of Giotal bows.

The paper was coondinsted with ahe Ubettona’ . af
Cipcrnviens.

Comments aed querizs ave welcome and may be ,
ditcered to :
SOV A.

Judges

eileen
Sudugeer #043
wide adda beget,

The USSR, leas altered He policies toward Eran ane Ireq in Bagheled’s faver
_ during the past your ‘and a half, bo spring 1982-Moscrw began 2 major ef
* fort tc improve ties with freq, emphasizing cloter military coeperation— _

pirticulasty arate tales and deliveries. In 1962, for example, the number of
Sorict seaborne sre dcliveries to [req tripled f* * ite

stil) MANO ee phic Muhond's cal fora negoilalen scepaient of
the war between Iran and Brag, Relations have iaproved to the point where
Soviet and Inegi Leaders have resently made laadatery public aintormmnts
__ Shout Bilateral les °°

Curing the sme period, Sovict-Iranian telallons have tleadily deteriorated
tS their lowest loved sface tee Shah's refgn. Ths owes telling indicators of
this decline are Telan's recent abolitina of the Tudeh Ciren’s Communist
parts] aed cepulsion of Soviet officials from lean and (dheseow’s ooanter-
sxpulsion of lranian officiats ‘

iaseow's HK toward Baghdad isa marked departuce frau fiz policy of try- "

ing ob itsintain stable relations with the tuo while probing for beter tied ,

with rag, At Use outsell of the war in Sepiember 190), the Soview skenght &
they saw an Opportuehy to make some gaint in Tchran. Their embargo of

anne deliveries to both coustries benefited Iran because Iraq had bern
receiving considerably more arms. The Gremlin coupled this with «
renewed effore to improve pollileal tes with Tehran. When the gamble
‘predeced ie tnenedtete resalia, the Bares i oering id Hitted the
embargo -hut relveed to concluds any new areas deals ‘

fo the apelag of 1982, tuswever, Moscow begua to take steps Uber evemiually
aeganted io a efoar tik toward Bagheiad. The Soviet move stemmed from
tarioos facnars: : paged sae

* fran’t major bartiefield victosics.in bate 1598) and the first half of 1982
emipornrily disadvantaged, traq. The Soviets may have believed at thas

” time that J they diel not aid Bagiviad, brag might decide it had aé choler
tut to wecelerate 18 worn tosued Western Europe, Chins, and even the
finited Sites,

® The OSSE feared that an (raglan victory would lead to the spcead of
Karomelai’ typ: of Islamic fundamentaliem acer iis southern border,

wie

* Thea risk thar o Soviet tile toward Iraq would impel Iron 10 turn back
toward the Unijred States seccsed much lower in the soaring of 1962 than
it bad cartier iy the revolution. By that time, Khomeini ted crushed si!
major appetitics, incuiding Uke relatively pro-Wesiern Bani-Sedr, and
the regime's anti-American chetric was a5 chrill ax ever.

« The Soviets had yoncduded thet the prospects for the [ranian tevelution
‘swinging to che loft were besorning slramer and that the outlook for good
bibteral tics was poor, They apparently believed that.os bine as .
a eemalned te power Soviet tnfleencs =e

There arc, iicsieaas! some icsiacel constraints on lhe i insprawement ing
Soriet-lvagi relsiions:
« Mutual distruct between Ineai Presifent Saddam Honzayn and Moscow
remains great.
~ The Sovies dg not want tp aeuspsaize Sype—their principal ally in the
_— Eatim—by developing, tot close 2 relatoaship with iis archenemy,
tag.

@ Most ingertant, we belleve the Krentic, despite the deterioration of lis
relations with the Khoamelaj regime, still easiders (ran mere important
genpoliticaby than Iraq acd will want to avoid providing an opening for
the Unived States in Tehian-

Afshough the Soviets are likely during the next yeur to continue sepplyiag

mars ort mititery becking te frac, they wilt attempt by avoid 2 complete

break in relations with Icam.

The course of the war will have 2 enajor effect on Soviet policies toward the
iwo courircs Curing the ackt year. A prolongation of the military
stalemple-=the mest Hhely ceenaris—ermbably would strain Moses
relations with Iran even further sad head 16 coatinved improvement in hs
ties with Iraq.

ihe Doviels wanasieaiy Cal for anced s¢ the war, ceen though they realize

that cestation of the conflict would victd them Habiltties as well ag bdvefins.

A piicefal seunlement would:

= Reduec the significance of one of the pcicae igftaas in Sovietsdranion
reladlons—Moseow's weapons sales bo Baghdad.

« Probably make the Persign Gell stares less mecwnes aboot Sranion”
expansioniim, which would decrease heir nood and. veillingness to
cooperaic rallizarily with the United States.

on =
tw

« Result in probably greater conceliunions from Iran and Iraq io the
swrurele agoina ferael, tharchy cineagthening the pro-Savies radical Ag
ates.
« Possitly ingreve the prospects for s rapprochement between Baghdad
ard Damurcns. P

The penential Habillties for the Kremlia from an end oo the war, however,
woald be an least as sipnificant:

« iraq, without sx peute a need for weaponry, might aceelerac lis
’ diversification of weapons suppliers and tecome leas depcaden on
Magen.

« frag, would probably improve its relations with the United State.

* Altwegh a dramatic iadeuensiaae fa iranian ties with Washington is a
remote pasibiliny, Maseaw might worry ths the abseace af the unifying
factor of the war could weaken the finda mentalist regime w tha point
that more pragmatic clerics. who ave not as averse op dealing witli ihe
Cinited States, would gain ihe upper hand.

But the Sovlers have leamed. te live vith the war and Can Continae 0 do
axe king a¢ neither sicte gains s decisive military advantage, Although
Moma wosld significantly enhasee ity positian in the Middle Esat if ii
became an bonest broker negotiating 2 telilemeat, the prosperts of Lbs
Qocurring ure slim.

3 488

eee

srt Sr Policy Before the War

Fhe The War: Early Sovici Muncuvering .
Reatecrment of Policy: Bering 981 Through February 1982.
, Macon Changed Caueat: Marth Threveh Joly 1983

eo
» v8 ae aed oo 7 be

mee ry) Mocrentions
Gasrak: Sntendiieation of the Tit
: “The War
_. Other Frictions With ivan
** Sepamding iMithery Ties With ireq
Limiinttons 15 whe Savtet-iesal Rapprdchersent
Quthsok

=

UF che Datemate Continues
ff the War Eads

ZED ®t ewe ee oe

¢:

Figure t - =

* Baghdad: The USSR and tho”
‘ ‘Wer Between lene and Iria

Extraductien

‘The DISSE s primacy ates in the Persian Galf region
dince [979 has been trcapitelize on the windfall b
received from the cfireinstion of U5 influence in iran
without jeopariizing ks shaly, though bu portant,
relnlineship with frag. The war keeween tran anil
iraq. which tcgun ie Sepvamber 198i, has oronted a
major Impetimen: tothe acensiglthment af this
objective,

We beBeed that the Sevict Union Tess acon che war ae.
on bulzecn, detcimocial in iis intereses, Cin whee ont
hand, the conflica has inoncesed tran’s depeadomce on
Seviei aod Eas, Esrepean trade end wand rocies,
weakened the posien of she antiGerict Saddam
Haraye, and bocsted Sestet bend currency earnings
from arm Salas. Nevertheless, the Saview probably
beliews thag hese benelits are owtwcighed by ather
forors, In pacticwdar. Mosewe's chifting policy toward
che war has cagered. bach Urant and Img. Goly since
varie 1982 has Baghdad’s auitedy alensd ax the
Sovtots have $egua to Favor leag.

Anuither of the war's Ratlllcics it cheat is has sade »
US military presence le the region less cigectionable
ta jhe conseprusive Pessian Gull siatat, who [oar
frentan capers. As the Sevints beve often,
kaenenced. Ube eur bas alto bonofived the Cndted
Statet aed Seract ty Gendiag tun antl coaeedes
avd by diverting Arab and lranian energics from the
conkromation with Zionicen,

Alibougs the ISSR hes erslatsiosd an official, phe
fic paticy af moun rakey dhreiighdut the war, ac diffver-
em gles dechig the conftest has leaned neues one
aids ut the other depending on is explaation of whe
fighting. Le satél (VE2. however, the Soviers
entrained trom toking » decisive: qenes on the sitie ul
giiber belligerent.

This paper analyzes why Monnox shasdaned ts
relatively cvenhaadad siznoe toward the twa belliger-
ents in spring 1982 and adopted 4 palley that ciearty

Gavnes. Iepy. ft Gridiy eeaniees Sted interests in
each oounley ated the polices the Kremlin followed
Guring che Fes year ancl w ball oT the war. Ii also
Points aus the factions whet will Heit Maoseos's lik
tnd Béghdad most iepectan of which tt lnd’s
genpolitied Sgeificanes te ibe USK. Finally, the
paper digusses dilfercm: acenur led fer the coune of
the war eed bow Soviet intezests and policies will be
alfected in earch.

Bathigrowud: Soviet Policy Before the War

Mostaw’s relavions with the Shah's regime giver 1962
were reladvely (rlendly duipite the Shah's deepucaied
sath omit and siigteian of the 95K, Trades
expatidied tapidly in the: 100s aed 1970s, ved. bogie:
wing. id 1988, Tehran cleared parched: Sorict arms.
By the time of (he Shah's euner is February 1979,
the framions hed avdoced 51-7 balion wurth of Soviet.
WApRnR—ealy efinand fete suppor squlsenenn.
Gee wvble on nage 15.)

Strains begea to ecanpear io Sovics-leanias eeladians
after 1993, however, when tke Shah etarted to eae tik
ail wealth w taild Iran inte the predominant militar:
powder in che Persian Cull esgion. The Shah's strategy
ineulved a suth closer alGanec with the Leite) Sess
and rosetied inn mone axetttio: fronian galicy. «lenth
often clashed with Soviet interests in the region. Thas,
Moscew. although suifprinad by ihe Shah's tepid
damige, weloomed ft aa a majer bows US influence
in the asa.

The Sovdas expemied cassidershle effinri wifes she
Shek fallin Febraycy (97% in an aitemps 10 coun. the
foninic of Agntollab Ki basetsi. The ishenate cover:
Meth S deriston re allow the prevines|y Dogs! Tusich
itan's Communit gertyi to opeme epenls and iis
espuusa! af radical “anticinperialios” und aneilernetl
ites prewmebly bolstered uke Kecintin’s hopes. Mas
sous Snvasiog of Algbanisten ia Deceraber 1972,

”

Tectia ii ear a aia

fenecver, severely net bark ‘Anion PRUE POTEN eatieted
for genuinely clon: relations aith die Kkgmelial ve
gimme. (Tuting (960 Tehran awke out ofeen azcinal ile «
Sevier gdetonce ip Afghenisien. clined dew a Iran's
matured gas pipeline to the USSR. and-reduced the
samber of Soviet tutionals cerving in tran.

Sorict-Fragi eclaiines.hileh had expunided duriag
the fired Ault of the [Fe «ith the slenlag of a
Feicendstgip: sind Cugpesativa Trea fi £973 und the
ante uf large quaniiies of siphinlexted Sovia weape
ans io Baghdad dome during the last few sears

ihe decade. feng agpesed she Savtet(Teban inmive-

mem ef Lthiopiy ip 1077 god (978, the Mucsist coap
ia Kabat in 1976 and Moss's imension of A(phact:
pian the Gllwatig sour. Tie beagi Sandan’ grin
dianchiatnsend wink tke LSSE canvinoed ahem in
FIFE jo combine sodoe 40 Mreni Commons Pans
«CPi meathers arresced white scurs earlier an herpes
sil TOOMEoy asrHeng He red Coreen. The nk TP!
tele? halding a vabiac pps eas scuued. Even
fyite @uttume Tur the Sessiers, bomen, wud beag's
offual (1 wedlece fy users Helin dequanicm wn thie
ESR fos ers—she ands" teal basis af their melation-
shir by perchasing ip womans % scutes foe dhe
Wea.

The We: Early Seudes Maucaering

The reudin cleash disupnreved af she Igs doviagi

ta alah Iran i Sepsiccudaes Moun F ‘

Soper oltledats — cousplatined
Song ihe franis did popes an the USS, af
pesos gt the Soviat-iagi :

eny.. vit inveauchirgg. ¥

cat iT dinect arena shipments te bork sides

hs eppesition’so the Inuyl Invasion us ‘well es ils- ee
OS Gerry favor iit Fenn. Snag Gore the: Wramtof ude -
decttion becaues 1 hed bon receiving substantial
aracounts of Soviet anew. twhile Inn, had been wetting
far fess, From the star. bomever. Mosier per sitempied
ep albonuene the negative cifects of the arres embares,
hick bh nover publiciand, on berh counisles. 4 al-

* inmesd gunell aongungs af Sevier arms te fiter throwgh

fo thens in the flvaa few months of the war and aley
fermubied, aed probably encouraged, coumirics—auck
a6 Libye, Sovin. North Roses, Gulgstin, and Pax
igid-—-ig ship Sovies-origio weageed té them,

Devpine this aitemer is saften ics impact, lean reseni-
edt dhe Suvicl embytru. A Seley a
inthe °° E ite Gecember FNC thus Saddam seas

* “Tudo” ewer Ue ans coratt é

at svased thet
SMiggeor's “betragel” ecu ds beluergl cies could “pce:
Gr again be the teen.”

Fs Lat the mate lime, wes
sacading she idea thas Suddam’s days were: (RR
terad. senacently with ge wing of dialing con eency:
iss his wisle. The Saves alcs signed 2 Friendship and
Cuopern lig Treas, eith Syein in cack Chater de-
Senter Chis wrarn, Prugiiligs betwen Daemsows and

Baglidud. :

Mowe’, willtegness ws risk wo caners with bray

apgarcacts steviamied. if paw. feeane i3 beobicd suse tts;
Wrawis nl) ous alter do been: with aha LSS
csnplevels wml freris sx dicptewtyre witty Sani:
geramalls in the fli uF (ae0,E
Bin the Middic Ever sam f
‘3 etirabutedd Wee con decrgas bee haggis desire ne

teach the “ungratefel tragis a]
~ “ee Jim.

sua tbe sume ime thal tee Krenilia considered
Saddam “defiant.”

Porhaget even more knportdan inthe Sovlet decision to
srulertake there anti-fragi Sion wes Moscow's sippass
ent perception of iren's invasion ss an oppictanily tg
cagke sore tsiet in Tehran. The Soviews began = new
effon to court the Khorscind regime. For instance,
‘ Sovia Arobassador Vinogradov met with then Prime
Silinieee Radel and Speaker of the Majlis Rafeankani
on daiisate occasions in Qotober and stressed Mtnct-

soe"? bcos la isqpeoring rotations. Tehran, keevror |

*

ef, Was net reseptivo, and the effec: foundered.

Resseceement of Policy: Spring DPSE

Thssagh Faeteusry 1527

In a pegor tactics! shift. the Soviets Gilied the acme
embarga inageing 131. Remeviag ike ombarne
clearly favieed Iraq because: & beach: muck more
shag Iran dfid fram ibe LIES. Woe beliews the Suviets
apnureniy Feared that continuation of the cattiacge
wae pamplag troy lo sccelaraic Hs. arms purchases
from Chins and the Wem and cand turn Gaghded

inremeubil seny From thet SSH. Their decision was ff -

probaitis sho inflanseed ty-warrics alco! the erasing
fabhecchement betwasn Baghded aml moderate Arab
Wtabes, signe ihiat ike Lined Siaies was setking to
inmates relations with iraq. and Meoseaw's oem Fail-
Whe Ws moder A beodway with bras

_ Burieg the nest 13 mentha. andl opting POE2, che
Sumieu dalvered aver F Feuth ul wearers to
irea £ ~

Jab of these aan
aprarcoils were beoghy wrtier conaces sgend before
the war. Duslie the game period, Iran. despite is
ayawals for atm. receiwed fron Menasee much panaill-
er neurites of neliary cquipmens, lacheding onsgil
GFENK, Nitta tion, track. and spare paris.

Léfiiag the endbargu reat 2 enajar srtitant in che
L SSE cetytions with begd and len anal helped claw
Bayete 's shift fren Sacict to Wersen manpens, bee
Ht creanal ace prublens Cor Mfosopw, Both Bagbeled
and Telrost preuenabl) viewed the muce as the
“paging af au reng. Fhe beauniane age had guct

Bw

Weasel £9 ervlicizs
and did so frequently. Raghdad £ 7

ad sirongly rezunbed Mapes
fellure to-curh ares shipments meade to iran by Sovies
allies and edienes.

lo addition, to the resuenguion éf the arms deliveries,
the Keeonfie seat oat cher Sats that hi mas interna
ed in mending fences with Baghdad. In April 1981,
Brexhmey—far che fied time since 1978-<nigacd the
wena) prutage io the lpagl leadership conueniaral-
"ing Ube algning of the 1672 Friendship aud Coopera:
. Won Treany. Shortly thereshhas, the Sovies repained a
eritles) cleecrleegeneraiing: facility in frag deceged
daring the war, end thes signed 2 few new econeniic
Cooper ntion eneciends.

Nonmhele. Saviet-lragi political relations remained
chilly threaghous the sent of (9). Althoagh Baphdod
geo Fine Depaty Premier Ravan to Moser in
Sure. 1 rtndained suspiclour of the Soviets. Far
esamnle’

Miso for aretiig (hair enemy

a

despiic improved relations witb Moscow, the
Soviews temdined determined 16 destabilize frag,
were instrecied Ww inoreace effares bo inecenti«
me Save enbversive eruivities
elaimedd tleat lesa offikials Gctered Maca wag
using $9198 14 ete Iran tonntivus the war.

Meanwhile. the Keeriin proibls ea umbivalens
abgyt the Gourse 4f political develepments in fran. [1
pultiely applasded ihe oueice ts fone bgt of Prime
Winiene Mani-Sads, whens Musume considered anti.
Surict and cupsble of turning, (ram heel ivan the
Woot. Aé the cange tieee, it hed wy texts ever the
franian clerics’ erpshitg ot abe faluanhs, teftics appa
tigre -tbe Sfopehedio-’: Khaly~ 49 the aunuser and
carl fall, The Soxices had repeatedly trimcized ihe
Mujuhedin fur ccfusiog tu angie with ather defcise
forces im frat ond were repeciatly chepsiedd af fis
SLL. le cecrthree the Aiamuine sopuer by force.

Bul some Soviets recognized thad the cooetiideron af
elerica) eanieo} wonld not accessasihy benelit the
USSE. For caampls, fyrestipa politicel Comebearaidr
Adeksaads Bovin warned in an article ie June 1981
and ors Mesoow television program in Jajy thar the
Jusdameeataliss clericn wha were becqming dominant
in Tehran were: virnkently wnii-Govies.°

Whatever reicrcattons it bad, howerer, Moscow eon -

tinued to court the Khomelel regioe, When teas’
new Pretidest, Prides Miswwr, atl Farign binder
nogk office tate in tks seemmer of 1981, thoy, ealike
muy of their predeceteses, did ead speak aut publicly
agwine! the Zosics. In atfition, trade increared in
VSB) te slightly above prereestutlonary levels, the awe
compiles cachanged vishs of rariogs law-lerel delega-
Hens. and Ambagsader Viaserador wae pramicd 9.
Aumber of meedings with teantan feeders. This perlect.
Peouhtntes. dure’ det 1 Ge she cules hefore cbt mareiy.

Maseaw Chenges Course: arch Theosgh July (8
la auc jedgment. the Hfting of the arme enabarge in
apring 1961 was concetlally a damage-limitiag avis
by Idosbow. lie previgus policy. which hed leven tue
favorable tp fran. fabled ce gradece benefits fer thc
Sivitw in Tchean aed Pecker damaged abelr glraudy
poor standing in Qughdad. Eeding the embargea,
fowever. shiwed but did na cevnee the deserinracion
in Soviet-lragi ies. partly betduste the Soctsts conitin-
vexd to cuart Rider. Jt was nod until ths spring of
£9KZ thot the Kemiin bagan te mun ino this policy
of equidisiance beisveen the belligerents to one of
clear sugeart fine fru.

frag. The most important indicuiuy of the Scutes tik

beware Bagtuad «as the cen lagi ie
Rd Por eee acme contmact—slhe fist since datare Wy

war bogon.

a

Ef grate Decsiusd af Bhene eaves. paditscal rela tines with
Babldad abe began wimprord

a Berween Murch and June, the Sevier: hass-
et vittis Inui the Isaci Deputy Trade Minister ancl
Minister of Cadiusiry and Tron Gegawy Paime Misiner
Asie. Leaning ute sume perso, bg receleedt ao nomber

of high-ranking Eau. Cunopoen officiaie and (he Cilef sorvt o6.0 debherate. warning 6 Dron (a ceases ite

of the Goviet Fercien Minituy’s Near East Depart-
fate, Glee Giri Wighest level Sevias offi-
etal be visit Beghelad clase beisre the wer

fn lave Hag Moncae began praising leng’s peblicly
aapreteed «[Hagnett ta ed tht war, Morcow Radin,
for exemple, fry a. bortundenes in Arebbe on 21 June.
welcomed Saddam's anscancencent thal req wostd
withdraw fan rouge from all Grenion Gerelory, calllag
i. = “puiltive step” that coed fea! Is “ending the
Mandy conilic: as soe as passitie.” The Soviets
supped the Srant-leupined UN Security Cound
vesoiutton on 12 July calling for an dmcdiaic cease
Fire aod withdraws of (gece ta prewar bousulsrics.
Soviet media cosimontery én the walor lanlen offer-—
tive at Bagrah that begen.gp (4 Jeby—ahe finer elas in
the war thet Scanian toeecs copped inte frags
ioeplicatly oeiticnl of Tehenn al supportivc of Ding hs
dad

iras. Moscow’: frevtration with the Khomeind re-
gine’s labore to respond §0 Bs contin overtures for
éloser celatlons.and with Tebvan'seecerrent watie
Sovitt gestwres was am inpartant factor i the deci
sion ta fa toward Lrag. The Sovicis tegen to egies
these Crusirations gubbely ax abo the same thie this
tilt toward Iraq wes breomitse costeet, On 9 blanch
1982 Peis publiched a0 anthacnauve asticle by fs
senior Third Wark conncntaioc, Pavel Demcheake.
ilens steal, in.etar ke deted birecem's pricenecet spaiatt
Irenkse policy toward dha USSR. Demchonks charest
thal there wore “eaten gigi” Gevions, apposed 03
imacoring Envici-lranwe relation. operating arava
the Aqqiolizh. He aha warned tha crac of ue
Soviet preteoce in Afghanistan waa “falc” sad chet
Morcow sxushd mtd withelddee 113 Wendt edi oweséde
Werecetion=-“incheding intervention (rom. irinian
"soll —endes

aicates Stucco anecaded Weis raid a

straager iavolvereent in. bohalf af Alghan justrgects.

T Stee Benaw oad’

Soviet media exidcicen of leosian cepretéion of the
Tudzh ake bogen te incresse. Such complaints, eont-
rapa in bevadicasts of the Matos! ¥aioe of tran
INV¥O1j}—-thee Baku- based Beriet radia ciation par
poring U6 be franieg—now began eppedring cere
frequenily én offtctal Soviet medina

Sevler Wetiwetioas. Vatiogs factors aceoumied for

ahls clear Oly (oeaed Iraq. In Gor fudemean. probably
the mast compelling wax Moatciw‘s conpera cour the
baht in. ches: war's enilitery: Wolente Ineadd Iran. The:
shift wat occuring a¢ a ume shen Moscone’s ov ticx,
with iran were Erasing

Siemens by Sovict offinsats iadieats Sdeacaw was
wacy af an Jreslaa wlenory. tran's ietprertive atelag of
Grinmeks on the kauleticld beginning ia Septeratecr
1921 made tho threat of qeerall victory @ realiay. In
our galgeend, the trcmiin pevbabls dhoughi gn bruni
an defegd al leay ant corebdishment of 2 pro-lranian
regime in Baghdad would have enderminad Sevict |
JaMuence ip irpn and strenzticacd the Xhomensl
realms, moaking & eves lett Sasrepalale 1¢ Saker

Furtheemore, Mastaw dit aot e2at 6 wt an
perp tesedae regime, whe Kioumit Gazal
might posendialls ativact adheenats seus the
SSE". quer, 4) ndlien Mudie. satced fe ipflgenm:
bevied ieonian banderef?

Semect tcadors alsa probably feared that a threatened
Iraq wiukd socelcrate as Uien wow the Wess,
China. aed modcrac Anabs. ff Musa would ase
rome bo it% aet. Baghdad might even pe ta
Wazhingicen § saased
shas weearhy May 1982 the CPSU Ceaaal Commisice
Sorreaciat did a tude thal contiutied whe Uninet

Soviet Remsserseent of the deauian Rewehition

Aa antele fa.the CFSU soumol Keomemenilet fred
dished in che Sule #902 issue tae probable writes
before Afay) if a fevdark fa the Saidete’ neassesm
ment of dire Freuian rovslation. if ertiiedresd the
irasioan clerics’ coasalidation af power in the nonmer
af {98! ex o mepaivs trraieg point in the mevotarien-
ory seopess, The cathy, Kortishns throsovaky.
depery chief of the CPSU Coopal Comunttiec’s froter-
aetiona! Departeest and cat of the USER'S senor
experts din Be Thied Wild, ciated thot the iricegh
of the Sindeountalint clerics marked the end of the
anafution’s “praises people's aneicteperialier™ ens-
tare ond the Seghtaing of an “Biker” apie ya
isdansie “ohird path” berseen capineliom

Biers,

bi aritel: sinicd that the February #970 revofarfan
wars “Dowrpecis demmorentic,” seed, oft whe sight died
a Gudership, could dave bcen.suraed tn on “anti-
eupinadion™ fran fe, preedoeders dirccalGe. Unfortes
nateie, demented Ufpanavehiy', the complete ntumph

*
* -

"af the Shitte olde: stysedt the cevelurion’s “progres at

sive” tradengles, fa ile teorde:

The more the sew Grgonization'ys pacer with tr
apecieratly Islamis features fin wilhich she ruling
cleryr paid paranssunt conned asrengihentd, the
mare rapldis the femndonions af rhe sevelution ax
trety poonte’s ounl-ieetielite aud democratic ogee
olotion were erica. . .

Perhops engogiag in wishful shinkiag, iMyonourkie
iheiraed thet the clerey’s policies were ineennifying
the efoss siregele ie fron ced tegpetted thas “theory
hovers Ba the fiiture™ were olwogs pass, He
eduuliiad, kowrerr,, that the tefbening forces in dean
were i disarray.

The articie, which hod te hares high-level aathorize:
Hon ta run ia Komumenist, see d rotlonalizodion ace,
at the sent vet. a voulirmetion ofthe axgatler shift
4a dhy Soviers* view of Khomeinl’s fron.

Statet had no interest in eecing eae Invade frag. If
the Soviets believed’ this. they eight have Feased char
Washington. to prevem a5 inuaias victory, woald take
arepe thas enighr boost LS flcence in.Baphdad, This
snting could hans late bMesnaw w med ieeer in Baghdad
BL & tine when Ge relation with Tehran wore deterio-
tating:

The tiew tfc Earzeli dawarion of Lebeendie in June (982
inflicted upon Zoried interests and credibility in the
Middle Bart atso may dave conarthated i Bénocnw’s
th toward freq, The Sovies may have tbougha that,
W they did not increase sppiet ta Baghdad, i would
SRDERE 10 the Acab wack tant Merrow wan filing all
1S Avals partners.

AGL of this wad Oototring 2A & tree when Macaw
cuncladed that the framien revolution wad stringing ou
the right mad thet, as lang a3 Ehcmeini or his
sepporters remained in power, Soviet influence in iran
mudd remain mci, The Soviets had con wm chis

conclusion by cmiiag 1982. ax cvidenoed by an anthas-
itatins avticte im the CPST) joarnal in July gece boas
and by their increasingly frank media evidcien of
tranian sali-Sovizticm indi.
ie
bel3 He ayied ula.

0 SJ trandian apposition vo tha Govier Union wus deep
ana atrane. The Sostets also recugafecdd tees befibet
forces Yetnaining ix Cran were no masich for che
¢letieal regime, Hated thar the Soules
belicwcal the Iranian sso weak and disesitted!
thai, even if the Khomeini regime ootlapaed. the iets
protably would the anebls so scla: peer.

The Sevlets apparcaily concluded, moredver, that
frasien heed of the United States was pill mreag.
i im sysing 1982 the Sovies:

ved tan remain hostile ts the Wetted

States fie a Keng time. Abiough the Soviets probably
reminéd Fabanl © guvestial inupciwcanesll ie ties
with ghe & Sista vier oAdeals Gepk nis
Sevier tit toward freq would nol produce en inmedi-
mic more by Tehran back toward die Untied Seaces.

Since Geacats Intcecificationof the TH

The lmaceversens in che UESR's thet with Iraq eed
deterioration ta ite exlacioes with iran have acceler
ated since frantén farems. fen erosted inta Fray at
Bacrah in Joly 3933.

Fle Wen. While maintatping un official stance of
nertmiiy, Maxoew has bese inorcasinaly erica
beth pabticly and privately of Eren’s refaral 1a contd-
aaa. weguelaced xettlemen. Ties Soviets in Gicicher
1882 ageln vousd far ao Eeegdeapicnd UN Security
‘Conntil-‘oteiation calling fer a cemee-fire, lpasl For-
eign Painistey afTicia

? re

a

The Soelew alsa have begun ro confront the Dranians

on the war eave dincctly and suthocinstively bi pric: -

ais. ~

Cpempke recelved che brenden eral bai crwags to

Moncow seperately on 5 March I9630>
rocayke scape ith no wacertein

potent i abe: dean
aqeick ewd 19 the war, fm r

me Chatac the USSR: decke fers

The reales baye responded with harsher palfic? ~
criticisms of Mascon’s shaper om the war, The regione
pemored Tebian pewspaher Eirelacer bisated the
Soviets in Inte Deeember er allowing Iraq to use
Sovittanade oissiics fo ac enack oo Desdul. At a
Feitdiay prayer service la January, Socaker of the
irusius Majic Rattaaiant atieied the “Westen and
Caster superpeecss™ of penviding arma that allow
Iraq ta contione the war, Agaiolish Mechkiol waa
even more blast t the Friday prayer sereices ta Gom

om 23 Pebrnary, when ee aimed thet Moscow had

“spaced on effect i mucisting cur enemy.” which had
“vamed the danke of oar dear youths.” Subsoicemt
Frag eitis attack: on Deaful end other fanien
Chica la See Tay er roan Witte tondeametien
of Moser toy the clerical teaders,

| Oehee Frécrteas Wish fran, The USSR's cehations

wish trae have become ieceeusingly strained over a
host of otfser mmtiess. in addition ts the wer, The
Kboeiciar ccgionn, os 1 had in 2980. allowed Afghan
refugert to merch on the Sevier Embassy ie Tebran
an the 27 December 1982 anaivertary of the Sovies
invesion, They tore down and burned the Sovieg Nag
Colne ower the Embassy's front peice, Moscow fied sn
ficial protest, bat the franien Forclen Minkury
pablidy enndemed the attack on ake Enitiassy hy
wupgestiig 11 was juetificd by the cane OcCUpATiON
he Mulin Afghanistan.

“The Sovicts have shown increasing concen: aver Trh-

fans ad to the sae Tapupgents sed ade cow

pense ily erlubctaing, the Kbommciai regione
fecaep ~

pot tne adomanis were
clearly overdramatives far effcer. Moscow's worries
an this sate BFS petinins.

RMoseow har sho proicsicd a cect: of Iranian ove
«page te eoinet and-burass Soviet activiti ica ™

Tam at

The mote icllng Wicatars of the depts we hich
Soviet-lranian rollins have senk, however, tac
been Teheae’s arrest OF the Tustet’s feaders, dicate
tonal the party, ng cxpatsion of 16 Soret diplamars
in May 1935. Tach General Secretary Kiang) wed
other party memabecs were erected by the Kdeamcini

government on 6 February on charges of spying for
she KGG, tioscow lodged sn official pratt and
calicd, thus Tar unsupecesfelly, far ttecir melexse, bs
late Apeil aed cadly May, Kizaart and other Tusich
feadert. “cxinfatsed? on Iranian wievition 15 being
agents of the LSSSE. insent anon overthawing ii
orical fepiave. Oe 4 Bday the pavorameny dissalecd
fie pwrtiy. d Ges Rigsusini erdorsef puttichs , Ths
same day Tolan capelied 18 Soviet diptgmsys—soic
te half whe officially accredited Zovies diplomens js

Iran-—~fer intcrfering in fran’s interned affafes.

Moscow's nespucne 0p the May eesbent was nesuained,
limited im private an] radia procs aod the symbole
nagaltion of thes iranian diplomats. This resienias
reflects the Meetlic’é unviiingnett to weite off tran
wmaliy and possibly » belied that ditaglving the Tudch
bad GiOls A de «ith lranisn incesnal skaa with

Tigt Crnaliees ettberced sr fate bone that Teron Ualegeyiis mae
roopeniog she tempest sal rgtntipbe bs ploer Wietiel Kéan Jangsl,
ohed¢ tcletiv speten the Shah's Exther es uhe cart (8h,
Ayprism snedict med, Wale whet URE Eames onthGouns sheir
wept

fertign policies. Gromgis, kewcers. in his speeth to a
session of the Supreme Bevie: ti nald-fune, ienplicitly
warned Tehri that the USSR wayld sespand in hind
aut avy fatare sndtiendlp irantes geag.

Expanding Military Tiet Wirk Fang, fa conwast to
sharpty devertersting relations with lean. Moscees’’s
relations with frag Juve been cootineslls improving.
Both sider’ gablit thotorie has efleteed this. Grams:
‘ha, danny the tame mith dune speech in which he
stithited tean, atatod thal Beg sae he USE “are
Finked by eclatioes of Eriendshig,” In an carky July
imteruew with a French newsgager. Camdest
ahe Cesat-Sovict “rapomebernnet:” The mast comerecc
iegigattes of the rapprechceucs, however, wee che
heavy flaw of Sovies weepiad to frag amd ait vetude-
sion an wf 3 hag flow arid dead r~

re.

Aumune, Ue weston, delit ered an 10tt noon Sorict arac slice by lige

LL Zitat: 2 . simor ting war began bave atide at ennurtaet :
(Pd band es teag’s obits tecaere ot the war, “Newent.

hes, Sewien ams presen eli eecith Baugh.
SDhctivapaers. danl"s tretiel parehones dace the way satted nee tabhes
« Over . anks, some uf which sane the Hoghded bas overated ter $1) ®illey fron. Wedern

japrevel susdel casipped with kaws eungeiiegers. cumin ual am mlditionsE™ 7] tru Ching
* Mundreds of satfnsteair mavales uted fuckers. sinace Ae: wie Peogam. Beug's enthtees Fees Boisien

wihhubuatls ate partiewbals galling ne Mewes &

em merci ig a
‘Hemme: Acunt Porchenet, UF7IFust : wee a.

an

Srevhkncy wat atill ac she defer wher ter Zavions
desided tn the apring of (082 tn after their policy
iqwnrd fran and frag. However, Andraper’s else 02
the cop of the Sevier party began at around the sons
ite, Although we da aot damy bbs cote in thls change
fe polley, as RG& chidl and a Politkure mensier. Ae
wadoubsedly teil a soy ia the warner. The fect thet
his reghue hos purrued it even mare tiporonsly
suggests that fir rpported the change.

The increasingly pro-drag! tilt, zapetker woh orker
infennaion, svggrsts thal <lefroney sag be nar
iaelined to support freg ond tetas convinced af oppor
tunities Jor the Soviets iy Iran than wee Geeskney.
Andrapor has sor publicly expresved dis views an

fron. bet levertla commanioter allekandr Bowie,
reportedly wnt of hin adeuert. has been a cedtic of the

clerical regia ey

A shat the RGR, white Aindtapov
sur ts chig. cnet a low regord for the left's political
proaypecrr la frag ond war deeply comerrned by bork
aarhSovien und allegedly pro-LsS sentiment withiir
the clevioal teedershis ~

pay denbacerritie= salen on Pelegation that
wirited! Macrae te Be fSez
Bhatt aU OROE it mach store apeipathetic te
frog's interests than wat Sreshace's. The cktef of the
OS faterentt Seccion tn Bogldad noted ie Febrrarp = ~
a Ss ae ees Pom ee See eee

Lz : _!

The Suritis may alsa have saved ta help frag by
urginis Syvia i tedgen the Waui pipclific iia. eromes
fs lerrataref.. :
af <
in Late 24arch, heoweves,
thes che Synans bed refused

T

L

|

th saidision va sviliary supply activity, there have
been ame reparen that Soviet miligary advisers have
Reterrn rreing cere fe pureerieting de wtih conte,
abvite and asmttance

od has reported thas military olficcrs onlined
caetion! péans For Jeon Guelse whe April (03 beta
along the Ckweveich River fran {

_] has claimed that Sovict pilols ore
flying Iraqi MIG-23s. although nei on operations]
rexvmshaniee ae Goaphet evesinex over leanina tensic
bry. Althsegh sorte of phese repays hawy been eae
Gormed and we diaubs that Sevicw pec actually ghalag '
franians, we think vtegee way beer leerca ped lag
adviaory cffort

Limitations te the Soriet-leaql Repprockence!

Some iompertant constrainis will lignit the imgrove-
ment i Sovbet-Lengl celetions. First, great motel
distraat sail! cniows boweren Moscee and Sactdam. The
Soviesé fois wet forganen Saddam's exemadion af
Fragi Comets in FSTE and kis continuing tight
restrictions en CPI wctiviny im Iraq, AMeugh semen.
SUS SUMreES fepurien! thet Saddac: velensed some CPI
aeeanters Crom jail in tyie spring 1982—zenve sures
Clan the release wae quid poo geo for the Awd are
deabetha CPi sill dees. not operate epeniy in Inet. As
recendly os 14 June, Saddam publicly condemned rhe
CPi. Moscow abo r@naios wary of Baghaiud's la-
cating vidlbary, ccongralc, and political cant
with Ching and Wesisrn oowers.

Satdam appencils ail daegly repens Mioscoe’s
arms embargo early in the war. This seppiment is,
never (er from the surines in hs public evements on
teltlona with the Seviets. He alsa continues in these
Micments to chastise Wimxcow on varie isguct. An
articte ta dhe Batt: Party newspaper in evid- Aagant
eviieized she LIESR's foreign policy. sparking = Savi-
et mainder aad.an deogs qxuster-nejot

Semmrd, the Seaview fave woe weigh the effecis of a full
rapprochement with Baghiad om uhele ces with Sprig.
They will want to avoid antagonizing Presiden *
Aton, their mon important alls ia the Middle Ease
aif a sirung supporter of ira, by developing 1a clase
a tehulenshig wits tvs archenern, Saddam Heian,
Gptimulty. of cuurse, Manca woald fike ta cee
ehded wed Danses sexed fe

Present the hope]

gwerss & ot RS

a

aaithat brag end Syria woubd
end" their mutead hasiibey. tua he was ae o logs as to
hav shit would Ge accomplished, As covet cariicr,
there ars wamonfinned reparts tag Moscow has om-
seccenilioliy seugh Sadiag agreement wo respen the
tragi pipedlios,

Ja asking Damesqus fo médorvin itt policy reward.
tran, the Kremlin is likely tn argue thal such u change
wndid ferer Arab antl end dure Tran back inte the
nedseal Arab fold. The Soviets’ apporent (silore to
Pash Syria mor forefolly, however, iadentes she
value wey aa on thee dics wish Daoascus.

Third, aca’ most Emporis. we believe Masoow stiff
comaider: Iim morn isipowtadd poomlzically than
frag. if fer on other reatdn than that the USER and
leas: share a, border of mire than 1.500 miles cand
bean. is addition, borders Afghanistan? The Khames-
wf reghne'’s vino anti-Americunise and its growieg
ties vo cadicul Third Werkd regimes serve Soviet
interns, Misco will won 19 be careful net to tii sn
for towed Baghisd thet fe convinces some (eanion
inaders 46 rathink chet fisslfley wcnard che Limited
Sates

abbont, that. as of spring 1962,
Moscow bebeerd Iran woukl remain hottie 0e abe
Caled Saates Foro long ginse, bran‘s improving tied
with Wesrvare Euengs and. Junan appear to be giving
Nioosow sect thoughis. A tates Faneive Sinisizy
wfficiul. for example, expressed concen T™ a

iran bes lou eueie saad Wanuets in Sovien
echolacky andl mvtdlia epticien, Zeerda, tor
example, calmed on & Jane that che United Stans i

pcoviding tran arin vie Erect
r :

.

The Saviets ace: Safronchok, Chief af the Foreign
Minisuy’s Middle Exat Deperument, i Tehwan af 5
ABN, He is ome of the bighest level Ravies officials to
vieit Iran since ebe reyolntion, The ireniver To

~_Jome 1s Vii, Cespae tee ducen
dpetente ang caguision of disiamats, then: have bern
shone adidiionsl imal slgmt—aech as the resuniption
of Acrofter fltehis to Tehraa—-tbat the Soviets and
leandons pte it interested ino total break ia reto-
tices.

tebaemoe alps comtioues tb arll Hienided artsiunts of
miliary cauipmens 16 lea cr. .

ete Hated, Tehran
sumssees Ie Su ears cpgigeens Trunk
enuauries Sach us Bulgaria, Malan, ond Creckuslern-
his alesne) certainly with Mapeew’s approenl

4

ae Ses Us EE

=

Ghatioas,

AF thr Stalemate Costionrs. Tie couse of the wor
EE Inawe @ emajer ¢ffcet an Sevier policy waveard Ieee
and Ieaq Geer the wea year

A. prolongation of tho tisfemave on ther bactketield bs
Dur pits lilbedy seonacio, 4, aloe Ironing berewk-
through is now only a wery dins posslbdiey. Felao's
fundamental duadegntages in materiel have beceene
@ivions at the Irpgis have sigbilized tke (roc and
bokserd thar delcainee forifieations, Chancs are
aleruast 2% slim thot Ivan and freq will] stide the wae at
thee nepatizting cabtc, Tespice ifiy's deciared willing-
mexs ip bcttle ihe war pencefally and growing weesi-
ness of war io iran, Khomeini é kained of Sadie
imupeds hin i6 secept nothing less thas the Ere]
hemuckes’s auctor, Gum's nent Bly neree Of acti fe =

figta a war of ativition coupind with lntreaged subver:

sion. honing thereby to conde Iraqi morale. further
sifain lrng's economy, and creniually bring atom the
overthrow of Saddan

Althoegh che Soviers did noi echeome the war and
heave persists called for che conflict’¢ ond, bath

pe blédly and privacy, ther have bexened to Hee with
i and can comtions 10. do 59 indefinitely as long an
fenither site gains @ decisive miktasy advantage. The
Soviets da 0 was is write cll cickher lean oF frog.
For ot tease she nent seas. owever, Plosame, while
wegbably misttapting to stubilize relations «ith Teb-
ran. is almost certain (9 continue pursuing a polics
erore favarattc to Baghilad. As larg ac Khomeini] aed

sk

eS 2 ee teem Ee

Figure 2
ixencirag War Feent, September R3

~

ween Remee 9 6 PO

Reguiar Army Units
faa frgrakrs

oe RL od
Bucharteted hae
sat y eremk a ey Be
| ister, Of mae
Mle Antsy me dane
*~
+

a

fis pupporters remain im peewer, Ube Soviets coun lise

Chance of incrensiag thely inijucnce in Iran. The
Soviets have abroady inpryved thelr rclarions with |
Taphdad and may believe that thelr anms cales will
intreats Iregt depandence on the USER and cremueal
iy (tonsinte inte Sovies leversec,

| if the War Ends, Atthoagh the Soules consistenthy

ave ealted fer an edd fo the war, ibey probally wou

. vinw ics ortannicnt of & mined biessing,

The Sovieis probably woold welcome an ond wa
major wri unprediciabte war on wbels border tat
omild redound to the Unlted States” beaefit. A poste
fal getikeerent would;

* Reduce wie significance of ane of chs prion Ivitenis.
in Saviet-franien relanicet—Sdieacow"s erapiat
ales to Baghdad. é

* Peybobly make the Posize Gulf sopics less nereoes
sbeut fracten expamionbm. whick wold doercasc
thelr aced and wHlingners to conperate miners
with che Liabeed Santes.

« Retalt iss geeate? Sonttibation: from Iran
ana brug to the srugge against Israel. shorchy

« wehengikening the pee Soviet radical Arb erates.

= Possibly impross the promnccen for 2 tapprocicreonl
betworn Baghdad aed Domasesrt ‘

AG end qe the sur, bower, «ould sles cacee peaea-
ist Habits for tke Hirerstins i

* ican, wilhoal as aduie o ceed fir weaponry. malght
moolernte itz diversifidetion of weapons aupplicm ©
sad Become: lex: dependisn! on Masener, Sefton,
might then hove 2 fer keel to rename bis effin pa
ieunes leay trons the LISSR.

« lag whald orotelly suprive its reiniigons eh tbe
United Suates. Saddam, fer example. hus sigded
publicly that full diplomatic relations will be te-
establighed os one as the war ead,

« Although a drseuic improvemens ie Braninn tick
with Wastigtat is 8 FeMOtG pelt, Stomcew
tight warrs that the wosance of the enilying forlar
ofthe war contd weaken the present fanigmenclict
regins. iosoen nay be tdacerned that in hese
ciresnmanaces more pragma; clerics. wit de eH.
as avers 4 Geuling wish ihe Calne Stare, saald
gain the opqer bend,

13

= fan mich: heva a freor baad us latrease its aid ig
Afzhan insurgents.

The Soviers chink jt unllbely that pene? aegertaidhnes
will. begins ayy tine ae ;

ed

we.

seo Sevict Mi
Eel SORT eins Ga Govier talevisieg on
430 July teat there is “ne ond vo ihc war pet Ip alpta.™

hidsto, howewer, is likely t¢ prabe Iran's postion w

. son iD the cons af continnnd stalemate might ave k

to REPCE 8b megddiations and poseliiy 1 Soviet media.
ton, Although isanian secplciona of the USSR make

. a Seviér sole of honest broker unlikely, 7c egeld be the

meit damaging neonate from the U5 poles df view, A
rile for the GSE in mediation=g bin to that which it
played berwecen India eed Pakistan of Tashken in
1965—eould bos subsientiat boost to ite ahiective of
becedhig = major player in dhe Middte Enc, new ta
mention ta fis standing with both feos snd iraq.

Miscnw =H ory to cnsupe that poo-Sorie: Third
World states nether than US friends anch os Tarkes
aud Pakistan. play cenieal roles in way medion.
Early in the wat, for magic, the Sons tackal 2

mediation effort af the Nenallgned ‘Stunemeny bed ty

Cuba. '

The aar's cmd alitust ctriuiely ples suahl be acum
panied Gy datadified Serict cffores ta imprace telnter-
al tise wit. bow trae and traq. probably sbrough
ANUS talex. ptonamic deals, and inercased potiical
eosmci., Mascow, in addition. is likely ts work
thetegh botk diplomatic meats ancl ucties meres
AG Ory tu tesioig fran’s fhestiitty toecurd ge Caded
Siates snd to forcnall @ significant upvern in US-
(raat relntinng.

‘ seemesdessiaapesananiaaniiaaentiaa aac inn na A as aaa aaaaaaaaaacaaaaaammaaaamaaasssacaseasaasssaamamamaassaiaaasmmmmassasmaassaimssaamiadinaiaated

-
‘
u
7 > 5 ee i
=
. -
>
«
bal
«
*
.
* +
& -
.
.
t ry
“ .
td
.
4 .
e
a
* a
*
<
"8
°

Appendix

Clrmnolegy of Soviet Paley Toward [raw and Ere, 1980-43

Can Jide Been.
Re - ct
bs Li ~- $ a MBH re a Saal
21 Sates Bras tnvaties Bran.
. see oes m~ PEE are,
Gaehes Sores tnd sere des
Pelagalsh|p sn Cindpoxakige.
Dacervbes :
iat i
Sgtite ewes! td
fate
dune Witdegh . < :
t P
Sepimecr Fira mujer trunlae wichery 94
im.
Gerster thtusgh trankan eatery at Bean.
Wcworertggr
2
Mork rons whttony gf Siteuili<
a
April
Muh Basil: of Rheucaerdahs tegans.
faitex lrethans wis boule af Khun
vaampbabr! they posk (ragis tut
aif 2B bak matt pachuis af bean
am neaaeney,
etc Urumgh Auge, | Wet it Leborans,
Suk fdesise crest Iraqi Gander fer

fen, time: is dade bois of ee
wag ht Bape,

‘cient ei ili

franinns and Fewer apron on seme

Wait srppe taals,

vom at ae < ites iis
seoaapen 4 od lranisn Seoakeru
Piotéion Khawised and Pale
Mininer Maxtved queue power.

Seict hastwcdes Vongredor
26a feccefthorte were biererre
trader.

Sheciale: Fronts anita Got
Sireicl grdarannes ignites esa.

Fovigy (URN eptteling sedan
Algkas sumases Crs Ponda
harder Bar Birue tiniz..

Socios hegih guiblichy criticlaleg
ftants smmes an te oar.

Luniermcle satiety Sn he CHEE
donvedd Kowsrmardar atiticiget ha
Kaorchié vege.

17

Soviets (if, eon cena.

Fea Depety Premier Raraatia chiy
Mae.

Sufteds wad Upgigts sign Fret ane seen
ta\- 6 vider

war began,

Ole Grinaentis. Chit at Fercign
Re

Wintary's Nes Bane
tet Hag
Sealer eficiad a cul tiese Wee evar
bern.

Sdeas bogie poliiely poakelag ttegs
Patel witiiagwyers oe bit the: wer,

Sidie winks WSancese.,

Shrrigty supfurt fewyi-m guned 1%

_ Bxtesily. Council revheliom coiling ber
ied aps cenodine and Siete ad

tapiteter bayadarétc.

He Ln the: heighega!. aved

b

Chronclogy of Seviet Policy Toward lean and bee, 1980-85 feestoued

-~ er

4s

Feinsit,

rie

7 om ee Paes Zee ae
Saalee © we A wm "tea oom ; “ me trea
concent - wr ss 2 é
sed hestanettontort
eect, Hg ees,
e Pe TRE ee
SetheGete poaecben bn elie
. Sean’
Brasheuv dies aad dandigae Fare ped Dresians ten
Recetere PRU beer, . Sees deal.

nereasy Of thet Bowler levasien sieca majo icon thal,
u Meare foslges aff :
ay e s
Wa TAS eerngeless
acdaews aime Feds tesdert Riswarl and aebor Shaashal exehrs folkeoup vais te
Giicativg Cells wtih beat Mrttiers aye aswesvel.ot
eapus les. tunecs of spxteg Br the £58,
Itaiany clos an & Surviet-ena
= derepdrel is, Tchram,. c 7
Secost Covevtick Rises olfee a feed Crane 18 Mutetn ty met;
aioe wand be welhes eanty ghia. papeerns Gee deagl arena paechanch.
fq. mg dae eathen. (teeta. Tekh bdo ake eine” = Seek agese ie veo Wage at taetl
adea: “weral aeage™ wea on Gomme erinsisbot i epg Car aid fen Bees,
ay OF conenon, et Kceted,
GES wh corieys polars slnee
er Seema, Crme atete eps Br Catch Meeetoed
BaCES cade Ernie celts. Whi
wen oxad oll Canis fesa capeds (8 Sake Grdonsm, for
Ges eda) Tesdich and inseferenee in
Tig (SER expels tee fractea
* Sehovnits be prialistien.
Gregan whh ther now bent:

a8 Ctnadiot tn ties LBS.

Chreuslogy of Sariet Policy Teward Iran nad rng, 4596-83 (cootloued)

oY

hase ; ‘ : . ’ > OR SEAS 7 RE CU OES 2 oe ee cee waa - . mee oe wow
bs the meee « ts A + ME wsme oe . OR NLS fT
Gong, wldresgity tation oh === Sladhebaes: Hagin i
SuprameSevien.asiciacs Iran's saat Garay in loarview uth hati
MEAS UE Che LEER bs Ry te-
oi he based agian Take = Ciremyan, senaina 6 Bia
rane sage LEER ond bene nse
she Sarit accelerate ea ol i ants “Tete top echaaians of Tricniebie,
date Kram Pummeabes punch i the: heeds Sevint-tregl “age
and Seven seen bp tha nective ke ov wih Feeney
sua ed Ghee
arte mates eansher wig
ee a eae
Aupat Waka ediesin te Mancow nnd Kzled Sovists and fusgis user
j Daged ti ty Soebescr ia thelr
Algioen acit vf Leela: oilingn near
~ L. . * .

[ or eur wee

>
.
?
y
‘
3.0
One,
“se 3
o¢@
-
wie
oe
.
&
%.
os
- of .
.
we
-, ¢
.
so 8 3
* >
{ ry
*
*

ws meswrety 4 0 oR beret!
y .
ede

17 OF STATE

wm se
4

cerecTs
—— -

e330967, NEY
United States Department of State.

Washington, D. C. 20520 P
at Bl\Pe
' @ OCT 1983

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

10
sey? cer IRN
SECRET/SENSITIVE PR i
RRO
TQ : FP - Mr. Eagleburger

~- Jonathan How
SUBJECT: Iran-Iraq War: alysis of Possible U.S. Shift fron
Position of Strict Neutrality

FROM =: = - Nicholas a lL + yy CaP)

You asked for our views on the present validity of our
" policy of neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war and the implications
of a shift from that position in favor of Iraq. This paper
explores the issue of a policy change and reviews ways in which
a change could be given practical effect.

THE PRESENT POLICY

* When the war began three years ago, otr poor relations with
both combatants and concern for our security interests in the
Gulf led us to reinforce air defenses by the deployment of
AWACS to Saudi Arabia and to block~-the use of air bases in the
Arablan Peninsula by Iragi aircraft to reduce the threat of
expansion of the war. Our neutrality policy evolved out of 2
this preventative reaction. Until now, this policy has served
our objectives and interests well. It has:

+~ avoided direct great power involvement:

-- prevented spread of the war beyond the territory¥ of
the combatants to threaten Gulf oil supplies;

-- contributed to the current military stalemate;

(== ‘preserved the possibility of developing a future

relationship with Iran while minimizing openings for
expansion of Soviet influence.

Two changes in the circumstances surrounding the war now
raise the issue of whether this policy continues to best serve
our objectives of stability in the Gulf and an eventual
negotiated conclusion to the war which return the parties
substantially to the status quo ante:

DECL: OADR

e

SECRET/SENSITIVE
-2-

-- bilateral relat»ons with Iraq aave irrroved over the
last three years while relations with Iran continue to
be virtually non-existant;

~~ the Iranian strategy of bringing about the Iraqi
regime's political collapse through military attrition
coupled with financial strangulation seems to be
: slowly having an effect. :

Iraq appears to have concluded that it must change the
strategic situation or risk eventual Iranian success. It has
elected to do this by attempting to secure from France the
Super Etendard-Exocet system with which to threaten :
interdiction of Iranian oil exports--thereby hoping to exert
irresistible economic pressure for a settlement, perhaps aiso
involving great power intervention. The current delay in
French delivery of this system is; we believe, only temporary.
while public concern about escalation of the war, and the
possibility of its affecting exports from the other oil
Producers, subsides. Nonetheless, Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz
left no doubt, in the hard line he took when meeting with the
Secretary last week, about Iraq's. annoyance with these delays -
and determination to overcome them. The Secretary responded
that this Administration does hot react well to threats. :

The changed circumstances could-lead to either of two
results which would be seriously adverse to our interests:
(a) Iraqi attacks on Iranian oil facilities intended to
interdict exports could cause Iran to try to prevent through
force all oii exports; (b) sustained Iranian pressure could,
over the next year, bring about Iraq's political collapse. It
is in-this context that a possible tilt toward Iraq should be
considered.

A TILT SORBED IRAQ: WHAT IT MIGHT INCLUDE

miare: ace three areas of possible: actions we might take to
bolster Iraq: financial, diplomatic and military.

FINANCIAL: iIraq‘s annual foreign exchange expenditure, at
present rates, is estimated to be $12 billion for military and
$6 billion for commercial imports. Its foreign exchange
earnings from oil exports are running at $6 billion yearly.
Pinancing from Saudi Arabia. and the Gulf states has fallen from
a rate of about $1 billion monthly during the first half of the

S2CART/oENS) T) VE ;

. . SECRET /SENSITIVE

oo

war to less than Lalf of taac rave. Iraq has mae up the
shortfall py nearly exhausting its reserves, deferring payments
and by obtaining additional supplier credits, but these
measures are only stopgap.

Increasing financial assistance to Iraq does not seem
feasible. Following the Secretary's first meeting with Tariq
Aziz last winter, we explored what might be done through
international financial institutions and found the
possibilities to be so meager as not. to provide significant
relief. Additionally, any support we might give Iraq in
securing access to such funds is‘severely restricted by various
legal and policy constraints. ‘U.S. intervention with Iraq's
Arab contributors seems likely to be less effective than what
Iraq-~as the bulwark against Khomeinism<-can do for itself as
wall as likely to detract from the approaches we continue to
make, especially to the Saudis, on behalf of other aid
recipients. . : :

Supporting Iraq in exporting more oil ia more promising.
The capacity of its pipeline across Turkey is being expanded by
about 25% by work to be completed late next spring. We have
told Turkey that we endorse the strong position it has taken
with Iran on the security of that line. Iraq is.working out
arrangenents, involving Americar firms, which will enable it to
build a pipeline that will connect to-the pipeline across Saudi
Arabia to the Red Sea. However, this link cannot be completed
before the end of 1984 at the earliest and, therefore, offers
no early relief. Promoting a security environment in which
Irag could fairly quickly (six months) restore some oi1 export
capacity (up to 500,000 b/d) from its. damaged facilities at the
head of.the Gulf would provide the most immediate effective
relief,’ although there are difficulties and uncertaintias -
associated with such a project. We have begun work in New York

on an approach through the, U.N. which would seek to exempt the
oil facilities and shipping of both combatants from further
attack. e
Additionally, we have encouraged the GCC states to try to "4
persuade Syria to reopen the 1.2° million b/d line across ‘ts AS ~\
territory. '
BI ks

dECRET/SENSTT CV" "

SECRET / SENSITIVE
inci

DIPLOMATIC: she secretary's meetings with Traqi Foreign
Minister Tariq Aziz have raised the level of visibility of our
dialogue with Iraq over the last year. In your recent meeting
with MPA Under Secretary Ismat Kittani, you told him directly
that Iraq's defeat by Iran would not be in the U.S. interest.
Contacts through Turkey have sought to reassure Iraq about the
sincerity of our interest in seeing an agreed end to the
fighting and our efforts to withhold U.S. military equipment

‘from both sides: this has been only partially successful.

_ To some extent, our expressions of concern to France and
others about the increased risk of escalation from delivery of
Super Etendard aircraft is regarded by Traq as having blocked
their being supplied, at least temporarily. This modestly
successful effort has caused Iraq to threaten to downgrade our
relations again. (There are current unconfirmed press reports
that the aircraft have left France for Iraq.) ,

The initiative we are fostering in the U.N. to discourage -
further attacks on oll-related facilities in the Gulf aims not:
only at enabling Iraq to meet its financial needs by increasing -
oil exports--thereby vitiating Iran's strategy of economic
strangulation and reducing the motivation for Iraq to escalate
the war-—but also at establishing an area of tacit agreement
between the parties on which an eventual ceasefire could be
built. This approach is subtle and fragile but promising,
provided that it offers benefits to Iran (such as enabling the
leaking wells to be capped and construction work on a
petrochemical complex at Aandar Khomeni to resume) backed by
the threat of severe Iraqi retaliation if Iran is the first to
attack oil facilities again.

Other actions we could take includes

(a) More explicit statements of support for the territorial
integrity of Iraq and the survival of its present government. ~
These would only confirm the Iranian regime's belief that Iraq
is an instrument of U.S. policy without having any positive
impact. Such statements would probably damage Saddam Hussein's
credibility among both internal and external supporters while
giving a propaganda opening to Syria.

(o) Intensified efforts to assure that U.S -~controlled
military items do not reach:

{1}. either combatant: We do not have evidence to
support the allegations of significant evasion of U.S. export

SECRET/SENSITIVE 3 i

SECRET/SENSITIVE
eo od

controls. Buc, as was recently done in the case of Korea, we
could strongly reaffirm to our friends our opposition to
provision of any U.S.-controlled equipment. This, we believe,
would have Limited military effect, but it would demonstrate to
Iraq the seriousness of our effort to keep U.S. arms out of the
conflict.

(2) Iran only: This approach would reduce the force
of our argument while doing little for Iraq, which does not
have U.S. arms in its aayenrory and has ready access to
alternative suppliers.

MILITARY: There are other possible actions which ‘could be taken,
to seek to affect the military balance:

{a) Seek to discourage the supply of critical equipment: tio
Iran. While difficult to carry out because of the sensitive
nature of some of the information which might have to be
revealed in a determined effort and because we have orily moral
suasion to counter commercial incentive, such action, if
successfnl, would have some medium-term effect on Iran*s attack
capabilities. However, we.could not influence Iran‘s main .
supplier which is North Korea.

(b) Permit U.S e“controlled equipment -to reach Hebe through
third parties. (This assumes insufficent .domestic support to
be able to supply U.S. equipment directly.) New sources or
types of military equipment are not needed by Iraq- Moreover,
the types cf equipment we could supply would be restricted by
legal requirements, such as the prohibition on supplying arms
through a third party which we cannot supply directly. Also,
we would expect sharp resistance in Congress to establishment
of any kind of arms sale relationship with Iraq. An openly
partisian position on arms supply would reduce our ability to
provide Yeadership on initiatives~~-such as the current UN
approach*+-to try to limit and stop the Fighting.

(c) We do not consider the commitment of U.S. forces to
defend Iraq a serious possibility and, therefore, raise only
the prospect of U.S. participation in multilateral protection
of Iraqi oil export operations. (Unilateral U.S. action would
encounter go much greater palitical opposition and risk that we
consider it also to be infeasible.) If Iran were to attack
Iraqi oil installations in the Gulf again, the U.S.~-in

DSECPFI/SENSTIIT=A TS

conjunction with its friends and allies--could help Iraq defend
its oil export operations. The way in which we approach such a
commmitment would be important in determining whether we were
entering into a state of war with Iran--with the domestic and
international political burdens that would imply. It would
have to be done in the context of keeping the Gulf open for
‘international oi1 shipments generally rather than characterized
as an effort to protect only Iraqi oil exports. Also, before
taking any military actions, we would need first to take a
number of political and diplomatic steps to, establish a firm
case that we had taken every possible peaceful measure to help
resume the oil flow before we moved on to more serious military
options. UN, GCC and US/Allied actions/statements supporting
Ereedom of navigation in the Gulf could help to create a more
favorable climate. The US willingness to take firm action
would reassure the Gulf states of our support for their
security. Such a step should also improve: US-Iraqi relations,
contribute to a further moderation of Iraqi, policies and begin
ee of restoring Irag as a counterweight to Syrian -
influence.

There are some serious risks, however, associated with such
action, many of which would depend on the extent of US
involvement: le!

-- Direct 0.S. and multinational military support
for Iraq could provoke greater escalation by Iran
and further defer any improvement in our

. relations in the post~-Khomeini period. (We would
be in a position which may make direct attacks on
Iran necessary to defend Iraqi facilities.) The
more active the tilt, the more predictable the
response. :

e- No matter how we attempt to portray our actions

*. as having the general aim of keeping the Gulf.
open for oil shipments, they will be seen as
specifically supporting Iraq in its war with Iran.

-- As a practical matter, it may be very difficult
i£ not impossible, to obtain Allied and Gulf
state participation in an active defense, though
the French are likely to be willing to provide
equipment and advisors. Nonetheless,

SECRET /SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE
2 -7=

protractec celense of Iraqi vis shipments would
require staging areas in the northern Gulf and g
the active assistance and support of Saudi Arabia }
and the shaikhdoms. I~

-- Defense of Iraqi oil facilities, even with active
measures, cannot be guaranteed and would he
difficult to sustain, militarily and financially,
in light of numerous other worldwide military
commitments. 4

=~ Congressional and public gapoore for an overt
tilt to Iraq would be difficult to obtain.

~- Israel and Syria would.object strongly to any US .
military action to assist Iraq.

rs
-

ASSESSMENT

Our policy of strict neutrality. has siveuay been modified,
except for arms sales, since Iran*s forces’ crossed into Iraq in .
the summer of 1982. The steps we have taken toward the
conflict since then have progressively favored Iraq. (We
assume that other actions not discussed here, such as providing
tactical intelligence, would continue as necessary.)

te belleve there would be a net advantage to sucking more
actively to restrict, so far as possible, all U.S.-controlled
equipment transfers to both parties (which would have little or
no effect on military’ capabilities but would strengthen our
credibility. with the Iraqi regime) and also acting to
discourage shipment to Iran of critical equipment from
non-communist sources. Other military or quasi-military
options have more disadvantages than advantages. Moreover, we
need to continue to be cautious about tilting so far toward
Iraq that either Iraq is able to force a level of U.S. support
we may not wish to provide (such as military protection of
transport in the Gulf) or that we become identified with a :
‘gegime whose longer-term political prospects remain uncertain.
Consequently, we propose that you authorize, by further

‘SECROT/SLNST11VE

a tT A LT LLL TL TER

SECRET/SENSITIVE
; ee:

instructions to us, appicaches to govecnmertc which have CHAS
transferred U.S.-contro? led equignenc co Iran or iraq, or might
a0 $0.

in addition, the qualified tilt which we have in fact.
Practiced for over d year .s8 «gain being wratcheted one Aotch
higher through the UN approach we are pursuing to assist Iraq
to resume oil exports through the Gulf. It balances our
interest in seeing that Iraq is not defeated with our interest
in avoiding ‘an escalation which could’ draw us directly into the
conflict -—- while doing nothing to worsen our position with
respect to Iran.
More broadly, we see significant advantage in maintaining
an overall posture of neutrality. What we propose here would
be within such broad limits. However, this further tilt toward
Iraq would, we believe, have the following political effects in |
the region:

~~ further improve our bilateral relations with Iraq
and encourage its non~alignment;

-- | Wg

-- support our objective cf avoiding Iraq's collapse ° '
: before revolutionary Iran without going so far as
fa to alarm Israel. ‘

This paper-only reviews the issue of tilting toward Iraq.
An inter-agency working group is currently reviewing U.S.
response options should Iran threaten an attempt to close the a
-<Gulf and near-term measures which might be taken to deter such
events.

ene

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SECRET/SENSITIVE
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